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“We will topple this regime, created on the back of the protest law” 
 
(Mahiennour el-Massry, 2014) 
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By adopting Social Movement Theories (SMT) as a basic framework to analyse the 
2011 uprisings in the Middle East, I disentangle the role of alternative networks and 
other forms of political conflict in reference to the Egyptian case in mobilising and 
forming a potential revolutionary movement. However, the intervention of the 
military junta, on the one hand, did not allow the proto-movement to develop into a 
revolution and, on the other hand, hindered the fulfilment of demands for “Social 
Justice” coming from the people.  
 
This dissertation aims to test the hypothesis of how during the Egyptian 2011 
uprisings the encounter in public spaces of more organised political oppositionists 
with other anti-regime elements demobilised the social movements associated with 
the so-called “Arab Spring”. Through participatory methods, the research hypothesis 
of this dissertation will be tested with reference to field work research involving 
Popular Committees and independent trade unions in two areas of Cairo and 
Mahalla al-Kubra. Driving factors for the differential impact of state repression and 
Political Islam on mobilisation will be identified through the analysis of the two in-
depth case studies and, in a comparative perspective, with similar forms of political 
conflict in other Middle Eastern countries. Semi-structured interviews and 
participatory research will be used in order to conduct the analysis. 
 
In this dissertation, I argue that during the 2011 uprisings in Egypt the Muslim 
Brotherhood monopolised the space of dissent preventing the formation of 
common identities among the protesters. Especially social actors in the “Egyptian 
Street” (e.g. independent trade unions and Popular Committees) and other 
opposition groups (Liberals, Socialists, Leftists, anarchists) did not find any place 
within the post-uprisings government and finally have been demobilised by the 
politics and political discourse of a pseudo Neo-Nasserism, implemented by the 




My case studies will show the effects of political mobilisation and military repression 
on Egyptian civil society, especially at the levels of workers' movements and Popular 
Committees. I will try to verify if this derived from a low ideological and structural 
integration between Islamists and Leftist political groups or from other reasons 
(state-society relations, army control over economy, youth disengagement, etc.). 
 
The final sections of the research broadens the perspective and addresses the 
implications of the findings on the workings of Popular Committees in other contexts 
in the Middle East and on the more general question raised in terms of 
democratisation; more specifically, I discuss to what extent the effectiveness of 
Political Islam in activating the social proto-movement might be replaced by more 
organised oppositional forces oriented towards social and workers’ rights. 
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The overthrow of the authoritarian regimes in Tunisia and Egypt is the most 
important achievement of the 2011 Arab Uprisings. At first the media and academic 
accounts presented the protests as a revolution occurring in a limited space – a 
Square - and lasting a couple of weeks. Later, some academic works (Achcar, 
Alexander, and della Porta)1 highlighted that the movement was the result of a 
longstanding social struggle where ordinary people were a central trigger of the 
grassroots protests. This dissertation tries to draw upon this approach narrowing the 
gap between Social Movement Theories (SMT) and the actual flow of events during 
the 2011 uprisings in the Middle East. As we will discuss in this dissertation, from the 
Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT) to the Egyptian workers' movements, from 
the People's Democratic Party (HDP) in Turkey to the democratic autonomy, 
theorised by Abdullah Öcalan and put in practice in Syrian Kurdistan, the 2011 
uprisings did not only open the Pandora's box of Political Islam in the Middle East 
but also facilitated many other oppositional movements.  
 
This research will be focused on the Egyptian case. Here the Muslim Brotherhood 
monopolised the public and political space after the 18 days of protests in Tahrir 
Square. Likewise, the army control over the different oppositional movements had a 
specific influence on the initial democratic transition. In other words, from the 
removal of Mubarak (2011) until the 2013 military coup, the army worked to isolate 
the political actors and divide and demobilise the proto-movement. This strategy 
prevented the further development of the uprisings and enabled the resurgence of 
the “Deep State” and, along with it, of more or less organised waves of terrorism2 
and an unprecedented state crackdown on dissent and political participation. This 
fully blocked the demonstrations and a potential transformation of the uprisings 
into a revolution and a possible reshaping of atomised individuals into a collectivity3. 
 
                                                             
1 Achcar, G., The People Want. A Radical Exploration of the Arab Uprising, Saqi Books, 2013. 
2 Filiu, J. P., From Deep State to Islamic State. The Arab Counter-Revolution and its Jihadi 
Legacy, Hurst Publishers, 2014. 
3 Achcar, G. The People Want, pp. 158-159. 
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Firstly, I will show the important, pivotal role, of street movements in the recent 
events (2011-2012). If there are many studies of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi 
groups and the effects of the infitah policies at different levels on Egyptian society 
and the security apparatus, still a great deal needs to be done for a better 
understanding of other social groups, often misrepresented by the mainstream 
media: social and workers’ movements, alternative networks and street politics, 
leftists and anarchist activists and their relations with more structured groups and 
the workings of the state.  
 
Furthermore, this dissertation will seek to demonstrate that, in the Egyptian case, if, 
at the very beginning, the encounter with the Muslim Brotherhood’s activists 
increased the potential for a revolutionary movement, later, it disrupted the agency 
and demands of the social actors in the streets. Eventually, it might be argued that 
the threat of, and then the intervention by, the army altered the demands coming 
from the street. Moreover, the precipitous electoral process may have hindered the 
revolutionary potential and undermined the saliency of the demands of street 
activists.  
 
This research will try to disentangle, in a potentially revolutionary but still 
authoritarian context, the dynamics of mobilisation and demobilisation in two 
Egyptian neighbourhoods during and after the 2011 uprisings. In the first part, in 
Chapters 2 and 3, I will answer to the questions: how did the social proto-
movements mobilise and interact with more established political parties? How did 
the state react to the protests in order to demobilise the oppositional movements? 
What has been the place of “Bread, Freedom and Social Justice” among the 
demands of the demonstrators? In the second part, in Chapters 4 and 5, I will 
answer the questions: to what extent did the encounter in urban and peripheral 
neighbourhoods between non-organised groups and more defined political 
movements affect the workers' proto-movement and the Egyptian civil society? How 
did the Popular Committees and Independent Trade Unions work, and did their 
operations evolve when the popular unrest ended? In the third part, in Chapters 6 
and 7, I will focus on the commonalities between the Egyptian case and the recent 
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upheaval in other countries, especially in reference to leftist oppositional 
movements. 
 
1.1 The Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes 
“The People want to overthrow the regime” was one of the most symbolic slogans 
of the recent protests in the Middle East4. In December 2010 a street vendor in 
Tunisia set himself on fire. In a few days, widespread demonstrations led to the end 
of Ben Ali's regime. On January 25 2011 a demonstration in solidarity with the 
Tunisian movement took place in Cairo, transforming Tahrir Square into a 
permanent encampment with hundreds of thousands of demonstrations asking for 
the end of Hosni Mubarak's regime. The reaction of the Egyptian army arrived three 
days later with tanks surrounding the protestors. In February and March 2011, 
protests of different sizes took place in Daraa, a province in the south of Syria, 
against the al-Assad regime; in Sanaa asking for the end of the Abdallah Saleh 
presidency in Yemen; some protests5 took place in Tripoli and Benghazi against the 
arbitrary practices of the Libyan Colonel Muammar Gaddafi; demonstrations took 
place in Manama (Bahrain); a protest began in Azadi Square in Tehran (2011) and 
later on in Gezi Park in Istanbul (2013). Although these protests had different 
backgrounds, agencies, practices and targets, they took place in a context, firstly, of 
economic crisis and consolidated inequalities, secondly, the decline of the key 
ideologies6: revolutionary nationalism, Marxism-Leninism and Islamism, thirdly, of 
decline of representative democracy: and the rise of anti-austerity, anti-capitalist, 
anti-politics and occupy movements.    
 
As Hinnebusch argued,  
The challenge authoritarian regimes face is that once societies reach a 
certain level of social mobilisation regimes that do not accommodate 
demands for political participation risk they will take revolutionary forms 
                                                             
4 Achcar, G. The People Want, p. 13. 
5 Achcar, G. The People Want, p. 166. 
6 Bayat, A. The Arab Spring and its Surprises, Development and Change, Volume 44 Issue 
3, International Institute of Social Studies, 2013, p. 599. 
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unless otherwise contained by exceptional means such as ‘totalitarianism’. 
MENA states were in a middle range of modernisation where 
democratisation pressures were significant but could still seemingly be 
contained and indeed had been in the republics for decades, first by a 
generation of populist, more inclusive, forms of authoritarianism, later by 
post-populist ‘upgrading’. Modernisation theories locate the roots of the 
uprisings in a growing imbalance between social mobilisation and political 
incorporation.7 
 
After six years of mobilisation and demobilisation, included a limited period of 
“Islamic Awakening”, army repressions, foreign interventions and civil wars, the 
2011 social movements in North Africa and the Middle East (MENA), especially in 
reference to the Egyptian and the Tunisian cases, can be defined as uprisings8.  
 
As Badiou states, in Egypt and Tunisia in 2011, “The inexistent has arisen. That is 
why we refer to uprising: people were lying down, submissive; they are getting up, 
picking themselves up, rising up. This rising is the rising of existence itself: the poor 
have not become rich; people who were unarmed are not now armed, and so forth. 
Basically nothing changed. What has occurred is restitution of the existence of the 
inexistent”9.  
 
Thus, considering the noted role of street politics as a means of mass mobilisation, I 
will describe the Egyptian oppositional forces as non-movements. As Bayat10 states, 
“Non-movements refer to the collective actions of non-collective actors; they 
embody shared practices of large numbers of ordinary people whose fragmented 
but similar activities trigger much social change, even though these practices are 
rarely guided by an ideology or recognizable leaderships and organisations”. 
                                                             
7 Hinnebusch, R. 'Introduction: understanding the consequences of the Arab uprisings – 
starting points and divergent trajectories', Democratization, Vol. 22 (2), March 2015, p. 208. 
8 Achcar, G. The People Want, p. 14. 
9 Badiou, A. The Rebirth of History. Times of Riots and Uprisings, London, Verso, 2012, p. 56. 
10 Bayat, A. Life as Politics, How Ordinary People Change the Middle East, Palo Alto, CA: 




Figure I shows the proto-movement in a demonstration in Talaat Harb Square on 
January 28 201111. 




The first question we might raise: did this multifaceted proto-movement develop 
into a revolutionary movement? The life and death of the revolutionary process is 
central to this research. As Skocpol12 highlighted, a revolution can be triggered by 
the spread of inequalities. Thus, street protests reinforce the vulnerability of the 
regime by showing the weakness of the state. Moreover, a social movement can 
grow when rising economic expectations encounter an economic slow-down or 
austerity13. However, these factors may not be sufficient for accounting for the 
emergence of social movements that play a role in revolutions. As Dunn14 argued, it 
                                                             
11 Photograph by Nabil Farag.  
12 Skocpol, T. Social Revolutions in the Modern World, Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 1994. 
13 Davies, J. C. When Men Revolt and Why, London, Transaction, 1971. 
14 Dunn, J. Modern revolutions: an introduction to the analysis of a political phenomenon, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. 
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is still vital to focus on what is being attempted and what is actually achieved by 
movements. In other words, a revolution can best be defined in retrospect. With 
references to the aforementioned literature, the 2011-2012 uprisings in Egypt would 
be described as social non-movements. Egyptian society was deeply divided by 
glaring social inequalities15. Moreover, as a result of policies of economic 
liberalisation (infitah), the lower strata of the population were affected by the 
retreat of the state as a distributor of social and economic goods and a sudden 
increase in vegetable prices in the urban markets in the wake of the 2008 global 
economic crisis16 and in the months before the 2011 uprisings17.  
 
1.1.1 Islamists and Dissent in Authoritarian Regimes  
The monopolisation of political dissent by Islamist groups is a common feature of 
many Arab and Middle Eastern countries. James Scott, in Weapons of the Weak18, 
explained how Islamists monopolised the space of dissent in the village of Sadaka. 
As Bayat19 notes, a reference to Scott's ethnographic studies focusing on individual 
reactions of peasants, along with Foucault's decentred notion of power and the 
revival of the concept of Neo-Gramscian hegemony can serve to enhance a “micro-
politics” perspective on social movements.  
 
Placing these approaches in the context of the Egyptian proto-movement (2010-
2012), I would argue that not only did the Islamists monopolise the opposition 
movements in the pre-revolutionary phase but, during the uprisings, they 
manipulated street movements and lesser organised entities in order to use and 
then deactivate their revolutionary potential.  
 
Thus, this dissertation seeks to explain how the proto-movement, its internal 
relations and with the activities of the state (e.g. ruling and military elites), evolved 
                                                             
15 Achcar, G. The People Want, pp. 26-39. 
16 Hanieh, A. Lineages of Revolt, Issues of Contemporary Capitalism in the Middle East, 
Haymarket Books, Chicago, Illinois, 2013, p.2. 
17 Achcar, G. The People Want, pp. 27 and 32. 
18 Scott, J. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1990. 
19 Bayat, A. Life as Politics, p. 51. 
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before the 2011 uprisings, during the Islamist monopolisation of power (2012-2013) 
and after the 2013 military coup. 
 
In order to disentangle the role of dissent in the context of authoritarian regimes in 
the Middle East, I will draw upon the work of Timothy Mitchell20. Mitchell’s 
assertion that the blurred relations between state and society are used to produce 
and reproduce the power of the former can be shown to be relevant for 
understanding the politics of the Egyptian state. For these reasons, if, in the 1990s, 
the state was extensively disengaged from offering public services, the level of 
participation in informal networks increased. More specifically, this practice has 
been brought about by the exploitation of political dissent and then through political 
control of civil society21.  
 
Michel Foucault22 described power as the reproduction of a two-dimensional reality 
(structure vs. practice). This, he argued, determined the formation of a culture of 
the state as a means of control civil society. Both Mitchell and Foucault's approaches 
are very useful to explain the evolution of state-society relations in modern Egypt. 
 
1.1.2 The “Deep State” and Infitah Policies 
We cannot discuss the state reaction to the 2011 uprisings, if we do not describe the 
workings of capitalism in Egypt23. President Anwar al-Sadat started the “open door” 
policies or the economic liberalisation (infitah) in the mid-1970s, on the pattern of 
the Nasser’s failure and, reinvigorated by Hosni Mubarak, in 1980s and 1990s, 
transformed the state from developmental to managerial24. This was not the 
consequence of the crisis of the state but a change in the “strategy of the elite” or a 
                                                             
20 Mitchell, T. 'Everyday Metaphors of Power', Theory and Strategy, Springer, Vol. 19, No. 5, 
(Oct. 1990), pp. 545-577. 
21 Mitchell, T. Colonising Egypt, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1991. 
22 Foucault, M. Discipline and Punish., New York, Pantheon, 1977. 
23 Luciani, G. 'Linking Economic and Political Reform in the Middle East'. In Schlumberger, O. 
(ed.). Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007, p. 163. 
24 Owen, R. in Hakimian, H and Moshaver, Z. (eds.) The State and Global Change: The 
Political Economy of Transition in the Middle East and North Africa , Richmond, Curzon, 
2001, pp. 234-237. 
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“structural adjustment”25 for its own survival. Those policies demonstrated the 
resilience of the state and the army and entailed widespread privatisation (e.g. 
tourism and agriculture sectors), the separation of the ownership of the industries 
from the management, corresponding to the creation of joint ventures with foreign 
private capital26. Later on, Sadat’s successor, Hosni Mubarak, paved the way for 
unequal growth based on the reduction of the public sector workforce, and cuts to 
food and transportation subsides. 
 
During the three decades of the Mubarak's regime, the retreat of the state brought 
about new forms of crony capitalism27 enhancing the political power of business 
cliques. Waves of demonstrations (e.g. 1977, 1985, 2003, 2005, and 2008), related 
to prices increases, unemployment and economic stagnation, erupted in a context 
of political repression or co-optation.  
 
As Warkotsch argues, if “Gamal Abdel Nasser limited political liberties and 
participation while increasing economic incorporation, Sadat shifted this balance 
towards more participation for less economic incorporation”28, later Hosni Mubarak 
impoverished both lower and middle classes increasing repression “to a degree 
where it seemed arbitrary even to people not usually involved with the political 
sphere”. 
 
As della Porta29 highlights in this instance, “Political and economic power became in 
fact more intertwined under Mubarak, especially since the early 2000s. At the core 
of the regime, the people close to the President were in leading positions in the 
ruling NDP, including as ministers or personal advisers to the president [...] 
                                                             
25 Tripp, C. States, Elites and the Management, In: Hakimian, H. and Moshaver, Z. (eds.): The 
State and Global Change. The Political Economy of Transition in the Middle East and North 
Africa. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2001, p. 222. 
26 Ayubi, N. 'Etatisme versus Privatization: the changing economic role of the state in nine 
Arab countries'. In Handoussa, H. (ed.) Economic Transition in the Middle East, Cairo, 
American University Press, 1997, pp. 129-134. 
27 Achcar, G. The People Want, pp. 53-80. 
28 Warkotsch J. in Della Porta, D. Mobilizing for Democracy, Comparing 1989 and 2011, 
Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 187-188.  
29 Della Porta, D. Mobilizing for Democracy, p. 187. 
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Privatisation increased quickly from 2004 onwards, while there was instead a de-
liberalisation in the political sphere”.  
 
However, crony capitalism and the extremely unequal distribution of the wealth did 
not entail that Egypt, during the 2011 uprisings, was in a revolutionary crisis. As we 
shall further discuss, the resilience of the state institutions and the poorly structured 
social proto-movements never allowed a coherent change in the structure of power. 
 
1.1.3 The Protests before the 2011 Uprisings 
The uprisings have been described as a long-term revolutionary process30 starting 
long before the 2011's upheaval. For example in Egypt, the funds for subsidies 
dropped “from 14.5% of government expenditures in 1980-81 to 5.6% in 1996-97”31. 
The Egyptian government dropped the number of subsidised food items, reducing 
the portions and allowing the price of sugar and bread to rice32. 
 
As Hinnebusch33 highlights, the possibility to begin a proto-movement is already 
intrinsic within the workings of authoritarian regimes: 
Mobilisation requires not just grievances, but also a permissive opportunity 
structure in which societal opposition can overcome atomisation and 
combine for collective action. Where society is fragmented along identity 
lines, mass mobilisation is obstructed; in a homogeneous society shared 
identity facilitates it [...] Civil society was much more advanced in Egypt and 
Tunisia because the early onset of neo-liberalism had both necessitated 
greater tolerance for it and had also led to years of protest experience by 
activists that generated organisational skills and networks that would be 
crucial in the uprisings. 
 
In a preliminary stage, the cooperation between the Muslim Brotherhood, workers’ 
movements, street movements, leftists and other secular movements, prevented by 
                                                             
30 Achcar, G. The People Want, p. 17. 
31 Hanieh, A. Lineages of Revolt, p. 69. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Hinnebusch, R. Understanding the consequences of the Arab uprisings, p. 211.  
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Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar al-Sadat, had as a common target the fight against 
the arbitrary methods of the police that all these groups widely experienced long 
before the Tahrir Square occupation.  
 
Thus della Porta notes that “In the early 1970s, an Islamist student movement had 
been used by Sadat to counterbalance the Left. Initially apolitical, it had 
concentrated on Islamic book fairs, selling of Islamic clothes, provision of services to 
the community. Violence then started with clashes with left-wing students, and, in 
the words of an activist, 'this then evolved in the concept of changing the bad by the 
hand, which became essential to the movement' […] In the 1980s and 1990s, the 
repression of the Islamic movement brought about new waves of radicalisation, with 
splinter groups emerging from the Muslim Brotherhood”.34  
 
Between 2004 and 2006 a tactical alliance between Islamists and leftists gradually 
emerged. As we will see later, this “cooperative differentiation” between the 
opposition groups, as della Porta defines it, will be refreshed within the 2011 Tahrir 
proto-movement:     
In the many protests carried out between 2004 and 2006, alliances were 
built [...] There was even increasing cooperation between left-wingers and 
Islamists (even the MB), as well as Nasserists. There was certainly a long 
history of antagonism, fuelled when, in 1977, the Islamists supported 
Sadat's economic measures against the leftist protestors, accused of 
conspiracy, and in 1993 the Left reciprocated by supporting the Unified Law 
for syndicates, which targeted the growing influence of the Islamists. 
However, some cooperation at the grassroots had developed already in the 
1990s, with a major turning point in the 2000s, during the campaigns in 
support of the Palestinian Intifada. [...] Notwithstanding bitter divisions 
within and between each area, networks blossomed during waves of 
activism within the principle of cooperative differentiation, which meant 
                                                             
34 Della Porta, D. Mobilizing for democracy, p. 149.  
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working on the basis of consensus, avoiding divisive slogans, but also 
keeping independence.35 
 
Protests against the police broke out after the murder of the young activist Khaled 
Said in Alexandria (2010) by a police officer. The Facebook page in his memory, 
administered by a young engineer, Wael Ghonim, has been one the most important 
symbolic references of the anti-police movement that led to the 2011 uprisings. At 
that time, the overlapping political discourses of the Kifaya (Enough!) movement 
against the 2005 Mubarak sixth presidential candidacy and the struggles to stop the 
arbitrary methods of police officers, especially in poor neighbourhood, stimulating 
an anti-police, anti-Mubarak movement, were the core issues of the 2011 
demonstrations. 
   
Protests spread throughout the 2000s, in various waves including the pro-Palestine 
university mobilisations in 2000, protests against the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the 
movements in Kifaya in 2004, the march of the judges for independence of the 
judiciary system in 2006, and workers' protests beginning 2008. As el-Ghobashy 
notes, “The reality was that Egyptians had been practicing collective action for at 
least a decade, acquiring organisational experience in that very old form of politics: 
the street action. Egypt's streets had become parliaments, negotiating tables and 
battlegrounds rolled into one. To compel unresponsive officials to enact or revoke 
specific policies, citizens blocked major roads with tree branches and burning tires; 
organised sit-ins in factory plans and ministers”.36  
 
1.1.4 Democracy: Continuity and Change 
We have seen how in Egypt the 2011 proto-movement was rooted in a longstanding 
process of antagonism towards the activities of the state. Yet, an initial question 
must be raised as to whether the 2011 uprisings were about democracy or 
something else? Post-democratisation analyses have failed to explain the transition 
                                                             
35 Della Porta, D. Mobilizing for democracy, pp. 99-100. 
36 El-Ghobashy in Della Porta, D. Mobilizing for Democracy, p. 101 and also see El-Ghobashy, 
M. ‘The Praxis of the Egyptian Revolution’ Middle East Report 258 (Spring 2011), pp. 1-7. 
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processes taking place in the Middle East after the 2011 uprisings. As Teti argues37, 
this is primarily due to a failure to understand democracy as more than a neutral 
category framed in a liberal and narrowly procedural fashion. Thus, the post-
democratisation current has, on the contrary, transformed a contingent model of 
democracy, rooted and developed in the Western tradition, to explain what the 
archetype of democracy is38. 
 
As the activist Gehan Ibrahim explains in an interview for this dissertation: “Should 
we (the revolutionary forces after the 2013 military coup) fight again against the 
army, together with the Muslim Brothers? The army is implementing the counter-
revolution. However, our democracy should be better than the Western systems in 
which citizens are forced to choose among two candidates who do not represent the 
grassroots’ demands”39.  
 
It might be argued that the Egyptian case has little to do with a democratic 
transition even when compared to the Tunisian 2011 uprisings and the Iranian 
Revolution in 1979. In other words, it is true that the recent demonstrations in Egypt 
led to a transition, but this process is not bringing democracy to the country, but it 
transformed Egypt from an authoritarian to a military regime. Indeed, on the one 
hand, in Tunisia a progressive constitution (2014) has been approved with the 
agreement of secular and Islamist political forces. On the other hand, in post-
revolutionary Iran, a sentiment of anti-Americanism was forged, there are regular 
parliamentary and presidential elections, with high turn-outs, an electoral 
competition among chosen candidates and a strong civil society.  
 
Thus, a second question might be raised as were there in Egypt any sort of 
democratic outcomes, even liberal democratic ones, after the 2011 uprisings? In 
Egypt, to a certain extent, the Muslim Brotherhood and Dostur party had as their 
                                                             
37 Teti, A., Beyond Lies the Wub. Challenges of (Post)-Democratization, Middle East Critique. 
21 (1), 2012, p.7. 
38 Teti, A., 'Bridging the Gap: IR, Middle East Studies and the Disciplinary Politics of the Area 
Studies Controversy'. European Journal of International Relations. 13(1), 2007, p. 117. 
39 Interview 24. The full list of the interviewees is provided in the next section. 
24 
 
preliminary political aims, liberal democracy. We might quote here as examples 
Dostur's40 former leader, Mohamed el-Baradei, who called many times for a more 
democratic transitional process starting with the writing of a new constitution and 
the Muslim Brotherhood leaders who defended the elected president after the 2013 
military coup talking about political legitimacy determined by election results and 
non-violent methods of dissent. On the other hand, the demands, initially and 
equally coming from leftist and liberal opponents, in May 2013, for regime change 
from the Morsi presidency did not correspond to the army and other groups' wishes, 
which that had little to do with democracy or accountability. In this case, the 
National Salvation Front (NSF) and other opposition groups validated the decisions 
of the military junta, through the Tamarrod (Rebel) campaign. Some of these forces 
felt threatened by the winners of the 2012 presidential elections and argued they 
were not true and consistent democrats41. Thus they did not wait until the natural 
end of the four-year long presidential mandate, forgetting that the respect of 
electoral outcomes, even if these outcomes were unpalatable for the losers, is one 
of the central tenets of a liberal democracy and that would be very risky to resort to 
mass demonstrations which demanded the dissolution of parliament or the removal 
of the president. In doing so, they decided to act as a proxy of the military regime 
exactly as the Muslim Brotherhood previously did (2012-2013).  
 
It is true that, as Geddes stated, “the ends of authoritarian regimes are [...] 
problematic”42. Thus, in the case of Egypt, most of the literature on transitology 
appeared not applicable. Although experiencing periods of “critical disjunctures”43, 
as the 2011 uprisings have been, in which the traditional phases of continuity – that 
is, the self-reproduction of the existing order – are distracted and a window of 
opportunity to achieve different and diverse alternatives suddenly opened, the 
                                                             
40 In Arabic Dostur means Constitution indeed. 
41 Waterbury, J. 'Democracy without Democrats? The potential for political liberalization in 
the Middle East'. In: Ghassan Salamé (ed.): Democracy without democrats? The renewal of 
politics in the Muslim world. London: Tauris, 1994, pp. 23-48. 
42 Geddes, B. 'What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?’ Annual 
Review of Political Science (2), 1999, p. 29. 




Egyptian state was acting in continuity with its traditional methods of operation, 
especially after the 2013 military coup, eventually transforming the regime from the 
authoritarian to military variety, as we will discuss in Chapters 2 and 3. 
 
These moments of crisis are critical because, on the one hand, “coherent 
collectivities of state officials”44 can launch distinctive new state strategies, 
insulating themselves from dominant socioeconomic interests and pursuing their 
own goals (e.g. within the army, the judiciary, the Interior Ministry, the Foreign 
Affairs Ministry, etc.). On the other hand, if today the Egyptian authorities do not 
follow democratic processes and thus leaving a broad space to continual internal 
coups and conspiracies, the political oppositions are still shaped and rooted in same 
arbitrary methods. Thus, all the political groups never abandoned their specific 
political objectives with the aim to build-up more inclusive identities forging in a 
more consistent discourse of democratic transition.  
 
Drawing on the fragmentation of the protesters, the army and its closely allied 
paramilitary groups spread a general fear of disorder in local neighbourhoods in 
order to discredit and alter the street movements. As Mitchell has argued in a more 
general theoretical frame, the control of the state over civil society is reproduced 
through such clandestine top-down forms of manipulation, which allows a type of 
constant but ineffective dissent that does not threaten the status quo. In the 
Egyptian context, these strategies have been implemented by the military with the 
use of a variety of methods: nationalist rhetoric, the employing of criminals, the 
closure of streets surrounding public institutions and the provoking of sectarian 
clashes.  
 
As we will see in Chapters 2 and 3, in order to deactivate the revolutionary potential 
of neighbourhood street movements, monopolised and manipulated by the Muslim 
Brotherhood, a bitter struggle arose between the state and ordinary citizens. 
                                                             
44 Skocpol, T. 'Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research'. In 
Evans, P. Rueschemeyer D. & Skocpol T. (eds.).Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge: 




Rapidly-called elections deactivated alternative social movements, returning them 
to the marginal positions they had been in before the uprising began. When the 
Islamists abandoned the street social movements, their continued occupation of 
public spaces lost its revolutionary saliency. Henceforth, the images and narratives 
of the street movements were dominated by the interpretations offered by state 
television and marginalised by the logic of electioneering in preparation for the 
struggle at the polls. The street social movements lost their initiative and the control 
of their narratives.  
 
1.2 Methodology and Ethical Issues 
This research will provide an overview of alternative networks and their mobilisation 
in the public space during and after the Egyptian 2011 uprisings with the specific aim 
of disentangling the activation and ban of Popular Committees and Independent 
Trade Unions. The methodology adopted has three components: 
 
1) Literature review   
 
This will be assessed in detail in Chapters 2 and 3 where I tackle the Egyptian 2011 
uprisings, and the consequent political repression and also discuss the ideology of 
the new social movements where I apply the literature concerning SMT and NSMs 
theories (Abdelrahman, Alexander and Bassiouny, della Porta and Diani, Gelvin, 
Owen, Tripp) to the Egyptian case. 
 
2) Semi-structured interviews 
 
The 58 interviewees are prominent experts, activists and stakeholders engaged in 
the study of the Egyptian and Middle Eastern uprisings or directly active in the 
protests45. The information collected through the interviews and combination of the 
literature review allows for a comprehensive understanding of the so-called “Arab 
Spring” with specific reference to the consequences of the encounter in the public 
space between more and less organised social actors during the 2011 uprisings and 
                                                             
45 The questionaire used for the semi-structured interviews is attached as Appendix 1. 
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the 2013 military coup in Egypt. The first aim of this dissertation is to tackle the 
reasons why the unrest did not succeed or lead to a revolution as happened, for 
instance, in Iran in 1979. This is vital for the later discussion in my case studies of the 
dynamics of Popular Committees and independent trade unions throughout the 
revolutionary process. 
 
The semi-structured interviews are problem-centered with the aim to define the 
targets of protests and the levels of repression, to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
strategies of the political activists and the repressive methods of the state 
institutions, and to describe the specific needs and demands of the movement, with 
reference to workers' movements and “Social Justice”. They will also illustrate the  
structural and social factors influencing strategies of repression and antagonism and 
thus to derive a definition of the 2011 uprisings while highlighting examples of 
strengthened Egyptian and Middle Eastern activism in civil society and trade unions. 
The empirical research will involve Egyptian activists (e.g. Revolutionary Socialists, 
Socialist Alliance, and Young Islamists), intellectuals and economists (e.g. professors, 
writers, and bloggers), stakeholders and trade unionists, workers and ordinary 
citizens, army and police officers46. Table I shows the numbers of interviewees per 
relevant entity.  
                                                             
46 The interviews took place during the years in which this research has been conducted 
(2013-2016) in Cairo, Alexandria, Suez, London, Kobane, Mahalla al-Kubra, Diyarbakir, 
Milan, Rome and Paris; in Arabic, English or Egyptian dialect. This is the full list of the 
interviewees: 1) Hossam al-Hamalawy, Revolutionary Socialists and workers movement 
activist (English); 2) Professor Sami Zubaida, Birkbeck University (London); 3) Ammar Abo 
Bakr, graffiti maker and activist (English); 4) Ahdaf Soueif, writer (English); 5) Jihad al-
Haddad, Muslim Brother optician (English); 6) Samir Amin, economist and director of the 
Third World Forum of Dakar (English); 7) Sonallah Ibrahim, writer and activist of the 
Socialist Alliance (English); 8) Ahmed, a young soldier who entered Tahrir Square on  
January 20 (Egyptian dialect); 9) Khaled, conscript at the Ayn Shamps’ barracks (Egyptian 
dialect); 10) a Port Said policemen (Egyptian dialect); 11) Wael Abbas, blogger and activist 
(English); 12) Professor Roger Owen, Harvard University; 13) Mohammed, a young soldier 
of Suez (Egyptian dialect); 14) Joel Beinin, Professor of History, Stanford University; 15) 
Moneim Abul Fotuh, politician and presidential candidate (Arabic); 16) Mahiennur el-
Massry, Revolutionary Socialists and lawyer (English); 17) Alaa al-Aswani, writer (English); 
18) Khaled Ali, political activist and presidential candidate (English); 19) Hamdin Sabbahi, 
politician and presidential candidate (English); 20) Ramy Sabri, Socialist political activist 
(Arabic); 21) Alaa Abdel Fattah, Socialist activist and blogger (English); 22) Ahmed Foad 




Table I: Number of Interviewees per Type of Relevant Institution: 
Egyptian and Tunisian activists 10 
Unionists 4 
Turkish MPs 2 
Experts and Economists 8 
Workers, fighters and ordinary citizens 
involved in Popular Committees 
29 
Soldiers, commanders and police officers 5 
Total 58 
 
All of these activists, experts and stakeholders operate at the national and local 
level. They have been selected based on their specific experience in participating in 
public protests, for their alternative approach towards social resistance or social 
movements, or for their social engagement in innovative practices.  
 
As for the methodology in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, I employ an extensive use of focus 
groups:  
 
3) Participatory research 
 
In this dissertation participatory research is conducted, composed by three focus 
groups47 with a number of slots with collective discussions and interviews with 30 
target activists and ordinary citizens. In an initial stage, activists and trade union 
representatives were involved in Sayeda Zeinab48, Mahalla al-Kubra49 and Kobane. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Mubarak Centre (English); 24) Gehan Ibrahim, Revolutionary Socialists activist (English); 25) 
Zaid al-Ali, constitutional lawyer, International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (English); 26) Omeya Seddik, head of the NGO  al-Muqaddima; 27) Ziya Pir, HDP 
(English); 28) Figen Yuksekgad, HDP (English). 
47 See Frisina, A. Focus groups, A Practical Guide, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2010. The participatory 
research can motivate citizens and workers to describe their discrimination, experiences 
within the movements and repertoire of actions. This is facilitated by the involvement of 
social workers. 
48 The questionaire used for the first focus group is attached as Appendix 2. 
49 The questionaire used for the second focus goup is attached as Appendix 3. 
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They provided a general framework of the Popular Committees, independent unions' 
targets and YPG/YPJ units in reference to their present level of mobilisation in a 
context of political repression or war. These professionals facilitated the contacts 
with the grassroots activists that were involved in a later stage. Table II shows the 
three case studies and the number of people involved in the process: 
 
Table II: Number of Interviewees per Case Study 
Case 1 – Popular Committees in 
Sayeda Zeinab, seven 
participants. 
1 Focus group with seven youngsters and 
ordinary people active during the 
upheaval. 
Case 2 – Egyptian Federation of 
Independent Trade Unions in 
Mahalla al-Kubra, nine 
participants. 
2 Trade unionists; one focus group with 
seven workers involved in the workers’ 
proto-movement. 
Case 3 – Popular Committees in 
other Middle Eastern contexts, 14 
participants. 
2 Ypg-Ypj commanders; 12 young fighters 
in Kurdistan. 
 
The testimonies offered insights and perspectives for the ethnography of the 2011 
uprisings in the Egyptian urban and peripheral neighborhoods as well as the 
evolution of Popular Committees in the Rojava Canton. However, the insights 
obtained from the participants within the focus groups refer to those specific case 
studies and cannot be used to support generalisations about the 2011-2016 events 
in Egypt as they are discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. 
 
As for the first focus group, after a first meeting with an ECESR gatekeeper, Ahmed50, 
in the case of the Popular Committees, a snowball method has been utilised in order 
to involve the other participants within the same Popular Committee in Berqet Fil 
Street. In order to select the participants within the Popular Commitees in Sayeda 
Zeinab, the primary data source suggested other potential sources useful for the 
                                                             
50 A full list of the interviewees, their age and current job status is provided in Chapter 4. 
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research. In other words, the composition of this focus group has been based on 
contacts from initial members active in the local Committees to additional 
participants via chain referral. 
 
Initially, in the three case studies, I interviewed the gatekeepers working as NGO 
activists, trade unionists or soldiers. They formed part of the process for the 
composition and organisation of the focus groups. The focus groups were organised 
with a specific aim of understanding the workings of Popular Committees and 
independent trade unions in two chosen neighborhoods, levels of mobilisation 
within the social movements, cooperation between the oppositional groups, 
personal changes in political participation of specific activists after the 2013 military 
coup, narratives of the 2011 uprisings and its aftermath, relations with state 
agencies, political parties and the Muslim Brotherhood, targets and strategies of 
these organizations, comparisons with other grassroots' mobilisations in the region. 
At the end of each meeting we had a debriefing session with the gatekeepers 
involved in order to talk about the group dynamics and the relevant results for their 
activities. 
 
1.2.1 Ethical Issues 
There are several potential complications in this field work. First, there is the 
problem of the current political repression in Egypt. Second, there is the issue of 
accessing citizens and their activities via the gatekeepers.  
 
For our participatory research, specific ethical procedural requirements were taken 
into account. Policy analysis and an understanding of the current context of 
repression was not suggested or reminded to the interviewees. We guaranteed that 
every individual in each group participated actively, and that he/she had their voice 
heard. Every participant within the focus groups filled a sheet with general personal 
informations51. All the interviewees, involved both in semi-structured interviews and 
                                                             
51 See Appendix 4. 
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focus groups, received informations about the research and gave an oral consent to 
be quoted in the dissertation52.  
 
During the focus groups, we sought to avoid scepticism or dissent. We explained to 
participants that the research could be done anonymously, if necessary. We 
highlighted that all the youngsters involved in the focus groups should never feel 
judged, and were free to answer or refuse to answer questions. 
 
The links with the local NGOs (namely ECESR, the local Mahalla al-Kubra's trade 
unions and YPG/YPJ's units) and the support I have received from them might have 
been problematic when dealing with some groups or individuals. Most of the 
activists, fighters and ordinary citizens who took part in the process received some 
kind of support from the association gatekeepers and social workers, employed in 
the NGOs, who helped us, as facilitators, in forming and organising the focus groups.  
 
It is true that the some interviewees wanted to avoid criticism of their respective 
associations. However, at an initial stage, especially for the Mahalla al-Kubra and the 
Kobane's focus groups, the presence of these facilitators during the research process 
helped the selection of the interviewees, the discussion and generally the voice of 
the activists involved in the research was neither mediated nor ignored due to their 
presence. I never contrasted the opinions of the facilitators.  
 
In a later stage, during the meetings when the personal information sheets have 
been distributed among the interviewees, the gatekeepers did not directly take part 
in the focus groups, this is the case of both the independent trade unions and 
YPG/YPJ's case studies. As for the Sayed Zeinab case study, the ECESR's activist who 
initially took part within the Popular Committees did not participate in the discussion 
with the other components of the focus group. In other words, the gatekeepers and 
their political affiliation did not influence the discussions with the selected 
interviewees. 
                                                             




Especially, the fieldwork research in Egypt was informed by data collected on the 
ground during a series of visits to Cairo, and by interviews carried out with activists, 
namely downtown Cairo’s street vendors, and residents of the Sayeda Zeinab 
district, who were active in Popular Committees during the uprisings.  
 
As for the risks faced by the researcher, there have been several complex situations 
that I had to manage. For example, this happened in May 2015. I remember one 
day, we were coming back home from Mahalla to Cairo by microbus. I was 
discussing with a colleague about the day spent with the activists. In the course of 
this I referred to Shaimaa el-Sabbagh by name. She was an Egyptian activist and 
poet killed close to Talaat Harb Square by the police on January 25, 2015. On arrival 
in Cairo, the driver told a policeman that we were talking politics and he duly set off 
after us. Luckily, we had just enough time to get the first available taxi out of there. 
 
In July 2014, during one of the meetings for the second focus group, when I left the 
microbus that had brought me from Cairo to Mahalla al-Kubra, the driver looked at 
me with some suspicion and asked me where I was heading to. No sooner had I 
found a place to sleep downtown that I became aware that the local branch of the 
Amn el-Dawla was constantly monitoring me. After having been informed about my 
presence by the hotel owner, scared by my foreign passport, they paid visits to my 
room very early in the morning and again in the afternoon, always asking questions. 
I always tried to be obliging and to talk in Arabic as much as I could. 
 
Finally, the third focus group has been informed by data collected in Northern Syria 
(Rojava) in 2015. After conducting the fieldwork research, I was arrested at the 
border on my way back to Turkey after the interviews with YPG-YPJ fighters, 
together with other foreigners53. In the end we were expelled by the Turkish 
authorities after two days of detention. It is evident that it is one of their priorities 
to prevent any kind of coverage and research centred on what is happening in 
                                                             
53 See also https://bianet.org/english/freedom-of-expression/165514-three-italian-and-a-
french-journalist-deported. Last time accessed 01/03/2017. 
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Rojava and the Kurdish areas of Turkey. 
 
1.3 Case Selection and Research Design 
In this section, I introduce by selection of case studies. The two areas of Sayeda 
Zeinab and Mahalla al-Kubra were chosen to carry out the participatory research 
and the focus groups examining the Popular Committees and independent trade 
unions. An explanation is required to explain why these areas are especially relevant 
for studying the Egyptian 2011 uprisings.  
 
As Alexander and Bassiouny explained “the key battles of the uprising were fought 
not in Tahrir but in the suburbs”54. Cairo had been the vital centre of the Egyptian 
2011 uprisings. The great Egyptian city and Tahrir Square specifically had been in the 
spotlight of the world’s mainstream TV cameras for weeks. However, this not to say 
that there were no other sites of demonstrations and protests in the town' outskirts 
and other parts of the country, such as, in Alexandria, where many political and 
workers' activists originated; Minya and Giza, in other areas of Cairo, were centres 
of the Muslim Brotherhood mobilisation especially after the 2013 military coup; 
while Suez and Port Said also witnessed army and workers engage in pitched battles.  
 
In this research I will be focusing both on a central district of Cairo (Sayeda Zeinab) 
and a peripheral area (Mahalla al-Kubra) in the Nile Delta.  
 
1.3.1 Sayeda Zeinab 
There are many reasons why Sayeda Zeinab is especially central for a better 
understanding of the dynamics governing the social proto-movements within the 
public space during the protests and its aftermath. Sayeda Zeinab is a middle class 
and socially mixed area, very densely populated, with some informal settlements 
(e.g. Abu Riche), and it is 15 minutes' walk from Tahrir Square. Moreover in 
Mohammed Mahmud Street serious clashes between political activists and security 
forces occurred. This place is vital for the understanding of the 2011 uprisings 
                                                             
54 Alexander, A. and Bassiouny, M. Bread and Freedom, Social Justice. Workers and the 
Revolution, Zed Books, London, 2014, p. 23. 
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because the Ministry of Interior is located in Mohammed Mahmud Street and was 
the centre of the most well organised demonstrations, especially during the 18 
crucial days of the mobilisation in Tahrir Square. Here graffiti artists spent days and 
nights challenging the regime with their art. With the repression orchestrated by the 
army, the alleys surrounding the Ministry of Interior became partitioned by walls 
and roadblocks, especially after the November 2011 demonstrations against the 
military junta, forcing the people to walk for hours to avoid continuous check-points 
during the day and the curfew nights when the internal movement within the 
neighborhood was not inhibited.  
 
The mosque of Sayeda Zeinab is surrounded by a huge open air vegetable and meat 
market, all around small unpaved alleys connect to the nearby ancient quarter of 
Helmeya or to the former King Farouk Palace of Abdin and its garden, closer to 
Tahrir. There is also a second, perpetually crowded, public market held on Tuesdays, 
in Mohammed Farid Street where the populace in 2010 was informed about the 
rapidly increasing vegetable prices, which was one of the triggers for social unrest. 
This is a very socially mixed district where many feloul or old regime supporters live. 
According to popular rumors, it was from these small alleys (Berket Fil, for instance) 
many infamous baltagi (criminals) were activated by the regime during the protests 
to sow chaos in order to undermine the coherence of the movement.  
 
In general these public areas are filled with street crowds, not only in Port Said 
Street, the main road leading to Abbasseya, which is full of clothes shops, big 
supermarket chains and the daily traffic of minibuses, taxis and carts, but the 
density is particularly evident within the alleys. This urban fabric has grown 
spontaneously in the last decades with the opening of hundreds of cafes, small 
shops selling food, carpenters, laundries, butchers, fruit sellers, internet cafes, 
restaurants, bakeries and in addition with carts arriving from the countryside selling 
fava beans (fool) and vegetables. Before the uprisings these alleys were vibrant day 




It is of great interest to follow the development of the demonstrations through the 
lenses of the quarter’s social dynamics. In Chapters 4 and 6, I will examine the 
activation and workings of the Popular Committees in this area, their internal 
dynamics, their composition and there later evolution into Private Voluntary 
Organisations or NGOs. These Popular Committees were central to the pace of the 
events in 2011 beginning on January 28 when the police station of Sayeda Zeinab 
was burnt down by residents and local political activists. Hundreds of other police 
stations were burnt the same night, sparked by pent-up frustrations caused by the 
arbitrary practices of the local police who controlled traffic, collected taxes but also 
raped, abused and harassed the people of this quarter. Afterwards the police fled 
and for months the Popular Committees controlled the neighborhood in the 
absence of the police.  
 
In Sayeda Zeinab, the turn-out for the Constitutional Referendum (March 2011) was 
especially high. Many young revolutionaries and NGO activists lived in this area that 
is slightly cheaper than downtown Cairo. Many of them after sleeping in their family 
homes in Sayeda Zeinab, in the morning joined the protests in Tahrir Square or 
participated in political debates at the offices of NGOs active in their neighborhood, 
or in party headquarters. Later they would share the day’s events during the night 
with less politicised friends in popular cafes, playing backgammon or drinking tea.  
 
There was a very high turn-out during the parliamentary elections (2011-2012) in 
Sayeda Zeinab. In the absence of candidates from the former National Democratic 
Party (NDP), the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the political party of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and the Popular Current (Tyar Shaabi) of Hamdin Sabbahi, part of the 
Egyptian Bloc (Kutla), were successful at the ballot box. However with the 
presidential elections (in June 2012), the old regime figures returned and people 
here mainly voted for the former Mubarak regime prime minister, Ahmed Shafiq. 
Just after a few months of the elections, it was already clear that the Muslim 
Brotherhood was losing its political prestige, especially among the less politicised 
but sympathetic residents, who on several occasions had gone to Tahrir Square to 
take a look at the crowd and express their solidarity with the demonstrators. At the 
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end of 2012 after the election of Morsi, who intended to extend his political powers, 
it was evident that the democratic transition was too rapid for these residents and 
was losing their trust. To a certain extent, at this stage, in this neighborhood the 
previously politically mobilised young people, seemed to become more and more 
de-motivated.  
  
For location, socially mixed composition, levels of mobilisation, urban fabric and 
number of Popular Committees, Sayed Zeinab is one of the most interesting Cairo 
neighborhoods to disentangle the evolution of the committees throughout the 
revolutionary process, as we will see in Chapter 4. Figure II shows the location of 
























































Figure III:  The Entrance of the Gazal al-Mahalla Factory55  
 
 
1.3.2 Mahalla al-Kubra 
As Alexander and Bassiouny argue, “strikes created a new urban geography of 
revolution”56. Thus it is vital to analyse the revolts from the periphery. Mahalla al-
Kubra in the Nile Delta is an industrial town with one of the biggest textile factories 
in Egypt: Gazal al-Mahalla. Twenty-one thousand workers are employed in the 
buildings of this old factory, built by Egyptian finance provided through Bank Misr 
(see Figure III). There are many reasons why this place has been chosen in this 
dissertation to study the evolution of the independent trade unions and their 
relations with party politics and state dynamics.  
Alexandria, Shubra, Suez and Ayn Sokhna have the biggest concentrations of 
factories and industries in the country. These places have been the centre of major 
labour struggles and strikes in the last few decades, and recent uprisings. However, 
Mahalla is the easiest to access for research for several reasons. It is only one hour 
by minibus from southern Cairo. There have been many episodes of clashes with 
police forces and public demonstrations in the last few years. Facilitated access to 
local activists and unionists is provided by a long history of struggle between local 
workers' movements and the factory management for better work conditions, 
                                                             
55 Picture by Francesca Leonardi. 
56 Alexander, A. and Bassiouny, M. Bread, Freedom, p. 202.  
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salaries, and workers' rights. One of the biggest demonstrations here was in 1985 to 
support the Sigad workers.  
It is quite common to encounter workers daily in this town especially when they 
begin or finish work. Likewise, the trade unionists are involved in long-term activism 
and demonstrations. The 6 April Youth Movement and Revolutionary Socialists have 
unique links to the workers here. The latter movement was born in this town in 
support of workers’ strikes in 2008, three years before the 2011 uprisings. Many of 
the trade unionists here have been in jail for years and supported the Revolution 
Continues Coalition after the 2011 parliamentary elections. However, the 
connections between the activists coming from this lower middle class town and the 
Cairo urban areas' protesters should not be exaggerated, as we shall see in Chapters 
2 and 5.   
Mahalla al-Kubra stood against the Islamists’ constitution (2012). This opposition 
came from the Left with many criticisms made concerning the lack of workers’ and 
social rights in the draft constitution advanced by the Muslim Brotherhood. These 
criticisms were expressed in the municipal committees in 2012, organised to discuss 
the new constitution, with the widespread participation of local farmers and 
workers. When the constitution, advanced by the Islamists, had been approved, 
many demonstrators entered Shon Square, to protest against its approval. 
Occupations, public assemblies, flash mobs, marches, sit-ins and other forms of 
protests were organised in the last four years by local workers. These workplace 
protests were present in the factories of Mahalla al-Kubra, paralleling the major 
strikes and waves of workers' demonstrations of the last few years in Egypt.  
However, especially among the farmers of Mahalla al-Kubra, there are many 
supporters of the old regime (feloul). It is very interesting though to study here the 
electoral constituencies of the different political groups and their changes during the 
stages of the 2011 social movements and their aftermath. At first, many Socialists or 
post-Communists supported the social movements in parallel with the protests 
going on in the whole country. Then they joined the Muslim Brotherhood during the 
elections but they later switched once again to the Popular Current of Hamdin 
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Sabbahi, the Revolutionary Socialists or the post-Nasserist Socialist Alliance or even 
supported the 2013 military coup.    
For the historical presence of industries and factories, the high number of workers' 
protests, levels of labour mobilisation, and number of independent trade unions, 
officially created only in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings, Mahalla al-Kubra is one 
of the most interesting peripheral areas to be studied in Egypt with the aim to 
disentangle the evolution of the unions throughout the revolutionary process, as we 
will see in Chapter 4. 
 
1.3.3 Research Design and Dissertation Chapter Outline 
By drawing upon the literature on Social Movements Theories (SMT), New Social 
Movements (NSMs) and alternative networks our argument about the 
marginalisation of Leftists and other oppositional groups caused by the more 
structured organisation of the Islamists will be tested first in reference to the 
Egyptian case and then to Popular Committees and independent trade unions thus 
aiming to fill the gap in the existing explanations of the workings of the 2011 
uprisings and 2013 military coup. The aforementioned literature will be used as the 
main source of theoretical and methodological guidance in seeking to understand 
the dynamics of mobilisation and marginalisation of the street social movements. 
Central to this research is the role public space played in forging political identities. I 
will show how more organised and established social movements and parties 
manipulated these spontaneous or less organised movements. The state and the 
military have re-established patterns of hierarchical control, marginalising these 
challengers and limiting the space for dissent. The imagery of political populism 
invoked by military officers as well as Political Islam, as a non-revolutionary 
ideology, deactivated these alternative social networks.   
 
In Chapters 2 and 3, the literature review will be presented in reference to the 2011 
uprisings and the 2013 military coup in Egypt. I will disentangle the strategies of 
political participation within the social movement, the nature of the “Deep State” 
and ensuing waves of repression initiated by it, and the political ideologies of “Social 
41 
 
Justice” and Neo-Nasserism. In Chapter 4, a definition of Popular Committees and 
their evolution before, during and after the 2011 uprisings will be provided in 
reference to fieldwork research in Sayeda Zeinab (Cairo).  
 
In Chapter 5, the rise and repression of independent trade unions will be addressed 
in reference to workers' activism within several factories in Mahalla al-Kubra. In 
Chapters 6 and 7, comparative perspectives in the study of Popular Committees and 
non-violent or more violent mobilisations in the Middle East will be assessed in 
reference to the war in Northern Syria, and the uprisings in Tunisia. In the 
Conclusion, I will analyse the outcomes of the 2011 uprisings in the Middle East, the 
transnational relations of the Egyptian protesters with other forms of social protests 
in the region and Western countries. This will entail a discussion of the political 
changes within the new national elite, which has arisen since 2011 in Egypt. 
 
Conclusion 
As seen in this Introduction, the 2011 “Egyptian Street” protests can be defined as 
uprisings. The initial and spontaneous mass mobilisation ended up in several waves 
of mass riots that never evolved into a more structured social movement. As we 
shall discuss in the next chapter, Egypt was ready for a working-class based social 
movement but lacked a political organisation, a leadership and an ideology that had 




Chapter 2  
The Uprisings in Egypt: the Unachieved Coalition 
In this chapter, I will provide a literature review on Social Movement Theories (SMT) 
and on New Social Movement Theories (NSMT), bolstered by interviews with 
activists and experts, in order to understand why the 2011 uprisings in Egypt did not 
lead to the formation of a cross-ideological coalition or political pluralism, and 
therefore ended up in proto-movements that lost their initial potential. In order to 
discuss my argument related to the monopolisation of the space of dissent by the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian army, I will further analyse the patterns of 
mobilisation and demobilisation of the mass protests and at the same time weigh 
the usefulness for my research question to the social scientific and historical 
literature.  
 
As seen in the Introduction, I now turn to the questions: how did the social proto-
movements mobilise and interact with more established political parties and how 
did they try to be institutionalised? In other words, I will describe actors and 
strategies, the levels of cooperation, integration, disagreement and 
incommunicability between the different groups present in the “Egyptian Street” 
during the 2011 uprisings filling the gap between SMT and the empirical realities of 
the unrest.  
 
From an Authoritarian Regime to a Military Regime 
I will further describe the nature of politics in Egypt before the upheaval and the 
process of transition from an authoritarian to a military regime. The 2011 uprisings 
had been deeply affected by the types of socio-economic structures and political 
institutions already present in the country. Linz and Stepan57 suggest that the type 
of non-democratic regime influences the potential for democratisation. Using their 
typology, Egypt before the events of 2011 can be termed as an authoritarian regime 
with a relatively high degree of pluralism, but experiencing a series of massive 
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mobilisations due to a highly organised underground resistance based on networks 
which predated the Mubarak regime and persisted since the time of Nasser.  
 
Barbara Geddes argues that a definition of a regime as authoritarian, single party, 
personalistic or military should be related to the “cooperation and conflict among 
elites”. In this respect, the pre-2011 Mubarak era can be defined as a single party 
regime where the National Democratic Party (NDP) had “some influence over policy, 
controlled most access to political power and government jobs and had functioning 
local-level organisations”58. 
 
As for the process of transition, while Linz states that “at any point in the process up 
to the final point chances remain, albeit diminishing chances, to save the regime”59, 
O’Donnell and Schmitter60 argue that each transition is unique. 
 
This is the case of Egypt, where the 2011 protests and counter-revolutionary waves 
did not lead to a democracy. However, post-uprisings Egypt (Tantawi-Sisi) can be 
defined as a military regime. After the parliamentary elections (2012) and during the 
Morsi presidency (2012-2013), a transition from an authoritarian to a military 
regime took place in order to stop any revolutionary and popular demands, even if 
an effort to legitimise this process as an initial transition to democracy had been 
done by the ruling elites.  
 
As Geddes explains, a military regime is “governed by an officer or retired officer, 
with the support of the military establishment and some routine mechanism for 
high level officers to influence policy choice and appointment”61. Thus, it might be 
argued that in both the Tantawi (2011-2012) and al-Sisi (2014 onwards) periods, 
there were and are elements of personalistic regimes as well, where “the leader, 
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who usually came to power as an officer in a military coup or as the leader of a 
single party government, has consolidated control over policy and recruitment in his 
own hands, in the process marginalizing other officers' influence and/or reducing 
the influence and functions of the party”62.   
 
In other words, the Egyptian army tolerated the authoritarian regime of Mubarak as 
long as it was not detrimental to its corporate interests. As Kandil explains, the 
generals “are not fundamentally opposed to authoritarianism, as long as they are 
not its victims”63. In the circumstances of the 2011 uprisings, the military personnel 
briefly adopted the Muslim Brotherhood as a “civilian partner”64 in order to deflect 
the military's Western allies. However, the Egyptian army also underlined the 
Muslim Brotherhood miscalculations during their government, and later 
consolidated its power in a military regime with the direct control over the state 
institutions and a single party, supported by the military establishment, after the 
2013 military coup orchestrated by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. 
 
2.1 Strategies: the “Egyptian Street” 
The following section will discuss the activation and workings of the key actors of 
the “Egyptian Street”, citing the relevant secondary literature related to SMT and 
reflected through my interviews. Secondly, I will compare the Egyptian case with 
more successful revolutionary processes (1979 Iranian Revolution) in order to 
understand why the social proto-movement did not develop into a revolutionary 
one but into social non-movements. Thirdly, I will discuss the role of individual 
Egyptian protesters and oppositional groups during the 2011 uprisings, with a 
specific focus on leftists and alternative networks, and their relationships with more 
organised groups (the Muslim Brotherhood), as key findings so as to later discuss in 
successive chapters the role of local committees and unions throughout the 
revolutionary process in the two chosen neighbourhoods.  
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The encampment in Tahrir Square, symbol of the anti-Iraq war protests (2003), the 
bread Intifada (1977) and student demonstrations (1972), began during the night of 
January 25, 2011. It was set up by 50,000 protestors, growing to 1 million by 
February 1. As the regime blocked Internet communications, the encampment 
“assumed an aggregative function, becoming all the more relevant”65. 
 
Young people were predominant in Tahrir Square during the 2011 uprisings, albeit 
encountering some opposition from the elders within political movements. 
Furthermore, many young activists, including football Ultras and gays (not 
necessarily included in associations defending LGBT rights), asserted their presence 
creatively through innovative forms of artistic resistance. Although facing 
harassment, Muslim and Christian women were key protagonists in the uprisings. 
Migrants from many Egyptian provinces (many of them peasants recently moved to 
the city) exercised a widespread presence in all the demonstrations following 
Mubarak’s resignation on February 11, 2011. Moreover, the subalterns, those who 
consider modernisation as “a costly enterprise”66, who originate from deprived 
areas of urban Cairo, many of them street children, formed a huge group within the 
“People of the Revolution”. Finally, workers mobilised in industrial disputes, joined 
the urban uprisings on several occasions.  
 
This multifaceted proto-movement was steered by a repertoire of direct action but 
did not possess a formal leadership. Protestors used non-violent methods that 
included sit-ins, funerals, permanent occupations of squares and pavements, 
marches, self-defence groups, etc. One of the key questions to be explored is the 
extent to which social networks were employed to connect individuals within these 
varied social movements and secondly why in the end their demands could not be 
expressed in the organised structures of Political Islam.  
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2.1.1 A Definition of Social Movements and New Social Movements 
Using the work of della Porta and Diani on the 2011 uprisings, their aftermath and 
also on previous comparable social movements in other locales I will disentangle the 
key features of the Egyptian proto-movement.  
 
Social movements can be considered as “networks of informal relations”67. These 
networks allow the diffusion of actions and the elaboration of shared 
interpretations of the social context. In other words, social movements are 
contesting collective actors who promote or stop social change. Moreover, they 
influence the development of the means of interpretations of society. Finally, they 
are the protagonists of non-institutional political actions. 
 
The main difference between New and “old” Social Movements is not only related 
to tactics and mobilisation structures. NSMs do not have as their first political 
objective to “capture the state”68 but to “challenge the boundaries of traditional 
politics and to establish decentralised alternatives”69. 
 
However, as Korany and el-Mahdi highlighted, the existing SMT and NSMT might be 
not adequate to address the Egyptian 2011 events: “The Arab Spring revealed that 
most of the new scholarly approaches remain deficient in fundamental, and indeed 
epistemological, ways”70. In other words, all the attempts to homogenise the groups 
present in Tahrir Square or taking part in the initialised transition might result in an 
excessive simplification.  
 
However, among the diverse political oppositionists who gathered in public spaces 
during the 2011 uprisings, several groups could fit with the general definition of 
social movements. This is true for 6 April Youth Movement and the Revolutionary 
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Socialists where debates over the correct form of organisational structures were 
carried out for years. Thus, many activists were not sure about the need to form 
political parties, use the tactics of New Social Movements or even shelter under the 
umbrella of NGOs. Nevertheless, the 6 April Youth Movement and the Revolutionary 
Socialists organised flash mobs, marches in poor neighbourhoods and public 
gatherings before, during and after the 2011 uprisings through a diffuse use of 
“cyber-activism”71, with a clever usage of Facebook and Twitter72.  
 
Many other groups were initially active in the protests or they later took part in the 
early electoral processes: such as the Liberal party Dostur, led by Mohammed el-
Baradei; Tyar Shaabi, led by a former trade unionist, Hamdin Sabbahi; the Socialist 
Alliance and other pro-regime leftist groups (e.g. Tagammu, the Social Democrats); 
Tyar Masri: the youth within the Muslim Brotherhood.  
 
Table III shows the different Secular and youth movements active during the 2011 
uprisings. 
 
Table III Secular and Youth Movements Active during the 2011 Uprisings in Egypt 
Secular Political Groups Leaders and Ideological Connotation  
Revolutionary Socialists Hossam el-Hamalawy 
6 April Youth Movements  Youth engaged in the Street protests 
Dostur Mohammed el-Baradei 
Tyar Shaabi Hamdin Sabbahi 
Socialist Alliance Pro-Regime Leftist Group 
Tagammu Pro-Regime Leftist Group 
Social Democrats Pro-Regime Leftist Group 
Tyar Masri Youth of the Muslim Brotherhood 
Other Groups Ultras, Workers, non-organised 
alternative networks 
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The role of new media was particularly important before and during the Egyptian 
uprising. This was “beyond the capacity of the state authorities to monitor”73. As 
Kamis and Vaugh argue, it enabled “cyber-activism, which was a major trigger for 
street activism; encouraging civic engagement, though aiding the mobilisation and 
organisation of protests and other forms of political expression; and promoting a 
new form of citizen journalism, which provides a platform for ordinary citizens to 
express themselves and document their own version of reality”74. 
 
On the other hand, these political actors also appeared to follow more traditional 
paths to mobilisation: the 6 April Movement and the Revolutionary Socialists had 
some connections to peasants’s and workers' movements. This is evident in the 
testimony of Hossam el-Hamalawy, a Revolutionary Socialist activist: “After 
Mubarak stepped down, middle class' workers and employees in the private sector 
went back to their jobs. However, Suez's workers, transport employees, workers in 
the military factories, landowners could not go back to their daily life ignoring what 
happened. They should have understood how their grievances overlapped with 
Tahrir Square's slogans”75. However, as we will see later, Alexander and Bassiouny 
highlight the limits of integration between social and political struggles: “Workers 
did not deploy their collective social power in order to resolve the political crisis of 
the ruling class in their favour”76. Moreover, Abdelrahman suggests that local 
workers’ leaders “mostly did not have any political affiliation”77, while the Muslim 
Brotherhood was never been able “to establish a stable base within the working 
class”78. 
 
Hamalawy suggests that the Revolutionary Socialists tried to bridge the gap between 
the tactics of NSM mobilisations and the more traditional methods of older social 
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movement labour and rural organisings: “We wanted the organisation of workers to 
build-up a state that is based on the labour market. We had to enhance their 
capability and their knowledge about their conditions of exploitation in order to 
bring them (the workers) in the front line of the protests. There were many 
contradictions in the working class. We worked to bring the factories to Tahrir and 
vice versa. Our slogan was the Square and the factory one hand”79.  
 
The traditionalist leftwing orientation of these groups thus led to controversies 
about both internal organisational structures and external strategies of mobilisation 
but equally how to deal with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamists' electoral 
victories and the military's aims. The 6 April Youth Movement split over the creation 
of a political party in order to participate in the 2012 parliamentary elections. Many 
members of the group preferred to create an organisation resembling a NSM and 
did not want to be involved in party politics. Moreover, some members of the group 
openly supported the Muslim Brotherhood during their year in power (2012-2013). 
At the moment of writing, the leading figures of 6 April Youth Movement are in 
prison for demonstrating against the protest law, approved after the 2013 military 
coup, and, with some other 230 non-Islamist defendants, have been given life 
sentences, for receiving foreign aid not allowed by the 2013 anti-NGO law.     
 
2.1.2 Occupation of Public Space: Conventional and Unconventional Forms of 
Protest 
In this section I pursue further an investigation of the workings of alternative 
networks active during the 2011 uprisings and their relations with public space, 
referring to my semi-strucutred interviews and employing and commenting on the 
secondary literature which covers this topic.  
 
Bayat suggests, streets are the spaces where people protest, but also where “they 
extend their protest beyond their immediate circles to include also the unknown, 
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the 'strangers' who might espouse similar, real or imagined, grievances”80. 
Alternative movements have been increasingly studied in contexts of authoritarian 
regimes (Bayat, Ismail, and Singerman)81. According to Bayat, street politics emerges 
when the “quiet encroachment” of the subaltern urban classes, who generally use 
public space only passively, began to share feelings of discontent collectively. As 
Bayat82 argues “the passive networks represent a key feature in the formation of 
non-movements. The poor street vendors would recognize their common 
predicaments by noticing one another on street corners on a daily basis, even 
though they may never know or speak to one another [...] They can be mobilised 
without active or deliberately constructed networks”. 
 
Thus Bayat83 continues, these non-movements mobilise only in order to defend their 
small but vital gains. In other words, “a common threat turns the subjects' passive 
networks into active communication and organised resistance”. However, as 
Abdelrahman84 argues in reference to the Egyptian case, these movements were 
“anything but quiet”. After decades of struggle, they evolved to a point where they 
constantly undertook “contentious actions” 85. 
 
Put simply, according to the poet and Socialist activist, Ahmed Foad Nigm, there was 
a genuine revolutionary potential on the occasion of the Egyptian uprisings 
unrepresented by traditional political actors and present in those latent New Social 
Movements embodied by the people of the urban districts:  
In 2011 a Revolution was taking place in Egypt. People without a knife to 
cut onions faced a huge system of State Security (Amn el-Dawla). And it 
collapsed. Everybody believes now in the Egyptian youth. They were 30 in 
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Tahrir Square, they became one million. This ability to push the people to 
Tahrir Square was not political. They did more than the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the Communists. The Egyptians did a Revolution against a 
corrupted and powerful regime (sic)86.   
 
So as Bayat argues87, “urban streets not only serve as a physical space where 
conflicts are shaped and expressed, where collectives are formed, solidarities are 
extended, and 'street politics' are displayed”. They also signify a “crucial symbolic 
utterance” what the author defines “political streets”. This definition referred to 
“the collective sentiments, shared feelings, and public opinions of ordinary people in 
their day-to-day utterances and practices that are expressed broadly in public 
spaces”. But he also notes the difference between organised, noticeable protest and 
direct but hidden, collective action, as when individuals and families strive to 
acquire basic necessities “in a prolonged and unassuming, though illegal, fashion”, 
instead of organising a street march to demand electricity, for example, “the 
disenfranchised simply tap onto municipal power grid without authorisation”88. 
 
With the help of the theories of Bayat relating to post-revolutionary Iran and pre-
revolutionary movements in Egypt, we can explore the ways in which passive 
networks of local solidarity forged an initial common revolutionary identity in 
anticipation to and in tandem with the more public, illegal demonstrations. As Bayat 
suggests, streets, squares and alleys forge the identities of people who occupy 
public spaces. Street vendors, the urban poor, youth, migrants and women formed 
non-organised movements which give rise to collective actions.  
 
This not to suggest however, that more conventional forms of participation were 
not undertaken. A variety of repertoires overlapped with each other. Firstly, the 
protesters opened blogs and websites of citizen journalism such as Rassd News 
Network (RNN) and they constantly monitored the protests. Secondly, the 
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demonstrators offered services (e.g. security checks before entering Tahrir Square). 
Thirdly, they began campaigning for a party or a candidate, for example this 
happened in order to support the Muslim Brotherhood leader, Khairat al-Shater, the 
former unionist, Hamdin Sabbahi, or the lawyer, Khaled Ali, when they joined for the 
first time the demonstrations. Fourthly, many young activists tried to convince their 
peers to participate: this happened during the campaign against the 2011 
Constitutional Referendum. The Laa! (No!)'s campaign was a first opportunity to 
create a common ground for the secular forces as a distinct movement.  
 
On the other hand, as mentioned, more unconventional forms of participation took 
place. Firstly, an unprecedented number of daily public gatherings were organised 
(there were demonstrations against the military junta, against the parliamentary 
elections, against the price increases, etc.). Secondly, demonstrators used any 
occasion to express their dissent. This happened during the funerals of the first 
victims of the demonstrations, called the “Martyrs”, by the activists. Many sit-ins 
and public building occupations were taking places both in central and peripheral 
areas. Thirdly, many activists participated in workers' strikes. As we shall see, this is 
especially true for some of the membership of the Revolutionary Socialists and 6 
April Youth Movement. Finally, accusing both the Muslim Brotherhood and the army 
of being counter-revolutionary agents, the protesters initiated several waves of 
electoral boycotts (e.g. Kazeboon, Layers).  
 
All these forms of protests shared a common target: the need to influence public 
opinion. After the 2013 military coup, public media stigmatised all these forms of 
protests and later they were suppressed. And the new victors learned to employ a 
series of tactics, some of them adapted from the 2011 strategies of protests. In a 
traditional vein, the military regime channeled all public gatherings within the 
parameters of nationalism (military parades and the Suez Canal extension's 
celebrations, Neo-Nasserism, patriotism, rehabilitating the image of the police, war 
campaigns, etc.). This process began before the military takeover. But since the 
occupation of Nasser Street in Medinat Nasser (June 2012) by former NDP and army 
supporters (almost the same participants in the 2013 military coup) who gathered in 
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order to defend the candidacy of the former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq at the 
2012 presidential elections, the army and its allies used almost the same repertoires 
of protest of 2011 and Tahrir (street demonstrations, mass protests, etc.) against 
the Muslim Brotherhood government and the remnants of the 2011 uprisings.  
 
2.1.3 Overlapping Interests and Non-Collective Identities 
In this section, I will focus on the limits of the proto-movement, why it did not pose 
a serious revolutionary challenge. Thus, I will differentiate between street networks 
and other organised movements (e.g. Islamist groups, workers, liberals, etc.). Finally, 
I will analyse the key features of the major oppositional groups and how they used 
street mobilisations and party politics.  
 
The defence of specific values and frames influenced the definition of political 
targets89. The different political group shared problems, strategies and motivations. 
For instance, during the uprisings different participants in the proto-movement 
considered the same persons (the Mubarak clique) as accountable for social 
inequalities and injustice. This determined a temporary political alliance between 
young Islamists and these alternative networks. As Gerhards90 argues, to be 
effective the movements had to generalise an issue and highlight its importance for 
the life of every single person91. This process can define common identities for the 
participants within the movement. Eventually, this can bring new agencies into the 
“movement frame”. In the Egyptian case, this did not happen except as a short-term 
integration of street politics, that otherwise would have been marginalised, within 
the social protest movement.  
 
However, this process happened in different contexts. The anti-Iraqi war movement 
(2003) and Solidarity Campaign with the Palestine Intifada (2000) brought together 
the Muslim Brotherhood and Secular groups. The latter in 2006 formed the Kifaya 
(Enough!) movement to prevent a new mandate for former President Mubarak. 
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Moreover, some Muslim Brotherhood members from Alexandria and the 
Revolutionary Socialists formed in 2005 the National Alliance for Change and Unions 
within the universities92.  
 
As Stork argues, “In 2004, the Egyptian Movement for Change (Kifaya) started to 
mobilize against Mubarak, especially on the occasion of the presidential referendum 
and parliamentary elections in 2005. Even if failing to reach its aims, Kifaya's 
mobilisation in 2005 inspired organisations such as Journalists for Change, Doctors 
for Change, Youth for Change, and Workers for Change. Artists for Change 
developed from informal networks of dissent that had kept the memory of activism 
alive. In 2005, left-wing and MB activists supported the mobilisation of the judges 
for independence [...] Islamists were key to the growth of the movement in one 
important way: they were the primary victims of state abuses”93.  
 
However the same ground for creating a common identity, for instance sharing the 
popular demands for “Social Justice” between the Muslim Brotherhood and other 
regime opponents, did not materialise in 2011. This was due to obvious weaknesses 
of both the Muslim Brotherhood and socialist parties from the beginning of the 2011 
uprisings. As Achcar argues, “of the region's organised political forces, no current 
seemed capable of leading a revolutionary transformation”94. As Zubaida adds in an 
interview for this dissertation, “The day before the 2011 uprisings, the old leftist 
parties were irrelevant. The army conceded some freedom of gathering and speech 
to the youngsters but did not allow the organisation of a workers' movement”95.  
 
The Islamists joined the protests in Tahrir Square after a few days, however the 
youth within the organisation were present in the demonstrations since the first day 
(on January 25 2011). Tyar Masri was the name of the group chosen by the 
youngsters to define their current within the Muslim Brotherhood in summer 2011, 
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some months after the January demonstrations. Liberals (Dostur), Socialists, 
Islamists were protagonists as well in the first 18 days of occupation on Tahrir 
Square and other public spaces in the poor neighborhoods of the main Egyptian 
cities. However, at this stage of the protests, the Muslim Brotherhood began to 
monopolise and manipulate the other political antagonists, maintaining “its 
hegemonic position in the popular protest movement”96. 
 
The main aim of this proto-movement was to topple the Mubarak regime. When this 
had been achieved, the Muslim Brotherhood had distinct aims compared to other 
anti-regime groups, namely to locate and destroy the buildings of the State Security 
(Amn el-Dawla – April 9 2011) and to win the parliamentary elections (November 
2011-January 2012).  
 
During street protests, informal networks built a potentially revolutionary 
movement. There were numerous activists with overlapping interests who could 
have also self-identified as members of different political groups at the same time. 
For instance Wael Ghonim, one of the most active bloggers in organising the 
demonstrations, had been part of the opposition secular forces later joining the 
Muslim Brotherhood electoral campaign for the presidential elections. This was the 
case for many activists of the 6 April Youth Movement, who sympathised with the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Similarly, we can mention here Revolutionary Socialists and 
other Socialist activists (e.g. Hamalawy, el-Massry, Abdel Fattah) who criticised the 
repression against the Islamists implemented by security forces after the 2013 
military coup.  
 
It might be argued that these temporary alliances were rooted in preceding forms of 
dissent and participation. As della Porta notes97, the recruitment within a social 
movement is easier for those who already have some personal links to protesters. 
Those interpersonal solidarities, built-up in previous experiences of mobilisation, 
facilitate new forms of involvement. This was especially true among the Muslim 
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Brotherhood activists who spent years together in jail but even for the most active 
among 6 April and the Kifaya movements. However, this could have been even the 
case in all the waves of electoral boycotts (against the Constituent Assembly as well) 
decided by the National Salvation Front (NSF) and the fake alliances among the 
secular oppositional movements on the occasion of a new wave of protests known 
as Tamarrod (Rebel), triggered by the army (May-June 2013). In a preliminary stage, 
within the Tamarrod campaign many Revolutionary Socialists, Liberals and other 
independent activists mobilised against the Muslim Brotherhood without the 
specific aim to topple Morsi or support a military coup.  
 
Thus the most likely members of these shifting coalitions were  the young and 
unmarried, with some experience of demonstrating, a high level of “accommodating 
innovation”98 (in other words the constant reinvention of prevailing norms), 
knowledge of available public spaces and the first to be mobilised in a revolutionary 
context. This is the case of the Iranian youth, as we will see later, who mobilised 
against the Islamic Republic during the most effective waves of protests (i.e. 1997, 
2003, 2009 and 2011). In a later stage, those youngsters left the country or found 
some space within local NGOs, reformist foundations, newspapers and the arts. This 
happened in Egypt as well on the occasion of the 2011 uprisings and in the 
aftermath of the downfall of the Mubarak regime.  
 
But the youngsters' mobilisation (which included rappers, gays, Ultras and graffiti 
artists) seemed to be weakened by certain features that this largest section of 
Egyptian society (70% of the population is under 30) share: precarious and multiple 
jobs, lack of housing, lack of participation in party politics, migration and an 
overestimation of the relevance of social networks as substitute for effective 
political debate99. Thus, the 2011 uprisings never had the chance to develop into a 
comprehensive oppositional movement because of the very factors which had 
driven youth to be in the vanguard of the movement.  
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Thus Bayat notes, “The young in general remained dispersed, atomised, and divided, 
with their organised activism limited to a number of Youth NGO's and publications 
[…] The young people subject to moral and political discipline does not necessarily 
render them carriers of a youth movement, because young persons are unable to 
forge a collective challenge to the moral and political authority without first turning 
into youth as a social category, that is, turning into social actors”100.  
 
If those weaknesses appeared as irrelevant for the first objectives of the proto-
movement, they became central reasons of disengagement with the emergence and 
spread of political repression. This has been the case after the 2013 military coup. 
The effects of the direct army take-over broke and later fragmented these already 
fragile, non-organised networks, finally, fully transforming the proto-movement into 
a series of non-movements.  
 
In other words, horizontal networks among different strands of Egyptian society, for 
different reasons, did not get the chance to create solid, vertical and new channels 
of communication forging a more effective revolutionary movement. The absence of 
a structured organisation, leadership, professionalisation, integration within the 
oppositional movements halted the political evolution of the proto-movement 
towards revolutionary organisations or to the formation of a radical oppositional 
political party. Thus, the insurgent proto-movement which comprised the 2011 
uprisings cannot be understood as a single, comprehensive phenomenon, as della 
Porta suggests, in her more general discussion of the usual evolution of social 
movements. This is true because it never reached the stage of development of a 
social movement as happened elsewhere, as for instance, during the Iranian 
uprisings (1979). 
 
As Marfleet argues, 
The movement was not homogeneous, however: it embraced those who 
aspired to establish a new social order, those who desired reform, and 
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those fearful of further challenges to the status quo. These very different 
currents were to engage in prolonged conflict over the outcome of the 
uprisings101. 
 
At a later stage, the army takeover further splintered oppositional political forces. 
These divisions within the opposition groups (for instance on the subjects of 
terrorism, women rights, Christian minorities or sharia) were wedges where regime 
forces could undermine unity and reinstate their own privileges. The main aims of 
the security forces in Egypt have been to prevent a possible formation of a common, 
revolutionary and radical identity among the oppositional groups in order to splinter 
the proto-movement. As we shall see later, this strategy of the “Deep State” 
succeeded because the Muslim Brotherhood underestimated the potential strength 
of street politics and secular forces (for example Kutla, the Egyptian Bloc obtained 
10% at the parliamentary elections). As a matter of fact, at the ballot-box, the 
Secular groups had limited but not irrelevant electoral appeal. 
 
2.1.4 A Comparative Perspective with the Iranian Revolution 
In order to understand why, in other contexts, a proto-movement developed 
revolutionary potential, it is useful to compare the 2011 uprisings in Egypt with a 
more successful example: the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979102. Bayat 
emphasises the importance of street politics in reference to the disenfranchised in 
Iran and their use of public spaces such as pavements and public transport and 
spaces before and after the 1978-1979 uprisings against the Shah. He argues that 
only in later stage the Shi'a clergy obtained the support of the poor to enhance its 
political power. As Bayat103 explains in reference to the relevance of social actors in 
the street during the Islamic Revolution:  
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Once they are perceived as natural allies, militant Islamism and the poor 
need only political opportunity to realize their alliance. One such 
opportunity developed in Iran, owing to its remarkable economic 
development and social change, spearheaded by the authoritarian Shah. 
The urban poor, the by-product of the modernisation process, benefited 
little from this economic growth. Indeed, they were its victims.  
 
In 2011 Egypt energised a similar latent alliance of the urban poor and the Muslim 
Brotherhood. But the Brotherhood‘s core constituency itself was a cross-class104  
coalition of the modern middle-class: salaried strata, liberal professionals, white 
collar workers and small entrepreneurs105.  
 
However, once in power, although the slogans of the demonstrators asking for 
“Social Justice” were the most common in the “Egyptian Street”, the Muslim 
Brotherhood or the Left never tried to integrate the poorest Egyptians into their 
politics, especially during the transition phase. Long before 2011, the Muslim 
Brotherhood underwent “a social mutation”, giving increasing importance to 
capitalists (e.g. Khairat al-Shatir: first choice as presidential candidate, later banned 
by the military junta) in detriment to the interests of the marginalised middle class 
and the subalterns106. For these reasons, alternative networks, so prominent in early 
2011 were left out of the transition stage. The same did not happen when the Shi'a 
clergy was in charge after the revolution in Iran in their relationship with the 
disenfranchised.  
 
As Bayat argues in the case of Iran,  
The mobilisation of the urban grassroots by the ruling clergy in Iran began 
mainly after the revolution. The clergy lent its support to the poor the 
rhetoric of the downtrodden, first, to offset the stands in favour of the 
lower class taken by the left and the Mujahedin-e Khalq, and second, to 
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win over the poor as their social basis in their struggles against the Left, 
liberals, and the remnants of the ancient regime. The honeymoon 
between the poor and the ruling clergy was over when the poor were 
polarised. A segment was integrated into the state structure [...]; others 
remained outside and their struggles for development brought them into 
confrontation with the regime107.  
 
Thus, if we compare this with our case, the exclusion of the workers and the 
subalterns is the main reason for the failure of the Egyptian uprisings  
 
2.2 Applying SMT and NSMT to the Egyptian Case  
In this section, I will apply SMT and NSMT to the Egyptian case. If many scholars 
have studied the relationships between Islamists and Secular groups during the 
Egyptian 2011 uprisings in terms of polarisation, in this chapter I will try to adopt a 
different approach and discuss instances of potential cross-ideological cooperation 
between those diverse actors, initially present in Tahrir Square. In doing so, I will 
assess the nature and quality of this unachieved cooperation especially in reference 
to the window of opportunity opened by Mubarak's ouster.  
 
To describe the levels of competition and cooperation between the different actors 
of the 2011 uprisings I will apply to the Egyptian case the “Patterns of inter-
organisational cooperation among movement organisation” (Table IV), advanced by 
della Porta108. Della Porta’s grid can be understood in the following sense. Thus on 
the one hand, there is “noncompetitive cooperation” when among the different 
protagonists of a social movement, high cooperation and low competition for a 
similar constituency is present. On the other hand, there is “competitive 
cooperation” when among the different protagonists of a social movement, there is 
parallel cooperation and competition for a similar constituency. Moreover, she 
continues, between the different actors in the social proto-movement, there is 
“neutrality” in a context of lack of competition and cooperation. Finally, della Porta 
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refers to “factionalism” when, among the groups taking part in a social movement, 
on the one hand, there is a lack of cooperation and on the other there is a 
competition for a similar constituency. 
  
Table IV: Patterns of Inter-Organisational Cooperation among Movement 
Organisations 
 Cooperation Lack of cooperation 
Competition for similar 
constituency 
Competitive cooperation Factionalism 




Table V applies this pattern to the Egyptian case in order to study the levels of 
competition and cooperation among Islamists and other oppositional forces during 
the different stages of the 2011 uprisings. At the very beginning of the occupation of 
Tahrir Square, in a wave of high political mobilisation and solidarity between the 
movements, there was “noncompetitive cooperation” between the different 
groups. This was helped by the permanent occupation of the same public spaces. 
Even the subalterns, in these circumstances, made “tactical alliances” with the 
Muslim Brotherhood and the revolutionaries109.   
 
After the dismissal of Hosni Mubarak, the Muslim Brotherhood and other opposition 
groups witnessed a “competitive cooperation” period until the Mohamed Mahmud 
Street's clashes (November 2011). With the electoral victories of the Muslim 
Brotherhood (2012), helped by the absence of politicians belonging to the NDP at 
the parliamentary elections due to their temporary ban from party politics, and 
during a wave of demobilising political engagement and strengthened ideological 
sentiment of belonging, “neutrality” was evident among the opposition movements 
or newly formed political parties. Even the poor, at this stage, tended to return to 
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their strategy of “quiet encroachment”110. The army's stigmatisation of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, as counter-revolutionaries, stimulated renewed protests that brought 
about a complete fragmentation of the coalition of forces of the 2011 uprisings in 
the wake of the 2013 military coup, which led to lowered political engagement. 
 
Table V: Types of Interactions between the Egyptian Social Movements (2011-
2016) 
  Cooperation  
  Yes No 
Competition  No Noncompetitive 
cooperation: 
Tahrir Square and 
demonstrations all 
over the country. In 




November 2012, in 
a context of 
decreasing political 
engagement. 
Lack of competition Yes Competitive 
cooperation: 
February-
November 2011. In 




the military coup,  




Table VI: Kind of Interactions within other Oppositional Forces (2011-2015) 
  Cooperation  
  Yes No 
Competition No Noncompetitive 
cooperation: Tahrir 
Neutral: After the 
military coup, in 
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Square and other 
demonstrations all 
over the country 
up to the military 








 Yes Competitive 
cooperation: 
Elections and 













Table VI shows the types of interactions among other social actors (2011-2015). 
During the 2011 uprisings, a high level of cooperation and the absence of 
competition among demonstrators in the strees, political parties and other social 
movements was evident, in a context of solidarity, high political engagement, 
mobilisation and constant sharing of public spaces. In the aftermath of the revolts, 
this was replaced with “competitive cooperation” among more organised 
movements, when Liberals, Socialists and other groups converged in the National 
Salvation Front (NSF) and took part in the parliamentary elections, and other street 
protesters; less prone to be involved in party politics Revolutionary Socialists, and 6 
April Youth Movement, workers' movements and many youth organisations 
converged in very diverse and temporary coalitions such as the Coalition Youth of 
January 25 Revolution, and Revolution Continues (Thawra Mustamarra), in the 




The Liberals, led by Mohammed el-Baradei, were worried about rushed elections (or 
the “electoral farce”, as Amin111 termed it) and consistently supported the writing of 
a constitution before parliamentary elections. The “competitive cooperation” 
among these groups was evident during the presidential elections in 2012, when the 
majority of them neither supported Ahmed Shafiq nor Morsi (with certain 
exceptions) or during the Tamarrod campaign (2013). The majority of these actors 
supported the campaign but only Liberals (Dostur), former Arab League's Secretary 
General, Amr Moussa, and many among them were able to take part in the interim 
government (2013-2014). Other street actors, the Revolutionary Socialists and the 6 
April Youth Movement had a more critical attitude towards the military takeover 
and contested all the decisions taken by the interim government, stressing a general 
support for human rights and condemning the repression of the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  
 
After the 2013 military coup, in the context of low political participation, 
demobilisation and deep polarisation, there was “noncompetitive cooperation” 
among these groups, with very limited space for dissent for the opposition forces 
and the many critics of the decision of the former presidential candidate Hamdin 
Sabbahi to participate in the 2014 elections opposing Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. After the 
Constitutional Referendum in 2014, a crackdown on dissent, and the clean-up of 
street vendors and public cafes in popular areas, led to all these groups becoming 
increasingly discouraged to participate in party politics, and they were leaderless 
and fragmented. For instance, Strong Egypt, led by Moneim Abul Fotuh, faced the 
first arrests of its supporters during its campaign against the referendum (2014), 
while Wasat party leaders were jailed and the party dissolved (2013). The 
crackdown involved journalists, reporters, social workers, human rights and NGOs 
activists, all of whom had been deeply involved in strengthening Egyptian civil 
society. The only possible cooperation among these groups at that stage was a 
widespread boycott of elections. 
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Thus, already with the March 2011 Referendum on the Constitutional Declaration 
and more openly with the Mohamed Mahmud's protests (November 2011), the 
Muslim Brotherhood left the “Egyptian Street” and considered the other opposition 
groups as marginal. After decades of internal debate whether to take part in party 
politics, the Muslim Brotherhood formed the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) as 
their political wing. The army too abandoned the streets after Field Marshal Tantawi 
did not succeed in imposing “supra-constitutional powers” for military personnel. 
Instead the army sought to undermine the movement by seeking an agreement with 
Muslim Brotherhood. 
 
During the Morsi presidency (2012-2013), the Muslim Brotherhood refused to forge 
a coalition with the secular front, due to divisions in the Muslim Brotherhood itself 
(elders vs. younger members), as well as ideological fragmentation outside the 
Brotherhood between Islamists and other rival oppositional forces. As the 
interviewee al-Hamalawy explains, “Islamists did not take part in general strikes. 
Together with the military junta, they distributed flyers to stop the workers on 
strike. However, the young Islamists were with us in all our struggles and fights 
against the military personnel. The Brotherhood's constituency is expecting different 
policies from them. When they talked about sharia, the Muslim Brothers' leaders 
intended neo-liberal laws while their voters understood “Social Justice”112.  
 
As della Porta argues, these temporary relations could have created new collective 
identities or “multiple identities”. However it was possible that a latent or growing 
identity was in the process of being forged during the 18 days of Tahrir Square 
between the youth of the Muslim Brotherhood and other alternative groups. But 
this latent alliance of revolutionary forces was cut short by the Muslim Brotherhood 
in government (2012-2013).  
 
In other words, the exclusionary practices of the Morsi administration contributed 
to end the short-lived period of cooperation between the Egyptian oppositionists, 
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contributing to a high degree of polarisation, labeling the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood as a conservative organisation, still very far from the so-called politics 
of Post-Islamism. What is this Post-Islamism? Bayat supplies us with a definition:113  
Islam may intervene in revolutionary struggles not merely as an ideology, 
frame, and model, but also as harbinger of vested interests […] (Post-Islamism) 
transcends Islamism as an exclusivist and totalizing ideology, seeking instead 
inclusion, pluralism, and ambiguity. It is nationalist in scope (as opposed to 
being Pan-Islamist), and consciously post-revolutionary- post idea of 
revolution, that is. It represents primarily a political project114. 
 
Thus for Bayat115 Post-Islamism is a mix of “religiosity and rights, faith and freedom 
(with varied degrees), Islam and democracy". But, in the Egyptian case, Political 
Islam in power showed to what extent the Muslim Brotherhood politicians acted as 
economic conservatives, politically exclusionary towards anti-regime instances, and, 
in more general terms, defenders of the status quo that prospered under the 
Mubarak regime. Thus, at that stage, alliances with the Left and Secular groups 
became impossible.     
 
As the two-time presidential candidate Hamdin Sabbahi confirmed in an interview 
carried out for this dissertation, for the other forces of the opposition, the Muslim 
Brotherhood no longer appeared to be a force for change. “In terms of wealth 
distribution: a few people and cliques of billionaires still control the country and 
leave the majority in poverty. The same liberalisation policies of Sadat, an aggressive 
capitalism strengthening the richest and damaging the poorer continued with 
Mubarak, Morsi and it is still existing. Nothing changed with the 2011 uprisings and 
later. Secondly: we suffered the dictatorship of the National Democratic Party (NDP) 
and the Muslim Brotherhood: the same control of a minority on a majority. Thirdly: 
we still did not achieve national independence”116.  
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2.2.1 The Social Movements and Party Politics  
Following weeks of occupation of public spaces in the spring and summer 2011, 
both the Muslim Brotherhood and the socialists appeared not yet convinced of the 
need for a political party and appeared much weakened by the repression of the last 
years of the Mubarak regime. At this time, the only two groups that were ready to 
become effective political actors were the reformists among the Muslim 
Brotherhood, known as the Wasat party that had already asked the authorities to be 
able to form a legal political party during the 1990s but had been rejected. After the 
2011 uprising they succeeded but this was rather short lived and the party was 
dissolved after the 2013 military coup. The other force, was the Independent Trade 
Unions (EFITU) (discussed in Chapter 5), which were legalised by the Essam Sharaf's 
interim government in February 2011 but then outlawed after the coup.  
 
In any case, the Left, secular and alternative networks never considered their 
demands as compatible with those of the Muslim Brotherhood. Equally, moderate 
Islamist leaders never considered the youth and the activists of these groups as 
suitable allies. Even the NSF, or among them politicians such as Moneim Abul Fotuh 
or Hamdin Sabbahi, initially perceived as suitable partners, were not considered by 
the Muslim Brotherhood as interlocutors during the formation of a government  
following the Brotherhood’s victory in the presidential elections of June 2012. As 
Alexander and Bassiouny confirm, the former unionist Sabbahi “prioritised the 
making of political alliances against Morsi with the feloul (members of the old 
regime) above mobilizing independently”117. This was brought about by a growing 
polarisation of potentially revolutionary forces pitting the Islamists, with increased 
prominence given to Salafi tendencies against the secular and leftists, NGOs and 
alternative networks. Meanwhile, the police and the military junta forged an alliance 
that became evident only on the occasion of the June 30 anti-Muslim Brotherhood 
protest, which led to the consequent dissolution of Popular Committees and 
independent trade unions, as we will discuss in Chapters 3 and 4.  
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In sum, the rapid re-elaboration of past slogans and discourse from anti-regime 
protest before 2011 generated a cross-movement alliance among the Islamists and 
the other secular movements during the mass protests and the formation of the 
Popular Committees. But this shifted again after the Muslim Brotherhood’s decision 
to form a political party (FJP), following shortly afterwards with their parliamentary 
and presidential electoral victories. As Abo Bakr explains in our interview for this 
dissertation, “Hazimun118 left the street protests on November 2011 during the 
fights on Mohammed Mahmud Street after a request of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
leaving alone in the streets the youth of Tahrir”119. 
 
Table VII and VIII show the results of the 2012 parliamentary and presidential 
elections. 
 
Table VII: 2011-2012 Parliamentary Elections' Results 
Political parties  
Freedom and Justice Party 47.2% (235 seats) 
Nour Party 24.3% (123 seats) 
Wafd 7.6% (38 seats) 
Egyptian Bloc 6.8% (34 seats) 
Al-Wasat Party 2% 
Revolution Continues 1.4 
Independents and others 10.6% 
Source: Al-Ahram 
Table VIII: Presidential Elections' Results 
Candidates First Round Second Round 
Mohamed Morsi 24.78% 51.73% 
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Ahmed Shafiq 23.66% 48.27% 
Hamdin Sabbahi 20.72%  
Moneim Aboul Fotuh 17.47%  
Amr Moussa 11.1%  
Khaled Ali 0.58%  
Others 1.5%  
Source: Al-Ahram 
 
This happened because the Muslim Brotherhood and their political party were 
perceived by other protesters as counter-revolutionary. In other words, the 
“transfer of power” to the elected president (June 2012) “did not put the nature of 
the state in question”120. This is true to such an extent that, after the 2013 military 
coup, cross-party alliances were unable to be established. Thus, the repression of 
the Muslim Brotherhood (2013 onwards) did not spark major protests from the 
secular groups. If on January 25 there still are commemorations in Tahrir Square, for 
instance, those for the Rabaa' massacre (on August 14 2013) is not a day in which 
the entire anti-regime movement takes part. As Soueif explains in an interview for 
this dissertation, “After the military coup we do not count the days. If the revolution 
was marked by symbolic protests and days that every activists will never forget, this 
is not the same with the Brotherhood's massacres”121. 
 
As a consequence, the proto-movement continuously changed the identities of their 
chief adversaries. If at the beginning of the 2011 uprisings, former President 
Mubarak was the chief foe, after the SCAF's takeover this switched to the military 
junta, while at the end of 2011 the Muslim Brotherhood joined this list of enemies. 
This hatred for the Muslim Brotherhood was clear in the words of the Socialist 
activist Ramy Sabri:  
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I was in Khalifa Mahmoud Street (during the anti-presidential decree 
protests on November 2012122) near the Presidential Palace when six 
Muslim Brotherhood's supporters attacked me with sticks and knives. After 
a while they were dozens. They pushed me at the entrance of a building 
after calling police officers. I am sure that they were supporters of the 
Muslim Brotherhood's, they were singing pro-Morsi songs, among them I 
recognised Alaa Hamza, leader of the Islamist movement in the Sharqeyya 
region123. 
 
More surprisingly this mistrust of the Muslim Brotherhood did not change after the 
2013 military coup. This was exactly what the army needed in order to split the 
oppositional forces and maintain its rule. But this strategy has not spared the secular 
youth movements from repression who were presented in the mainstream media as 
corrupt and dangerous, especially the Ultras after the Port Said massacre124. Thus 
the riots and repression in Port Said have been used as an example of the political 
instability which the nation risked.  
 
2.2.2 The Muslim Brotherhood and Party Politics 
In this section, I discuss the nature of the Muslim Brotherhood after the 2011 
uprisings, its policies and its relationships with other political oppositional forces. 
One sources of tension between the Left and the Muslim Brotherhood was the 
feeling by the Left, that the Muslim Brotherhood was too closely aligned to US 
foreign policy objectives. Hanieh argues that the Muslim Brotherhood represented 
an “attractive partner” for Western powers125. Achcar adds that “the Bush 
administration was perfectly aware that the Muslim Brothers would be the chief 
beneficiaries of a democratic opening in Egypt”126. This point was strengthened after 
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several meetings between Morsi and Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, and the US 
Ambassador in Cairo, Anne Patterson in 2012 (the same happened in Libya)127.  
 
In turn the Muslim Brotherhood felt that the other oppositional forces were a priori 
reluctant to cooperate with an open mind during the process of drafting a 
constitution or more generally with the Morsi presidency (2012-2013). As al-Haddad 
explains in an interview for this dissertation: 
We tried to include other opposition forces within the Constituent 
Assembly. They were fragmented and stubborn. They tried to block the 
system, then they left the Assembly. Doing so, they invalidated the first 
Assembly. When the Constitution was almost concluded, opposition 
leaders, with the interference of foreign powers, definitively left the 
Assembly. That year they (secular movements) had been called hundreds of 
time to give them responsibilities within the government. They answered: 
‘We are just waiting to see your corpse’. I think we have done more than 
enough to integrate them. Morsi should have been more revolutionary, 
taken the government and not depended on the secular forces. Thus, we 
nominated high bureaucrats who did not have any revolutionary necessity 
to reform the state128.   
 
However, it is also true that the Muslim Brotherhood’s policies (e.g. Islamic finance, 
labour rights) did not help the formation of common identities between the 
Islamists and left-wing movements, although at that stage presidential and 
governmental powers were very limited by military, the hostility129 of the judiciary 
and weak control over the security apparatus130. As Khaled Ali explains in an 
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interview for this dissertation, “Any labour market reform cannot be done by the 
Brotherhood. I thought they had common interests with the Egyptian workers. But I 
was wrong. The Brotherhood's constituency fully supports the leaders' decisions. 
There are politicians and activists within the Brotherhood critical towards the 
leaders of the movement but they left it months ago (2010-2011)”131. 
 
In sum, Islamists and other secular opposition groups shared a very ambiguous 
common identity during the occupation of Tahrir Square and other public spaces, as 
well as within the Popular Committees and independent trade unions, as we shall 
see in the next chapters. This “noncompetitive cooperation” was partially reiterated 
with the formation of the new Parliament and when, after the presidential elections, 
former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq could have been the new President. For this 
reason some leftists decided to vote for the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
Mohammed Morsi, as recalled in the interviews with Alaa Abdel Fattah and Ahdaf 
Soueif, “The initial result of the 2011 Revolution was the election of a legitimate 
Parliament, this clarified how the control of the political arena pursued by the 
military junta was illegitimate. An elected Parliament cannot ignore the demands 
coming from the revolutionaries; feel the pressure for the needed reforms and 
answer to the demands coming from the ongoing and future workers' strikes 
(sic)”132. However, Ahdaf Soueif, as many other leftwing activists decided to vote for 
Morsi at the presidential elections. “At the presidential elections I decided to vote 
for Morsi not because he was my candidate but just because I did not want to see 
the Mubarak regime coming back”133. 
 
However, secular and Islamists never did share revolutionary, multiple or common 
identities. They had very different narratives about the events preceding and 
following the 18 days of Tahrir Square. Thus, many among the political oppositional 
forces and alternative networks began to forge a silent coalition that in 2012 stood 
against both presidential candidates. Moreover, the alternative networks were 
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mainly formed by people who did not want to take part in the electoral process 
(what can be termed as anti-politics). If they participated in the elections for 
personal reasons, they voted either for the Muslim Brotherhood or for the army's 
candidates but without a deep set political motivation. This undermined the long-
term viability for the formation of new political coalitions after the initial events of 
2011. 
 
One could argue that in 2011 having suffered years of repression, the opposition 
was in no fit state to manage the sudden revolutionary upsurge. In other words, if 
the Muslim Brotherhood managed to gain control of the proto-movement after 
2011, this was thanks to the inherent weak and leaderless nature of the temporary 
coalitions forged in the heat of the 18 days in Tahrir Square. This is also true of the 
more structured elements of the opposition who found a temporary leader in 
Mohamed el-Baradei134, former chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA). He was never considered as a reliable interlocutor by the Muslim 
Brotherhood. So even if the Islamists dithered and debated for years about the 
formation of a political party and lacked political experience (one of the most 
popular adjectives to define the Muslim Brotherhood was “incompetent”135), they 
were clearly the most structured, organised, and rooted (all over the country, 
especially in the countryside) political force after 2011.  
 
The Muslim Brotherhood was forced to confront the demands arising from the 
“Egyptian Street”. And the military junta saw its opportunity to tame the street 
movement by helping it become the representative of the “Street”, so as to control 
the proto-movements who occupied urban public spaces, while censoring or 
coopting the Left, the liberals and the secular parties. However, although Morsi's 
period in office was marked by efforts by the Muslim Brotherhood to “insert its own 
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Renaissance Dam's dispute with Ethiopia.  
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supporters”136 in the apparatus of the state, this attempt was circumscribed by the 
military junta and the judiciary137. 
 
Accordingly, by the time of the 2012 presidential elections, there were no other 
alternative political choices except the Muslim Brothers and the military. Meanwhile 
former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq, emerged as the candidate of both the military 
junta and former NDP political elite. He emphasised in all his speeches Egyptian 
nationalism and the need to rebuild the dismantled political party of Mubarak. The 
military accelerated the electoral campaign in order to better integrate the political 
oppositional groups, while the approval of the Salafi political party (El-Nour) by the 
military junta was instrumental in the spread of fear of disorder, thus stimulating 
more episodes of sectarianism and division. Thus table Table IX demonstrates the 
correlation between occupation of public space (2011-2014) and the gradual 
polarisation between the Muslim Brotherhood and other movements, the former 
NDP and pro-army supporters. 
 
Table IX: Muslim Brotherhood and Secular Groups, former NDP and Pro-Army 
Supporters, their Gradual Polarisation and Occupation of Public Space (2011-2014) 
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137 Interview 25. 
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2. Political Polarisation from the Mohammed Mahmud Clashes (November 2011) 
to Parliament’s Dissolution (June 2012) vs. Street Protests (February-November 
2011) 
 






3. Political Polarisation during the Presidential Elections (June 2012)138 









4. Political Polarisation during the Presidential Palace Clashes (November 2012) 
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5. Political Polarisation after the Military Coup (2013-2014) 
Tahrir Square Heliopolis  
(June 30 and July 26 2013)                                           (August 2013 and June 2014) 
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Thus the Muslim Brotherhood was chosen as the military's temporary political 
proxy139 and the most effective anti-revolutionary movement before the 2013 
military coup. As Marfleet argues, “Their [the Army and the Muslim Brotherhood] 
common project during the revolution was that of containment of the movement 
from below, which each viewed with anxiety and disdain”140. However, the Muslim 
Brotherhood's leaders believed, naively, that the military élite no longer wanted to 
be directly involved in politics.  
 
From its foundation, the Muslim Brotherhood, operated as a substitute for the State 
in the lower social strata, and challenged the legitimacy of the ruling elite141. For 
these reasons, Nasser and his successors maintained a well-established policy of a 
mixture of concessions and repression towards the Muslim Brotherhood, but also 
prevented its political participation in the established system. It is not the aim of this 
research to examine the democratic credentials of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood, but this movement has often been misrepresented by some groups on 
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the Left as “entirely reactionary” (Amin, Aswani)142, “expressing the needs of the 
bourgeoisie or the petite bourgeoisie” and “working in the interests of the region's 
imperialist powers”143. More radically, Fred Halliday highlights that the “Islamist 
movements posed an existential threat to the values and organisations of the 
left”144. Thus, Achcar, in reference to the relations between the Muslim Brotherhood 
and the army after the uprisings, talked about “a competitive struggles within and 
between fractions of the same Egyptian capitalist class”145. However, in this 
dissertation I adopt a more nuanced understanding of the political location of the 
Muslim Brotherhood political involvement. As Alexander and Bassiouny 
demonstrate, the Brotherhood can be understood as a “reformist organisation”, 
with more “organisational resources and funding” compared to other political 
groups in Egypt, but ultimately “weak and hesitant” in advocating any serious 
programme of political reforms, once in power146. The Left’s negative attitude 
towards the Islamists had often “led to tacit or active support for the state's 
attempts to crush Islamist movements”147.  
 
However, as argued previously after the 2011 unrest the Muslim Brotherhood 
monopolised and altered the demands arising from the “Street”. However, later the 
Brotherhood gained a certain amount of authority, it is still difficult to assess how 
much power Morsi really had during his presidency. The government of the Muslim 
Brotherhood diverted “the energy of the popular movement away from the assault 
on the core institutions of the old regime”148, even if it did not jettison all of its 
programme, the Muslim Brotherhood took concrete steps to “ensure the 
continuation of the military's political and economic privileges”149. The military coup 
in 2013 confirmed that the Muslim Brotherhood was nevertheless perceived by the 
Egyptian army as not a completely reliable partner for the “Deep State”.  
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The 2011 social proto-movements in the “Egyptian Street” were monopolised by the 
Muslim Brotherhood. This could have been a greater leftwing input but the post-
Communist parties did not achieve a great deal. They appeared weak, fragmented, 
disoriented and leaderless, before, during and after the uprisings. The only example 
of an effective recent left-wing party after a period of demonstrations (Gezi Park 
protests 2013) in the Middle East, at the time of writing, was the Kurdish resistance 
– especially the People's Democratic Party (HDP) in Turkey and the YPG/YPJ fighters 
in Northern Syria, as will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
 
However, this process of marginalisation of the Left happened with many other 
social movements in the region. The 1979 Iranian Revolution was clearly 
monopolised by the Shi'a clerics but, in this instance, it was the Iran-Iraq war that 
brought about the demobilisation of all the leading actors of the uprisings, especially 
the left-wing parties (Communists, Mujaheddin, Fedayn, the Kurdish movements, 
etc.). This happened in the 2011 Tunisian uprisings as well. However, the moderate 
Islamist political party (Ennahda) was influenced by the Egyptian political repression 
and accepted to be a minority group in the Parliament, supporting a more 
comprehensive process for drafting the new Constitution, leaving space for the local 
trade unions and leftist activists. Similar patterns affected the political oppositions in 
Syria and Libya. Especially in Tripoli, the National General Congress (NGC) is now 
controlled by the Islamists as a consequence of a tentative military coup (2014) of 
the former General Khalifa Haftar, supported by President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.  
 
In this chapter I argued that during the Egyptian 2011 uprisings the social proto-
movement was demobilised by its encounters in public spaces (such as Tahrir 
Square) with other anti-regime actors (most notably the Muslim Brotherhood). This 
process prevented the formation of a cross-ideological and cross-class anti-regime 
coalition, as it will be argued in the Conclusion. In the next chapter, the role of the 
Egyptian state, society and the working class will be discussed in order to introduce 
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the analysis of the activation and demobilization of Popular Committees and 




The Uprisings in Egypt: State, Society and the Working Class 
With literature review and interviews, the aim of this chapter is to disentangle how 
the different waves of repression altered, manipulated and halted the revolutionary 
potential of both greater and lesser organised political oppositional forces during 
and after the 2011 uprisings. In other words, I will analyse the repression of the 
social proto-movements carried out by the “Deep State”, introducing the literature 
on the relationships between political and military elites, trying to understand why 
and how the army usually intervened when confronted with popular unrest in order 
to hinder mass riots and class-based social movements.  
 
In this Chapter I will answer the following questions: How did the state react to the 
protests in order to demobilise the oppositional movements? What has been the 
place of the slogan “Bread, Freedom and Social Justice” among the demands of the 
demonstrators? In other words, I will disentangle the role of “Social Justice” as an 
ideological tool that was hijacked by the military elites with their deployment of 
populism. This process is relevant to later discuss how the Popular Committees in 
Cairo neighbourhoods were forged and demobilised in parallel with the major waves 
of unrest and political repression and to analyse the workings and levels of 
mobilisation of the independent trade unions, created after the 2011 uprisings and 
now under strict state control. 
 
The army has played a vital role in the political and economic development of many 
post-colonial states. Especially in the Middle East, the military has been, on the one 
hand, an agency of modernisation, with a peculiar role in economic development, 
and, on the other hand, an agency of order, especially during bouts of major unrest. 
Therefore, in many cases in the Middle East the military and the modern national 
State became coterminous150. The Egyptian, Syrian and Iraqi armies, forged by 
                                                             
150 Janowitz, M. Military Institutions, p. 15 
81 
 
French and British, had been modelled on the European style of organisation151. As a 
consequence, Janowitz states “ex-colonial origin ensures that the military will not 
limit its role to the mark of sovereignty”152.  
 
3.1 The Military-Civilian Divide 
I tackle here the military-civilian divide, explaining why in Egypt the army increased 
its political involvement after national independence. First of all, the relationship 
between military and political elites or the effects of economic liberalisation policies 
on officers, acting as businessmen, have always corresponded to both the overt or 
covert influences of the military on state institutions. Moreover, in many cases, 
external influences in the twentieth century forged army strategies and determined 
internal factionalism. Finally, the temptation of a military takeover of political 
institutions, in certain cases, altered the function of the military.  
 
If, in the mid-twentieth century, the role of military officers in Egypt was prominent 
in overthrowing the monarchy and the beginning of the national independence 
movement, there are still many controversies among scholars about how one 
defines the precise political and economic roles of the military in the last decades. 
Due to the lack of fieldwork research, Owen, Vatikiotis, Hurewitz, Abdel-Malek, 
Nordlinger153 focused their studies on army political takeovers caused by domestic 
threats of instability or against challenges coming from other groups (e.g. co-opted 
political parties, businessmen, etc.) operating within the state. In other words, as 
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Janowitz argues, in certain cases, militaries had to increase their coercive practices 
in order not to prevent the challenge from “organised counter-elites”154.  
 
More recently, other scholars, such as Sorenson, Droz-Vincent, and Springborg155 
have tried to deconstruct the military-civilian divide and explain more critically why 
the army increased its political involvement in post-colonial Egypt. They argue that it 
was caused by the military defence of their corporate interests and also to head off 
the weakening of the military’s capacity to prevent popular uprisings, which might 
result in significant structural changes. This dissertation employs this argument in 
analysing the behaviour of the Egyptian military elite and its decision to intervene 
during the 2011 uprisings in order to assess the different patterns of demobilisation 
of the social proto-movements. 
  
The Egyptian case is a good example, as Mitchell156 argues more generally in 
reference to how state-society relations operate in authoritarian regimes, of how 
the blurred distinction between military and civilian elites has been used in order to 
generate power. Thus other social actors or elites have not held the same claim over 
economic power or to guarantee domestic unity. The officers, coming from 
relatively uniform and isolated backgrounds, appear as a united, prestigious and 
cohesive entity. This description of the military however masks its own political and 
structural divisions.  
 
In Egypt the purported distinction between the military and the civilian political 
elites has been used as a cover to conceal the overlaps between these two realms. 
In other words, the military’s power depended on this bogus separation from the 
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political elite. Gamal Abdel Nasser exchanged his military uniform for a civilian 
suit157 but in so doing enhanced the army’s corporate interests. Later, the 
“corrective revolution”, encouraged by Sadat, was represented as an attempt to 
lessen the military’s political role but did not correspond to a significant change in 
the army’s political involvement158. More recently, in the period before his 
resignation few people still perceived Hosni Mubarak as a military ruler.  
 
However, the political-civilian elite, after the 2011 demonstrations, needed the 
military’s intervention for its own defence. As we shall see later, the first elected 
non-military President in Egyptian history, Mohamed Morsi, was rapidly abandoned 
by the military elites159 in order to restore the formerly near complete overlapping 
relationships between military and political elites so as to defend their corporate 
interests, and to accede to the pressures of other agents in the “Deep State”, 
business cliques, the Coptic Church, and also to demobilise the social proto-
movements, as well as to safeguard the geopolitical interests of Saudi Arabia. 
 
3.1.1 The Military Junta and Major Unrest 
In this section I further disentangle the workings of the Egyptian army and its 
political interventions, especially during popular unrest. Egypt is a more centralised 
state with a strong and well-established public apparatus (e.g. judges, military, 
police, bureaucracy and cultural institutions), compared to weaker states in the 
region such as Libya and Syria where the 2011 unrest ended up in civil wars. Egypt 
has low levels of peripheral power and lacks instruments of direct democracy160. 
 
In 2011, the army surprisingly decided to take the side of the protesters abandoning 
President Mubarak. Perhaps this happened because they did not favour the 
succession of Gamal, his son as the only person to share some power with his father, 
to be the new president. However, Gamal Mubarak did not have a solid military 
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background and this was viewed with distrust by the military161. The SCAF, led by 
Field Marshall Hussein Tantawi, was officially in charge from January 2011 to June 
2012, when Morsi was elected. However, the military junta control over the political 
elites and the supervision over the transition process never ended.  
 
This approach was meant to give some apparent concessions to the Muslim 
Brotherhood (e.g. Constitutional Declaration, Parliamentary and Presidential 
elections). However, on June 30 2013, any controversy on how to handle the period 
of transition within the army disappeared in order to regain the complete control of 
the institutions with the military coup of July 3 2013. The separation of military and 
political functions was completely abandoned by the takeover of General Abdel 
Fattah al-Sisi. In so doing, the military junta obtained total control over a closed 
Parliament (up to 2015), the judiciary, the Interior Ministry, the bureaucracy, some 
small political parties, a youth movement (Tamarrod) and trade unions. As al-
Haddad argues in one of our interviews, “The military coup has been a retaliation of 
the old regime and the “Deep State”. The Tamarrod campaign unified the 
opposition' cliques: resentful citizens, public bureaucracy, the leaderless 
oppositions, families close to the National Democratic Party (NDP) and mercenaries. 
They portrayed it as a mass demonstration but they agreed only on a point: they did 
not want the Muslim Brotherhood in power”162.  
 
As seen before, this favoured a degree of internal corporate independence and 
facilitated several internal coups in order to control state institutions but in a 
context of total adherence towards the policies of the military junta, thus for 
example the former Minister of Interior, Mohammed Ibrahim, was suddenly 
dismissed without public explanations (2015); the former head of the Judges Club, 
Ahmed el-Zind, took over as Minister of Justice without a political debate (2015); 
other examples are the allegations of several plots within the army: in 2014 and 
2015, Sami Annan and other 26 officials were accused of planning a military coup. 
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3.1.2 1952-54 vs. 2011-13: a Comparative Perspective 
Military interference in politics is not new in Egyptian history. In this section, we will 
compare the military takeovers in 1952-54 and 2011-13. The relevance of this 
comparison for this dissertation is to show how the Free Officers restored order in 
1952, which has certain similarities with the SCAF’s takeovers in 2011 and 2013163. 
In Egypt the military personnel, confronted with major uprisings, have always 
intervened in order to defend the ruling elite, spreading fear and limiting political 
dissent by invoking the need for stability. In contrast, connections between Left-
wing, Liberal and Islamist oppositions were forged as a consequence of these bouts 
of political repression.  
 
Popular demands for change erupted on January 1952 when a mob of students and 
activists burned down 750 buildings in Cairo during several demonstrations against 
the government and King Farouk. The British intervened with artillery in Ismailia, 
with the aim of destroying a weapons compound, which exacerbated these 
uprisings. A curfew and martial law were imposed. The urban unrest led to the Free 
Officers’ (RCC) coup on July 23 1952. After four days, the RCC forced King Farouk to 
leave Egypt. In the following two years of transition, the officers consolidated their 
authority transforming the military coup into a “revolution from above”164. By June 
1953 they named a figurehead as president, Muhammed Naguib, and abrogated the 
constitution and suppressed political movements.  
 
In 1954, Naguib was ousted and the Muslim Brotherhood, which initially 
participated to the protests, was outlawed. Many leftists initially perceived the RCC 
as closely echoing their political demands, as well as, trade unions, universities and 
professional associations, faced a crackdown. Those political groups and the 
Wafdists, experienced deep internal divisions over the issue of supporting or 
opposing the military takeover. Thus, the coup-makers, the Free Officers, were 
described by other oppositional groups as “masterly manipulators” after the 
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abdication of King Farouk. In other words, as Marfleet states, “[Nasser and the 
Officers] enacted a decisive strike against the old regime; at the same time they 
were hostile to the movement that had facilitated their bid for power”165. 
 
3.1.3 Strategies of Repression during first Waves of Protests (2011-2013) 
Bearing the events of 1952-1954 in mind, we can now turn to how the Egyptian 
military junta demobilised the revolutionary potential of the 2011 proto-movement. 
In 2011 in Egypt for the first time in 30 years, street vendors, urban poor, youth, 
football supporters, migrants, many women and workers formed a non-organised 
movement, performing “collective actions”. In early 2011 the authorities tried to 
strangle the proto-movement as they had done successfully during the less universal 
revolts of 2005 and 2008. As a lieutenant colonel in the riot police recalled on the 
night of the January 25 the streets and squares “had to be cleaned up”166.  
 
According to witnesses, in a few hours, 200 vehicles, 50 buses and 10,000 riot police 
forced the people out of Tahrir Square. On January 27, police officials planned a 
shutdown of the Internet, mobile phones and a crackdown on bloggers and Internet 
activists167. The following day, huge crowds gathered in the square of the main 
Egyptian towns again. The slogans were “Down with Hosni Mubarak!”, “The people 
want to overthrow the regime”. In several urban districts, the police sought to prevent 
ordinary people from joining the crowd or proceeded to make arbitrary arrests.  
 
As Tripp explains:  
In every city, the protests homed in on a range of different buildings and 
public sites associated with the regime, but also with aspects of Egyptian 
public life that had been curbed and repressed by the years of dictatorship. 
Thus, in Suez the ruling NDP building was surrounded and then set alight, 
police stations were besieged and the public spaces around government 
offices occupied. In Cairo, thousands converged on Tahrir Square, the central 
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site of public demonstration in the shadow of the Mugamma and with the 
NDP headquarters looming in another corner. But there were also protests 
and demonstrations outside the main court buildings and the journalists' 
union – public institutions central to the rights of Egyptians, but dominated 
and cowed by the regime over the years. In a tactic designed to baffle, 
outmanoeuvre and overstretch the security forces, many of the protestors 
kept up a mobile form of demonstration, dissolving and reassembling to 
create flash-mobs across the city that the riot police found difficult to track, 
let alone to prevent or to suppress168.  
 
On the night of January 28, the police appeared clearly unable to confront such 
diverse and huge crowds. Thus, the then Minister of Interior, Habib al-Adly, ordered 
the removal of the police from the “Street”. A curfew and martial law were imposed. 
According to the Arab Network for Human Rights, 841 people died on January 28 
2011. Workers and poor from deprived neighbourhood were those who paid the 
greatest price in loss of life and injury169. 
 
As Tripp highlights, “On February 1, a week after the original demonstrations, some 
two to three million people came out on the streets across Egypt, reclaiming public 
space and showing their defiance with their voices” […] “Tahrir Square had become 
the symbolic epicentre of the uprising [...] The Square itself had become a focus not 
simply of protest and demonstration, but also of debate, entertainment and 
sociability [...] a popular assembly in constant session”170.  
 
With the police no longer present, the uprisings continued with attacks on police 
stations, National Democratic Party (NDP) headquarters, State Security buildings, 
municipal councils, governors’ offices and utility buildings. The same night, groups of 
criminals, known as baltagi, suddenly appeared, especially in poor neighbourhoods. 
This suggested that, as many witnesses attested, policemen and members of the 
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ruling NDP paid these groups directly. Ordinary people, political activists and Muslim 
Brothers created self-defence groups or Popular Committees in many 
neighbourhoods to protect homes from possible attacks.  
 
In order to demobilise the revolutionary potential of the proto-movement, poor 
neighbourhoods suddenly became chaotic. This suggests that, as it happened in 
previous mobilisations, criminals and infiltrators were extensively used as public 
agents in order to spread fear, arrest foreigners – in other words, to trigger a real 
fight between the state and ordinary people171.  
 
As Alaa Abdel Fattah recalls in one of our interviews for this dissertation, since the 
beginning of the uprisings and over all of 2011:  
The civil resistance movements continued their struggle. They were 
engaged in simple self-defence actions. In Tahrir's sit-ins there were street 
children and spontaneous poor who would like to see some achievements 
from the Revolution. On the other hand, there were men infiltrated by the 
army, often in plain clothes, who triggered the clashes. The same people 
infiltrated Popular Committees during the uprisings and the Agouza's 
demonstrations on August 29 2011. Those infiltrators began setting fire to 
the Institut d'Egypt from the roof on December 17 2011172. 
 
After three days the military personnel reacted, the army's tanks began to control all 
the roads heading to Tahrir Square. As a soldier, who entered in Tahrir Square that 
day, explained: “The country was out of control. We had the order to go to the 
Square and not to shoot at the protesters. We were welcomed by the crowd in the 
Square: they gave me flowers and fruits. I will never forget this day. Moreover, I 
would never use force against people belonging to my family” 173. 
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On February 2, thousands of people paid by the NDP converged on Tahrir Square, 
some riding horses and camels, armed with iron bars and stones attacking the 
protesters. As Tripp argued, “This turn of events re-energised the protests. People 
demonstrated their outrage at the methods used by the regime, showing that they 
were determined to maintain their protests on a scale as great as or even greater 
than before”174. 
 
The military was already in the position of being the saviour of the national interest, 
the only power that, intervening, could entail order, guarantee the ruling elite and 
restore stability175. On February 10, SCAF issued “Communiqué Number One” 
supporting the legitimate rights of the people to protest.  
 
Even if the levels of repression did not have univocal effects on the levels of 
mobilisation176, the Egyptian army had clearly perceived that an initial 
accommodative strategy towards the protesters (and later on with the Muslim 
Brotherhood government) was not successful in demobilising the proto-movement, 
especially within the factories, as we shall see later. Then, they gradually decided to 
prevent again any form of dissent.  
 
All kinds of paramilitary groups, ranging from the military police to State Security 
agents were deployed. As Janowitz highlighted, since national independence, the 
growth of paramilitary forces paralleled the development of their functions, 
structures and coercive methods177. It is plausible that, to restore order, the army 
made extensive use of policemen too. This explains the extent to which the army, as 
the major entity of order, was ready, overtly or on the sly, to activate the police in 
order to defend the political elite. This renewed alliance between army and police, 
or better put, between Interior and Defence Ministries, not necessarily in place 
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during Mubarak's time, clearly surfaced with the June 30 2013 anti-Muslim 
Brotherhood protests. The dynamics behind these events confirmed the extent to 
which the Egyptian armed forces were and are rooted in state institutions and how 
much the military is able to intervene employing its formal and informal 
apparatuses, as well as instrumentalising other forces, when the status quo is 
threatened178.  
 
It was in these circumstances that the army decided to abandon the then President 
Hosni Mubarak. Despite his reluctance to resign, the military clearly wanted to 
remove him. Mubarak could only remain in charge until he was not a threat to the 
established order. Protestors remained in Tahrir Square until the announcement of 
Mubarak’s resignation was made on February 11 2011 and the military junta 
officially took over.  
 
As Tripp explains, “The resignation of the president, dramatic as it appeared, was 
just the beginning [...] (Many knew that) Tantawi and others on the SCAF were 
themselves clients and long-time associates of the departed president and strongly 
suspected therefore that they would not willingly oversee radical changes on the 
dispensation of power”179. 
 
At this stage, the SCAF attempted to modify the demands arising from the “Egyptian 
Street”, to highlight its role in the maintenance of order and generally 
institutionalise the movement in the transition to a new regime. However, many 
young soldiers expressed strong support for the protesters (their relevance will be 
discussed in the next section). As Interviewee 10 stated, “I am against the SCAF, I 
was in a barracks room with other 20 soldiers in Salah Salem180. When I had the 
chance, I went to Tahrir Square with my military comrades, although it has been 
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strictly forbidden by the officers. Nobody confessed that to the generals when they 
arrested us”181.  
 
For instance, an individual soldier (at that time a deserter) supporting the 
revolutionaries, in a demonstration at the Syndicate of Journalists in Ramses Street 
(2011), argued: “During the last evenings, many soldiers switched off the electricity 
in the barracks for hours. The day later, the officers found insulting graffiti in several 
rooms. For these reasons, many soldiers were harshly punished”182.  
 
The night of January 28 is vital to understand how the need of stability was 
stimulated by the action of army officers. This pattern of action was constantly 
reproduced before the 2013 military coup, with the use of relatively small amounts 
of violence, in order to stop further demonstrations, except during the clashes at 
Maspero (State-Television building) in October 2011 and during the Port Said 
massacre of February 2012. In both cases, the role of the military junta in triggering 
the violence was evident and had been confirmed by many witnesses. The military 
did not intervene in many sectarian clashes between Copts and Muslims that broke 
out in different Cairo districts (e.g. Moqattam, Helwan, Embaba and Maspero) from 
February to October 2011. As a Port Said policeman confirmed in one of our 
interviews: “They were ordered not to search the football supporters when they 
entered into the stadium. Moreover when the clashes started the lights were 
suddenly switched off. They were even ordered to close all the entrances to prevent 
Al-Ahly supporters from leaving the pitch”183.   
 
The lack of police intervention suggested that this was retaliation against the role 
played by the Al-Ahly Ultras184 during the demonstrations. Thus as the blogger and 
activists Wael Abbas confirms: “The Revolution did not succeed, people still 
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disappear. Some of them have been tortured and not justly tried. Thus, SCAF 
hampered the autonomous development of the Revolution. We thought that the 
Mubarak removal was enough, but it is the role of the army, which presents itself as 
neutral, that should be discussed”185.  
 
Thus, the methods used by the military junta to create a need for stability were 
diverse and subtle. Firstly, they implemented military trials for civilians. Secondly, 
state-television programmes constantly discredited demonstrators. Thirdly, they 
tried to discourage women participation in the protests in different ways, through 
rapes and harassment186 (carried out on a massive scale, not only by the security 
forces but by other Islamists and ordinary people too), and virginity tests. Moreover, 
anal tests for alleged gay' activists were also carried out. Figure IV shows an anti-
sexual harassment graffiti near Tahrir Square. 
 
Figure IV: Anti-sexual Harassment Graffiti near Tahrir Square 
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Fourthly, a huge number of arbitrary arrests and summoning to court of journalists 
and protesters were put in place. Fifthly, violent searches of NGOs were carried out 
followed by their closure. Sixthly, public spaces were partitioned with walls and 
barbed wire fences. But to make sure that the political elite was not threatened, 
SCAF adopted many other measures: precipitous electoral procedures, the 
constitutional referendum, the electoral laws and the elimination of candidates for 
the presidency, culminating with the closure of the Parliament (June 2012).  
 
As Marfleet highlights, 
Police and security agencies had seen compelled to retreat and for the 
first time in decades most neighbourhoods, workplaces and campuses 
enjoyed freedom from constant surveillance […] These gains were 
modest, however, and fell far short of demands raised in countless 
strikes and protests. The government had enacted political reform – but 
guidgingly and according to limits established by the armed forces 
command, which still held power. The dictator had gone but the 
dictatorship was in place187. 
 
3.1.4 Strategies of Repression before and after the Military Coup (2013-2015) 
In this section, I discuss how the army intervened in order to stop the initial political 
transition, on July 3 2013, eventually, forging a military regime. In other words, as 
Bassiouny and Alexander argue, “the generals were able to turn the contradictions 
between social and democratic aspects […] to their advantage”188.  
 
The military elite forged and infiltrated the Tamarrod (Rebel) campaign against 
Morsi (May 2013). Many youngsters in this group were already working for the 
Secret Services (Mukabarat) and the Military Intelligence before joining the 
campaign that led to Morsi's dismissal189. On June 30 2013, a huge demonstration 
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took place in Tahrir Square, supported by the police, the judiciary, the Coptic 
Church, the public and many private media, former NDP politicians, the elders 
among Socialists and Liberals, intellectuals and triggered by the Tamarrod (Rebel) 
campaign, infiltrated by the Military Intelligence.  
 
Within 48 hours, President Mohammed Morsi was asked to resign. On July 3, he was 
arrested by the Presidential Guard and detained for months in a secret location 
without clear charges. This was the beginning of the restored army rule, with the 
support of Saudi capitalists190 and the main local Salafi groups, the launch of a long-
lasting interim government, as stated in the military backed “roadmap” which 
included the figurehead, Adli Mansur, the head of the Supreme Court, as the acting 
president, and the beginning of a new relationship with Russian President Vladimir 
Putin, which has served as one of pillars of Egyptian foreign policy. Meanwhile, the 
re-mobilised Popular Committees were banned by the Interior Ministry, as we will 
further discuss. 
 
At this stage defining these events as a military takeover was considered 
problematic by many observers. Initially, media accounts presented the 
demonstration on June 30 2013 as a popular unrest similar to the protests of 
January 25 2011. Some analysts added creative adjectives defining it as a “popular” 
or “democratic” coup. Later, other academic works (Owen, Bayat, Alexander)191 
defined the army takeover on July 3 as a military coup. Drawing upon this approach, 
as in part discussed hitherto and more extensively tackled in the Conclusion, I will 
explain, especially in reference to the activation and then banning of Popular 
Committees and independent trade unions, that this process of military 
interventionism to hinder the potential of the revolutionary movement started long 
before this day, perhaps already on January 28 2011 when the army's tanks began 
to control all the roads heading to Tahrir Square. 
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As Owen explains in an interview for this dissertation, “The army intervened in order 
to stop the popular mobilisation; they say that they did that in the name of the 
people but they only wanted to bring the people back home. The same process 
happened during the French Revolution”192.  
 
Likewise, these events determined a temporary re-mobilisation of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s non-violent demonstrations in order to support the legitimacy of the 
Morsi presidency with sit-ins in the main squares of all the major Egyptian cities. 
However, the Muslim Brotherhood did not want a violent confrontation with the 
army. Thus they organised peaceful demonstrations, marches and flash-mobs 
throughout the country. In Cairo this happened in Rab'a al-Adawiya (Medinat 
Nasser) and al-Nahda (Giza); similar peaceful protests were organised in Minya 
(Meidan Palace), Assyut (Meidan Omar Akram), Alexandria and Suez (Meidan 
Arbain).   
 
As Abbas highlights in one of our interviews: 
The army acted in a more devious way than Mubarak. The military personnel 
incited the crowd against the Brotherhood, they did not intervene to avoid 
clashes and defended who wanted to kill the Islamists. Many Egyptian 
followed Tamarrod but it was not a political group, it was a petition 
campaign. I suspect they were in connivance with the Security Services and 
lacked political awareness. Did they support the military coup? They don't 
remember what the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) ruling 
meant for us (the revolutionaries) over the last two years? We do not have to 
confuse Tamarrod with the Coalition of Revolutionary Youth. In their public 
interventions Tamarrod supported the army interferences. The 
revolutionaries would never have supported the police and a military coup, 
even if backed by the crowd (sic)193.   
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On August 14 2013, the security forces, after a controversial decision taken by the 
former Interior Ministry, Mohammed Ibrahim, who had been appointed by Morsi 
himself, and in coordination with the military junta, as well as the acting Prime 
Minister and the then head of the Armed Forces, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, attacked the 
Rab'a al-Adawiya and al-Nahda's encampments. Hundreds of people were killed or 
disappeared during these days194. Those events clearly revealed the aggressive 
nature of the military-police's takeover, probably, paving the way for a less popular 
image of the Egyptian army, as confirmed by the very low turn-outs at the 2014 and 
2015 presidential and parliamentary elections. 
 
As Zubaida adds in an interview for this dissertation, “After the coup 41, 000 people 
have been arrested, hundreds of detainees have been tortured, many activists have 
been illegally arrested, unconstitutional laws have been approved; the army 
privileges have grown, the military personnel received extra payments, many 
contracts have been granted to factories controlled by the army; a fascist, extremist 
and xenophobic political discourse has grown”195. 
 
The political role of the judiciary in limiting the demands of the protesters, both 
Islamists and other political groups, was particularly evident at this stage of the 
repression with hundreds of death sentences pronounced against the Muslim 
Brotherhood leaders and supporters and life sentences against other protesters, 
while NGOs were searched or closed, and the censorship of the independent media 
was put in place (including the notorious Al-Jazeera trial).  On the role of the 
judiciary in the repression process, in an interview for this dissertation, Seif al-Islam 
argues, “The Egyptian judiciary is an instrument to prevent political participation. 
Since 2006, we fought for a real independence of the judges from the government. 
Nowadays, the judges are still dependent on the security apparatus. And justice is 
used as a political tool against the enemies of the regime. The judges work to please 
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al-Sisi. Sometimes they do that even without specific orders but only to serve the 
regime. It is only with the re-organisation of the army's role in politics that a 
democratic society can emerge”196. 
 
In this restored military regime, after the closure of public markets, the expulsion of 
street vendors and the cleansing of downtown buildings, some forms of irrelevant 
dissent have been tolerated. However, all the charities of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
its hospitals, its NGOs, its associations and its media outlets have been either closed 
down, or have faced noticeable levels of repression or the removal of its former 
management. The Society of the Muslim Brotherhood, its political party the FJP and 
the coalition defending Morsi government's legitimacy have been outlawed by the 
Egyptian courts. The Islamist movements within the universities have been heavily 
repressed (especially on the Al-Azhar and Ayn Shamps campuses).  
 
The political leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood have been stigmatised as full-
fledged terrorists. The recent major episodes of political repression and terrorism – 
the al-Fateh Mosque clashes (2013), the October 6 clashes (2013), the attack on the 
Mansoura police station (2013), the third Tahrir Square anniversary (2014), 
bombings of the Islamic Art Museum (2014), the assassination of the General 
Prosecutor (2015) and several murders of groups of people who were allegedly 
Muslim Brotherhood supporters (2015) – along with the never ending violence in 
the Sinai, where a curfew and emergency law have been imposed - are claimed by 
the acting government to be the responsibility of the Muslim Brotherhood or carried 
out by the Security forces to eradicate other terrorist organisations.  
 
At this stage, it is not the aim of this research to discuss the issue of state terrorism. 
However, it is enough to argue that, considering the timing and locations where 
some of these events took place, many independent journalists and analysts 
(Filiu)197 have highlighted the overlapping responsibilities of some branches of the 
military Intelligence and the State Security (Amn el-Dawla) in collusion with radical 
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Islamists in triggering a permanent need for political repression. It has been argued 
by some observers that such a “strategy of tension” has been used by the post-coup 
ruling elite in order to counter-balance its lack of democratic legitimacy.  
 
However, it is important to note that the social services provided by the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the 1980s and 1990s, a sort of second social state in Egypt, has been 
partially replaced by an unmitigated diffuse condition of poverty among the lower 
strata of immigrants and other people, marginalised by the neo-liberal policies of 
Mubarak, Morsi and Sisi. Although these subaltern classes were the real 
protagonists of the 2011 uprisings and continue their everyday struggles against the 
brutal practices of the State, the question might be raised as why this lumpen 
proletariat did not find any noticeable representation within movements on the 
Left198? A possible answer might be the widespread lack of education199, political 
awareness and a complete mistrust of party politics and electoral procedures within 
the subaltern classes, which was not addressed by leftist activists, present in the 
“Egyptian Street”, and only marginally addressed through post-Islamist capitalist 
discourse200 in the wake of 2011. Therefore it is understandable how in the 
conditions of the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings, a nationalist and “neo-Nasserist” 
political discourse has been able to integrate and co-opt left-wing ideology. This 
happened because post-Islamist ideology appeared less able to address the 
demands of the “Street” than the army, as we will discuss in the next section. 
 
Following the 2013 military coup, all manner of political activism and political 
pluralism has been repressed in Egypt. The resilience of the “Deep State”, the 
restoration of the privileges of the ruling elite of the National Democratic Party 
(NDP) and their traditional form of crony capitalism have weakened the ability of 
alternative movements to exercise an influence on civil society. However, the 2011 
political mobilisation did enhance the space for new forms of protection for specific 
interests or single issues. This is the case with the opening of human rights or labour 
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rights institutions such as the Arab Reform Initiative201 and the Centre for Economic 
and Social Rights (ECESR)202.   
 
Thus, the incompatibility between the Muslim Brotherhood and other oppositional 
movements, especially on the Left, in the context of absence of control of the 
security apparatuses, contributed to isolate the Muslim Brotherhood from other 
oppositional forces, preparing the ground for a military coup. In other words, other 
oppositional groups saw the temporary alliance of the military and the Muslim 
Brotherhood as a counter-revolutionary agreement. The Muslim Brotherhood was in 
fact isolated because it shunned a suitable alliance with the “Street” and other 
oppositional forces and relied on an agreement with the military, which the army 
saw as an alliance of convenience and had no intention of allowing the Muslim 
Brotherhood to rule without constant supervision. On the occasion of the 2011 
uprisings, the Egyptian army intervened to restore order. The SCAF, firstly, 
attempted to preserve the ruling elite, secondly, triggered a need for stability in 
different ways to stop the proto-movement.  
 
In this section we have discussed how, during the Egyptian 2011 uprisings, more 
fragile political actors, such as Left-wing groups and alternative networks had been 
demobilised. These findings are vital to later discuss how civil society activities, in 
general terms, and more importantly for the two case studies of this dissertation, 
Popular Committees and independent trade unions vanished after the military 
takeover. In the next part, the role of ideology in fostering this process will be 
assessed. 
 
3.2 Ideology: “Social Justice” in Egypt  
Citing the relevant secondary literature and interviews carried out for this 
dissertation, this section will evaluate the slogan of 2011: “Bread, Freedom and 
Social Justice” and the missed possibility to forge a “collective identity” between 
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Islamists, the “Egyptian Street” and other oppositional movements. In doing so, I will 
explain, in more general terms, how workers' movements have been demobilised in 
the interests of the management of the main Egyptian factories, governed by 
businessmen with military backgrounds.  
 
Many scholars have underestimated the role played by workers' movements, 
alternative networks and other civil society agencies during and after the 2011 
uprisings. However, we draw upon other approaches (Beinin, Gelvin, Alexander)203 
that considered the major political changes which have occurred recently in Egypt as 
directly triggered by the spread of labour protests. As Alexander and Bassiouny 
argue, the roots of the 2011 uprisings lay “in the transformation of the relationships 
between the state, capital and labour that took place over the previous 35 years on 
both a local and a global scale”204. In other words, the “social soul” of the Egyptian 
2011 unrest “was a critical element from the start”205. As they explain,  
Through their self-organised collective action, workers asserted the 
centrality of the social aspect of the revolution, in confrontation with the 
reformist political forces such as the Muslim Brotherhood, who hoped to 
restrict its scope to a limited democratic transition. This continuation of the 
workers' revolt was the key factor in the destabilisation of the post-
Mubarak political settlement between the Brotherhood and the generals of 
the old regime206. 
 
An initial answer to the question why the demands for “Social Justice” did not forge 
a collective identity between the diverse political antagonists, might be that, on the 
one hand, “the revolutionary movement lacked real roots in the workplaces”207, 
and, on the other hand, the main responsibilities of this failure were due to the 
Muslim Brotherhood' leaders who were not considered by other oppositional 
groups as genuinely defending the subalterns.  
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As the former presidential candidate and ECESR's director Khaled Ali outlined during 
our interview for this dissertation: 
The Muslim Brotherhood did not want to bring 'Social Justice' but they just 
wanted to promote state aids. The 2012 Constitution, voted by the 
Brotherhood, was dangerous for social rights. Workers' organisations could 
have disappeared and it would have been tougher to form new trade unions. 
This is against the International Labour Organisation’s rules. According to 
their constitution, if the board of a trade union was perceived as responsible 
for penal or civil crimes it could have been dissolved. But this was not the 
case for the professionals’ unions where the Brotherhood had the 
majority208.  
 
However, one of the reasons why “Social Justice” did not become the main target of 
the oppositional groups is related to the way in which the army and the “Deep 
State” diverted the social demands of the proto-movements from Political Islam to a 
faux Neo-Nasserism. 
   
3.2.1 The Heritage of Gamal Abdel Nasser 
What does Nasserism mean for the Egyptian people? Gamal Abdel Nasser’s pictures 
were among the first items Tahrir’s street vendors sold in the aftermath of the 2011 
uprisings. His popularity, as an Egyptian national hero, has never diminished. But the 
army as a whole, embodied in the SCAF, wanted to be represented as his legitimate 
successor once they decided to support the “revolution”. This “popular” side of the 
army, in poor neighbourhoods, took the form, for instance, of butchers receiving 
meat from the military factories that was sold at half price to the public.  
 
The popularity of the Egyptian army has been longstanding. The seizure of power by 
junior army officers in 1952 under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser 
represented just such an attempt to overcome the blockage imposed by the political 
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alliance between the colonial power (Britain) and large landowners, led by the royal 
family209. Firstly, the political economy of Nasser's regime was a form of state 
capitalism, “made necessary by the crisis of accumulation which the Egyptian ruling 
class had failed to solve”210. Secondly, independent workers' organisations and Left-
wing political parties “emerged for the first time from the shadow of liberal 
nationalism”211. However, Nasser pursued the “political suppression of the workers' 
movement with its social incorporation”212. 
 
The agrarian reform, approved by Gamal Abdel Nasser, denuded the large 
landowners. If in 1950, 72% of the landholders held 6.2% of the agricultural land. In 
1952, 94.4% of the landowners held 46.6% of the land213. A semi-feudal oligarchy 
was forced to abandon its privileges in favour of a rural middle class. Likewise, public 
assistance and minimum wages for peasants and workers were established. Those 
polices contributed to “demobilise the working class”214. After the RCC took over, 
other anti-regime movements, especially the popular support enjoyed by the 
Communists and the Muslim Brotherhood, were perceived as a danger, although 
many officers sympathised or were aligned to them. The Communists were 
persecuted and marginalised by the RCC throughout 1953. For instance, the 
workers, who participated in the Kafr al Dawwar’ strikes, were depicted by the junta 
as “enemies of the revolution”215: an agency of disorder.  
 
Thus, the army in Egypt acted as a force against the working class long before the 
2011 uprisings. Since the 1919 workers' movements, the military has operated as an 
anti-revolutionary institution. As seen before, if the Free Officers and the SCAF 
intervened in 1952 and 2011 in favour of the ruling elite, it is primarily due to the 
defence of its corporate economic achievements. On the one hand, the agrarian 
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reform promoted by Nasser did not undermine military interests, on the other hand, 
a policy of nationalisation and, afterwards, liberalisation extensively increased the 
influence of the military in the Egyptian economy. Rather, paradoxically a less 
pervasive state gradually enhanced the role of military personnel both in public, 
semi-private and private sectors.  
 
Finally, intertwined military and civilian elites forged a “military society”216 and a 
military economy. If, on the one hand, due to the infitah policies, the military elites 
were increasingly transformed into a business class, on the other hand, with the 
permanent threat of regional wars, the Egyptian army increasingly controlled budget 
allocations and US aid217. As a matter of fact, the military personnel became editors 
of major national newspapers. They began to control production factories for civilian 
goods ranging from washing machines to pharmaceuticals, branching out from the 
traditional military industries which produced weapons, equipment and military 
technologies. The army developed dairy farms, fisheries, meat production and 
bakeries. Moreover, the military became involved in the tourist industry, controlling 
hotels and resorts. Finally, they were engaged in black markets, smuggling facilities 
and often retired military officers had seats on the boards of private companies.  
 
For all these reasons, the military has been favoured and less affected by the 
consequences of the infitah policies than other groups, which have experienced 
economic inequalities and lack of welfare provision. Thus, the army has constantly 
increased its economic weight as a parasitic actor, thanks to the advantages 
accorded by the ruling elite: cheap manpower, monopolistic rights, privileges on tax 
exemptions and house building regulations, and subsidies. These elements 
contributed to the building-up of the military’s corporate interests. 
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3.2.2 Strikes and Workers' Movements 
The need of the Egyptian army to defend these economic privileges became clearer 
during and after the 2011 uprisings. The army argued that this restored 
interventionism was in the interests of the people and the middle classes, in the 
name of Egyptian nationalism and on the same path of the Nasser's 1952 
revolutionary coup. However, the real aim of this renewed military intervention in 
politics had nothing to do with Nasserism, “Social Justice” or labour rights. 
 
Thus, in this section, I look at the pivotal role of workers' movements during the 
2011 uprisings. As Alexander and Bassiouny highlight “the strikes demanding the 
'cleansing' of the state apparatus, as they raised the prospect of new forms of 
democratic control over the existing state institutions from below, were particularly 
threatening to the interests of the old regime, precisely because they fused both 
political and social demands with workers' social power”218. 
 
During the presidency of Anwar al-Sadat, and the former colonel, Hosni Mubarak, 
Nasser’s agrarian reforms were dismantled. The redistributive functions of the 
public sector disappeared, along with the cutting of wages and the prolonging of 
working hours219. Yet left-wing and workers' movements were increasingly 
weakened because they also participated in the formulation of these policies of 
liberalisation. After the crackdown on the 1977 and 1984-5 strikes, military and 
political elites tried to present all the demands coming from a left-wing background, 
or advocating labour rights, as already integrated in the ruling elite and overlapping 
with its nationalism220.  
 
As Tripp explaines, “In 1977, the decision by the Egyptian government to introduce 
some of the required price reforms by cutting subsidies on flour, sugar, cooking oil, 
petrol and butagas provoked an immediate and outraged response by hundreds of 
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thousands of Egyptians [...] Starting in 1977, these were protests against the erosion 
of living standards and of workers' rights”221.  
 
As a consequence of the constant repression of labour protests, in 2000, left-wing 
groups and other parties supporting workers' rights seemed have been quashed. 
However, as Beinin states, the strikes continued to take place in many industries 
(e.g. the Misr Spinning and Weaving Company in Mahalla al-Kubra):  
From 1998 to 2009 over two million workers participated in more than 
3,300 factory occupations, strikes, demonstrations or other collective 
actions. With notable democratic internal practices, union activism bridged 
specific claims to Arab socialist frames or Islamic notions of moral economy. 
Much protest developed in the 2000s usually around bread and butter 
issues but becoming later politicised. Labour protests followed each neo-
liberal turn in the government [...] Egyptian workers have not received the 
message that class struggle is unfashionable222. 
 
Thus, the workers were among the protagonists of the 2011 uprisings but, later on, 
even when the general political atmosphere was still liberal, SCAF did not allow 
them to reorganise organisational structures within firms. In the aftermath of 2011, 
the role of the army as an agent of anti-working class policies emerged again223. As 
the Revolutionary Socialist activist, Hossam el-Hamalawy argues in an interview for 
this dissertation: “The workers' movement had been spontaneously activated, 
independently from the street protests. However, the repression of the labour 
movement never ended because in the transition phase, the workers’ 
demonstrations expressed a sharp opposition to the military government and the 
militarisation of the management of the major Egyptian industries” 224.  
 
As Gelvin writes, labour protests had a key role in the 2011 uprisings and in its 
aftermath. During turning points in the 2011 uprisings, along with street 
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demonstrations taking place, the activation of Popular Committees, there was the 
parallel spread of workers' protests, often supported by the independent trade 
unions.  
 
Thus, the greatest waves of street demonstrations witnessed a similar increase of 
conflict in labour movements. This happened the day before the Mubarak 
resignation on February 11 2011. Gelvin explains:  
In Egypt, where protest leaders and the labour movement had an 
intertwined history, tens of thousands of workers from both public and 
private sectors, including those from the petroleum, railroad, banking, retail, 
manufacturing, public transportation, health care, and heavy industry 
sectors, struck on February 10, 2011, and joined protesters on the streets of 
most major cities. In the volatile textile industry, 18, 000 workers left their 
jobs, and walkouts shut down the Cairo airport and stock exchange. All this 
took place the day before the army told Mubarak he had to go225. 
 
As Alexander and Bassiouny confirm, “in the days immediately following Mubarak's 
fall there were between 40 and 60 strikes per day”226. But even in contexts of lower 
or decreasing political mobilisation, there have still been periods when strikes have 
been broadly disseminated.  
 
Table X shows the number of workers' protests shortly before the 2011 uprisings 
and the 2013 military coup. 
 
Table X: Number of Workers' Protests before the 2011 Uprisings and the 2013 
Military Coup 
Years/Months Number of workers' protests 
2007-2010 550 
                                                             
225 Gelvin, J. The Arab Uprisings What Everyone needs to Know, Oxford University Press, 
2012, pp. 56-57. 
226 Alexander, A. and Bassiouny, M. Bread, Freedom, p. 200. 
107 
 
May 2011 103 
June 2011 95 
July 2011 75 
August 2011 89 
September 2011 58 
February 2013 359 
March 2013 334 
April 2013 461 
May 2013 450 
Source: Our elaboration on Benin 2010, Adil 2012, Alexander 2014 
 
Thus, to return to Alexander and Bassiouny, “Instead of the waves of strikes and 
apparent signs of workers' self-organisation which preceded the June 30 protests 
paving the way for a new phase of the revolution, it was counter-revolutionary 
forces, led by the military, which reaped the benefits”227. In this second case, 
workers' movements pushed the military elite to be concerned about the 
consequences of the Muslim Brotherhood's neoliberal policies.  
 
In a further phase, the spread workers' strikes brought about by a reshuffle within 
the interim government (2014) with the end of the Hazem Beblawi's cabinet and the 
beginning of a long-lasting premiership of Ibrahim Mahleb. 
 
3.2.3 The Alleged Neo-Nasserism of the Interim Government 
In this section I will focus on the army’s self-depiction of its takeover in 2013 as a 
reaction in the defence of the social demands of the 2011 uprisings. All the 
aforementioned episodes, along with the electoral appeal of the so-called “neo-
Nasserist” candidate at the presidential elections (2012), Hamdin Sabbahi, are vital 
in order to understand why Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, once in power, wanted to be 
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represented as a new Gamal Abdel Nasser. To a certain extent, after the strongest 
crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood in the history of contemporary Egypt, he 
tried to give to his presidency a pseudo-leftist appearance. For instance, it is true 
that many Egyptian socialist intellectuals228, on the eve of the military coup, 
supported the army's intervention against the Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, 
despite the repression, the army allowed the old fashioned leftist parties with small 
followings (the Social Democrats, the Social Alliance, Tagammu and Popular 
Current) to partake in legal political action as the coup.  
 
As Tripp229 argues, although the interim government's economic policies have 
nothing to do either with Nasserism or with socialism, President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi 
needed to represent his actions as informed by the demands originating from the 
“Egyptian Street” and the labour movements. But after the military coup, 
restrictions of the activities of the independent trade unions were approved and the 
prohibition of strikes within the factories was imposed230. With the Sharm el-Sheikh 
Forum (March 2015) and the opening of an extension of the Suez Canal (August 
2015)231, al-Sisi reinforced the traditional type of crony capitalism, so prevalent 
during the Mubarak regime. Cutting subsidies, attracting private and foreign 
investments, financing great public works became the main features of the political 
ideology of al-Sisi’s bogus Neo-Nasserism, which was in fact deeply at variance with 
Nasser agrarian reforms and his foreign policy232.  As Tripp notes,  
The government had made enormous efforts not simply to suppress 
resistance, but also to portray it as embodying the very features that had 
necessitated economic restructuring in the first place. It was made to stand 
for the forces of reaction associated with the discredited state-centric 
system of the 'Socialist era'. It was also characterised as incubating the 
                                                             
228 Interviews 7 and 18. 
229 Tripp, C. The Power and the People, pp. 139-162. 
230 Alexander, A. and Bassiouny, M. Bread, Freedom, pp. 50-52. 
231 At the presence of the Russian Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev, the Socialist French 
President, François Hollande, and the Greek Prime Minister, Alexis Tsipras, to try to validate 
and reinforce his “neo-Nasserist” political discourse.  
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forces of anarchism and disorder – a common feature of capital's portrayal 
of labour233. 
 
It is clear that the Egyptian pan-Arabism of Nasser differed significantly if compared 
to the SCAF’s political discourse. Nasser's idea of nationalism had the aim to 
promote inter-Arab cooperation (a “united umma”) as an alternative to the alliance 
with the West234. However, the instrumental nationalism promoted by the former 
President Hosni Mubarak and, in continuity, by the SCAF, appears less ambitious and 
synonymous with populism. With widespread recourse to flags and hymns, the 
Egyptian political and military elite promoted the elimination of any political 
opposition, an Islamisation from above, relaying on the financial support of 
international organisations (e.g. IMF, WB) and a rooted military alliance with Israel 
and the US.  
 
In a similar fashion, al-Sisi tried initially to promote himself as not dependent on US 
aid, albeit 1.3 billion dollars per year of aid had been re-established in 2015. He tried 
to represent the 2013 military coup as a decision taken against US interests in the 
region, nurturing a strengthened relationship with the Russian government. He has 
been militarily aggressive (for example, attacks in Libya and Yemen, the support to 
Israel in the 2013 Operation Protective Edge) appealing to a rooted chauvinist form 
of nativism (so for instance, Syrian and Palestinian refugees have been left without 
citizenship), added to consistent support for the monarchy of Saudi Arabia, while 
Gamal Abdel Nasser had been a strong opponent of the Saudi monarchs235.  
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234 Jankowski, J. and Gershoni, I. Rethinking nationalism in the Arab Middle East, New York: 
Columbia UP, 1997, p. 153. 
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As Beinin argues, this so-called Neo-Nasserim of al-Sisi was not apparent in the 
policymaking of the interim government either. “The acting Prime Minister Hazim 
Beblawi was a man of the centre and his government is not a leftist coalition” 236.  
 
This conclusion is also drawn by former presidential candidate, Hamdin Sabbahi in 
an interview for this dissertation:  
The interim government was not a leftist coalition but included some leftist 
politicians: like Kamal Abu Eita (a real unionist), former Minister of Labour; 
former Vice President, Hossam Eissa; the then Minister of Social Solidarity, 
Ahmed El Borai, and somehow the former Vice Premier, Ziad Bahaa El Din. 
The other members of the government were not from a leftist formation237.  
 
In addition, according to Owen and Beinin, the Nasserists within the army and the 
inner workings of the states had been eliminated long before the 2013 military 
coup: “The true Nasserists were eliminated within the top posts of command inside 
the military personnel, years ago. In the political arena, the army has always fought 
against both Nasserists and Islamists, which explained why Marshal Hussein Tantawi 
needed a week to admit that Morsi won the elections against Ahmed Shafiq”238. 
 
The weakness of the Egyptian left-wing and socialist political groups has diverse 
causes239. One of the most important was a lack of structured connections between 
the workers' movement in the countryside and leaders active in urban spaces. This is 
a key difference compared to the Tunisian case. After the 2011 uprisings, the highly 
centralised and well-structured Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT) had great 
resources to weather the transitional period. However, if the political rhetoric of al-
Sisi employed a left-wing tone to contain the forces of the 2011 uprisings with their 
demands for “Social Justice”, this tone could also undermine the appeal of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, with the exception of some very marginal cases, which has an 
ideology rooted in neo-liberal and conservative policies.  
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As the writer and Socialist Alliance activist, Sonallah Ibrahim, adds in an interview 
for this dissertation, this process is also due to the organisational features of the 
left-wing groups. “The popular movements are not strong enough to promote 
change. And the Left does not work with the people”240. 
 
In the long run, it might be argued, due the current crackdown, such effects might 
spill over and transform the demands of the Muslim Brotherhood and result in a 
political discourse with more noticeable elements of “Social Justice”. This possibility 
already surfaced during an interview carried out for this dissertation with Moneim 
Abul Fotuh241, former Muslim Brotherhood politician and presidential candidate: 
“the Muslim Brothers are reformists, they are not revolutionaries. I left the Muslim 
Brotherhood in opposition to the Movements' leaders. I was against the formation 
of a political party. On this issue the debate within our political party (Strong Egypt) 
is still going on if we will keep active in politics or to be involved only as a think tank. 
The Muslim Brothers are capitalists, Strong Egypt is a centre-Left movement, we 
trust in the defence of workers and the poor. We stand against Islamic financial 
interests”. 
 
3.2.4 The Crackdown on Left-wing Activists      
As happened after the 1952 uprisings and as a consequence of the 2013 military 
coup, after the Islamists, it was the turn of left-wing groups to be repressed. As 
Bayat notes, the generation of youngsters who had gathered previously in Tahrir 
Square, at the time of writing, is disillusioned242. Many of left-wing political 
prisoners have been sent to prisons for breaking the anti-protest law or storming 
police stations243. Many have been on hunger strikes for months. Still these 
                                                             
240 Interview 7. 
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242Bayat, A. Revolution and Despair.  
Available at: http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/20688/revolution-and-despair (28 
January 2015). Last time accessed on 14 August 2015. 
243 For instance, Mahiennur el-Massry is in prison at the moment of writing for storming a 
police station during the Morsi presidency (2012-2013). 
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sentiments of disenchantment are not coterminous with a complete 
disengagement, even if repression is ongoing.  
 
As el-Massry argues:  
It is time for the leftists to be repressed. The regime' targets are the NGOs 
(whom many members are leftists). Old cases of leftist activists (e.g. Hes-
sam Mohammedin of the Revolutionary Socialists) are referred to the State 
Security. They arrested leftist activists in Sharqeyya: after the Brotherhood, 
it is time to censor the Left. They began with the anti-NGO law and after 
they condemned demonstrators at the Presidential Palace (on July 2014, 23 
people were arrested in Heliopolis including the activist Sanaa Saif)244. 
 
The murder of the Socialist Alliance’s activist, Shaimaa al-Sabbagh, by a police officer 
in Talaat Harb during the vigil of the fourth anniversary of the January 25 (2015) 
demonstrations in Tahrir Square showed clearly that the police had returned to their 
brutal practices to suppress dissent and the everyday struggles of the poor, in a 
more aggressive fashion than even during the Mubarak regime.    
 
As one of the interviewee, al-Aswani states, “Shaimaa el-Sabbagh represented the 
Revolutionary Youth, composed in the majority by women. She was from the petty 
bourgeoisie of Alexandria, one of the most active cities during the Revolution. She 
was one of the poets of the Revolution. With her gesture to bring a rose to Tahrir 
she wanted to say that the revolution continues […] On the other side, she found the 
brutality of the police. Why should have an armed general killed a disarmed woman 
like Shaimaa? He challenged her audacity”245. 
 
This act of violence perpetrated by the police is the symbol of the repression of 
political oppositionists and workers' movements carried out by the Abdel Fattah al-
Sisi's military regime.  
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As seen in Chapters 2 and 3, the originality of the 2011 uprisings in Egypt was to bring 
together at least three strands of protesters: marginalised citizens, anti-police 
activists and workers. As Abdelrahman summarised, “protest was no longer the 
domain of ‘professional’ activists, but one of ‘ordinary’ citizens who did not in fact 
see themselves as activists or attach a political label to their actions”246. These waves 
of protests were “spontaneous, dispersed forms of contentious actions”247 breaking 
out when “groups of angry citizens”248 reached a point where they could no longer 
accept daily humiliations. 
 
However, despite several attempts of formal and informal cooperation between 
Islamist and Secular groups, the protests never evolved into a mass-based 
oppositional movement, nor an inclusive political coalition, or to put it as della Porta 
and Diani did, the proto-movement never became a social movement but downsized 
its ideological or “revolutionary” potential, as many activists would define it, ending 
up in a social non-movement already at an early stage, when it was too soon to form 
new political parties and cross-ideological coalitions.  
 
The “Islamic Awakening”, as the Iranian authorities defined the results of the 2011 
uprisings, did not last for long. In Egypt the military personnel intervened in order to 
defend its corporate interests, restore stability, prevent concessions to the workers' 
movements, temporarily allowing an Islamist government with no effective powers, 
activating more radical political parties (such as the Salafi) in order to later discredit 
the Muslim Brotherhood and stigmatise them as terrorists. In other words, the 
exclusion of the secular forces who did not find any political overlapping between 
their demands for “Social Justice” and the conservative and neo-liberal policies of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, prevented the transformation of the proto-social 
movement into a revolutionary force. Between 2012 and 2014, this political 
exclusion enabled a certain degree of coordination among other political groups or 
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individual protesters. After the 2013 military coup, both Islamists and other 
oppositional groups faced more severe repression, which demobilised all the 
potential social and political actors, merely leaving a very restricted space for 
dissident politics to some socialist parties, with the emergence of a Neo-Nasserism, 
which was followed by imprisonment for the recalcitrant veterans of 2011, and the 
co-optation of the more amenable into the military regime.     
 
Finally, it has been discussed how, after 2011, the social demands of the proto-
movement were demobilised through the employment of populism. This strategy 
was used by al-Sisi and the army to prevail over the popularity of Political Islam and 
neutralise the revolutionary potential of the left-wing organisations, the workers' 
movements and other oppositional groups.  
 
However, as I will show in Chapters 4 and 5, where I tackle my two case studies, the 
activation and banning of the Popular Committees in Sayeda Zeinab and 
Independent Trade Unions in Mahalla al-Kubra, focusing on the cooperation betwen 
Secular and Islamist groups at the micro-level, the social conflict that broke out 
during the 2011 uprisings certainly has not been resolved. 
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Chapter 4  
Patterns of Mobilisation and Demobilisation of Popular Committees in 
Egypt (2011-2016) 
 
There are many different narratives about the events related to the Egyptian 2011 
uprisings and the 2013 military coup. A soldier, a policeman, a supporter of the 
dissolved National Democratic Party (NDP), one affiliated to the Muslim 
Brotherhood and a left-wing activist would give very diverse, and often opposite, 
accounts of the major reasons for mobilisation and demobilisation during the 
demonstrations that took place in the urban settings between 2011 and 2016 in 
Egypt.  
 
This is true even if we look at the grassroots level and we try to describe such micro-
dynamics of the uprisings within the urban districts. In this chapter, I will focus on 
the workings and attempts at institutionalisation of Popular Committees249 (lijan 
sha’biyya in Arabic) in the Cairo downtown district of Sayeda Zeinab in reference to 
one of the focus groups carried out in this neighbourhood during my sojourns in the 
Egyptian capital city during the uprisings and between 2011 and 2016. As seen in the 
Introduction, in this chapter I will answer to the questions: to what extent did the 
encounter in urban and peripheral neighbourhoods between non-organised groups 
and more defined political movements affected the proto-movement? How did the 
Popular Committees and their operations evolve when the popular unrest ended? In 
doing so, I will explain in which circumstances and to what extent the Muslim 
Brotherhood supporters monopolised the space for dissent, as I argued in the 
Introduction.  
 
                                                             
249 The Popular Committees were already present in the Egyptian urban neighborhoods 
during the first Intifada: the so-called Egyptian Popular Committee in Solidarity with the 
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represented a new phenomenon for this country. 
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According to the Egyptian Life for Development Foundation250, thousands of Popular 
Committees were active in Cairo during the 18 days of occupation of Tahrir Square. 
As mentioned earlier in this research, I decided to focus on the central district of 
Sayeda Zeinab for its socially mixed composition, high levels of mobilisation, high 
turn-outs at the first elections and highly partitioned and diverse urban fabric, 
located very close to the main governmental buildings, in order to analyse the 
evolution of the Popular Committees in an urban milieu throughout the mobilisation 
and demobilisation process. 
 
In this chapter I argue that the Popular Committees in Egypt challenged the 
traditional patterns of state control over civil society. In other words, the 2011-2013 
mass riots were paramount in the formation of new means of popular mobilisation, 
triggered by the participation in alternative networks which included local 
committees that aimed at enhancing a diverse range of unmet needs and motivating 
ordinary citizens to participate in the electoral process, providing social services, 
security and self-defence. 
 
4.1 Popular Committees as Social Movements 
It is still problematic to include the Popular Committees within the initial social 
movement that took place in the “Egyptian Street”. However, as seen in Chapters 2 
and 3, the Popular Committees fit quite well with della Porta’s and Diani’s definition 
of social movements as a “network of informal relations between individuals”. 
Moreover, their evolution into civil society activism or their further dissolution 
might be better understood as a transformation of the initial mobilisation into social 
non-movements, as seen in more general terms in the previous chapter. 
 
In other words, in a chaotic and potentially revolutionary context, when the state 
cannot provide some of its ordinary services, especially security, there will be 
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ordinary citizens who will find an alternative way to support their own “communities 
through mutual aid and informal leadership”251.  
 
Although the Popular Committees were very diverse in nature252, they generally 
worked primarily against the arbitrary methods of the police and as service 
providers (delivering gas tanks for cooking and heating, supplying food at low prices, 
planning sewage systems, and bringing electricity to residents)253.  
 
Secondly, in a more stabilised environment, the participants within the Popular 
Committees aspired to have some influence on the local public officials in order to 
push them to be more accountable in their daily duties and to fight against the 
effects of crony-capitalism on youth and adults excluded from the labour market. 
Thus, they appeared to be willing to form more structured organisations such as 
NGOs or Private Voluntary Organisations254.  
 
In a later stage, when the state apparatuses went back to their usual functions of 
service providers, the Popular Committees were generally perceived as a challenge 
to the state institutions and were eventually dismantled and legally banned. 
 
Thus, if at the very beginning of the social proto-movement the Popular Committees 
were described by the public media as the “true spirit of the revolution”255, they 
were later stigmatised as one of the triggers of chaos in the local neighborhood and 
then prohibited. This pattern followed the same evolution of other actors of the 
proto-movements later stigmatised by the state media as “dangerous youngsters”, 
as seen in Chapters 2 and 3. 
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On the other hand, it might be argued that the Popular Committees could be 
considered as potentially “paramilitary organisations”. In other words, as they 
necessarily do not challenge the state institutions, especially in their initial stage of 
existence, Popular Committees seemed to be mobilised, in a context of absence of 
police and military control over the urban space, as a mere substitute for collapsing 
state institutions.  
 
They later evolved into “paramilitary groups” only when the first demonstrations 
developed into violent clashes with the regimes. This might be especially the case of 
organised and armed militias common in other MENA countries (e.g. Syria and 
Libya). However, in the Egyptian case, Popular Committees never took this shape of 
structured and paramilitary groups as happened in other countries in the Middle 
East where the proto-movements evolved within civil wars, as we shall discuss in 
Chapter 6.  
 
On January 25 2011, Egyptians went down into the streets to protect their relatives 
and property from “looters and suspicious outsiders”. In a few days the police 
almost completely disappeared from the local neighborhood while the army’s tanks 
went to the streets only three days later. Spontaneously, thousands of people, 
divided into small groups of 10 to 12 participants, sealed off major intersections on 
each street and set up checkpoints within their neighborhoods or surrounding their 
own building. “Every block and neighborhood in Cairo was run and operated by its 
residents”256. 
 
At this point, a first definition of Popular Committees in Egypt might be provided. As 
Hatem Hassan argues, Popular Committees are “self-defence groups heterogeneous 
in their tactics, organisation, and efficacy, but a critical response to the security 
vacuum”257.  
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In more general terms, James Gelvin defined Popular Committees as “grassroots 
movements built on horizontal ties”258. In this regard, it is crucial to refer to the 
analysis provided by Gelvin on the reasons that triggered the formation of Popular 
Committees in other historical contexts in the region. Analysing the evolution of 
mass protests in Syria (1918-1920), Gelvin envisages259 the emergence of the masses 
as new national actors defined by the horizontal ties of a modern political 
opposition. When an increased number of citizens began to contest a growing 
number of public issues or simply to ask for more participation260, this renewal of 
civil society can trigger the emergence of a complementary mobilisation. In this 
regard, Gelvin261 uses the concept of “populist political sociability” in reference to a 
kind of mobilisation in which “the organisation of relationships of power among the 
non-elites follows horizontal, associational and national lines”262. 
 
According to him, in 20th century Syria, the Popular Committees “institutionalised 
and broadened horizontal and associational ties”263. To a certain extent, they 
defined a new framework for social and political legitimacy. They “filled the void 
that neither the government” nor the “national organisations were structurally or 
ideologically capable of filling”264. This happened because the Popular Committees 
were involved in many modern and alternative procedures, partially alien to the 
state apparatus. “The committees commanded popular support because they 
integrated a variety of pre-existing, informal networks”265, profiting from the 
integration among familial, occupational and market bonds.    
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This is true for the Egyptian case as well, as I will show in the following sections, in a 
focus group carried out with seven participants in a Popular Committee of Sayeda 
Zeinab between 2011 and 2015. The aim is to understand the levels of political 
participation of these people, analysing their electoral choices at the ballot box, the 
way in which they perceived insecurity and the need for stability, the reasons that 
triggered their mobilisation and demobilisation, and the attempts to institutionalise 
the often precarious structures of the Popular Committees.  
 
Still only a few scholars have focused their research on the development of Popular 
Committees during and in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings in Egypt. In doing so, I 
shall try to add a new understanding of the development of Popular Committees in 
local neighbourhoods, in reference to the literature on the participation in civil 
society in the Middle East, considering them, on the one hand, as a long-term 
phenomenon, not limited to the 18 days of occupation of Tahrir Square266, as 
Hassan argued, and very diverse as to the political behaviours of their participants, 
as other scholars who have separated those committees run by secular activists 
from  those organised by the Islamists267.   
 
I involved in this specific focus group seven Egyptian unmarried young men (20-34 
years old) with different political and economic backgrounds coming from middle 
and upper-middle class families. They were all living close to Berqet Fil, a small alley 
parallel to Port Said Street in the popular neighborhood of Sayeda Zeinab.  
 
Mustafa, 23 years old, was a student living with his brother and grandmother when 
we began the fieldwork research; at the moment of writing, he is an employee in an 
air-conditioning company and an estate agent. Khaled, 25 years old, was 
unemployed in 2011, he later joined the army, as a conscript in Suez, and came back 
to Cairo at the end of 2013. He is now working in a shop belonging to his family. 
Midu, 28 years old, is working in a clothes shop in Sayeda Zeinab. Ahmed, 25 years 
old, was a student of law when I began this research; he later joined as a human 
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rights lawyer at the Centre for Economic and Social Rights (ECESR), run by the 
former candidate to the 2012 presidential elections, Khaled Ali. Anas, 27 years old, 
was a student at the Cairo University living between his father’s house in Sayeda 
Zeinab and his mother’s house in Giza because his parents were divorced. At the 
moment of writing he is working for a left-wing NGO (Hisham Mubarak Human 
Rights Centre) and he has married. Moataz, 34 years old, is working as a carpenter in 
Berqet Fil alley. Finally, Mustafa, 33 years old, was a supporter of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, working in a shop belonging to his family in the Shubra neighborhood; 
he previously spent long periods in Italy and worked as a translator.  
 
The focus group was conducted in long, distinct sessions at cafes or other informal 
settings in Port Said Street (Sayeda Zeinab). Table XI shows the composition of the 
first focus group with seven participants in a Popular Committee in the Cairo 
neighborhood of Sayeda Zeinab.  
 
Table XI: Focus group 1: Sayeda Zeinab, Popular Committees 
Focus group: seven participants Young men (20-34 years old), middle and 
upper middle-class, participants in a 
Popular Committee in Sayeda Zeinab 
between 2011 to 2015, unemployed or 
newly involved in precarious jobs or 
NGO activities, unmarried. 
 
4.2 Popular Committees: Patterns of Mobilisation  
In three days, between the first demonstration in Tahrir Square in Cairo on January 
25 2011 and the “Friday of Anger” on January 28 2011, the police began to retreat 
or apparently disappear from the “Egyptian Street” while the rumors of many 




In a few hours, Popular Committees were quickly organised. “Neighborhood watch 
brigades, typically led by young men, sprang up to fill the security void as reports of 
criminal violence mounted”268.  
 
As confirmed by Hassan269, participants in Popular Committees had three objectives: 
“scaring potential outsiders from entering their street, unifying responses to 
potential threats, and keeping residents alert”.  
 
During our focus group we talked with the participants in one of the Berqet Fil’s 
Popular Committee in Sayeda Zeinab about the reasons why they initially mobilsed. 
As Mustafa270 states, ordinary people were heavily involved in self-defence groups. 
“I spent my all day and night taking care of the safety of my neighbourhood”. 
Ahmed271 added that their mobilisation was a direct consequence of the absence of 
policemen. “With the honest people of my area we formed groups to substitute the 
absence of policemen after their disappearance”. According to Mustafa272, the 
police force disappeared from the street because it “was not trained to resist for 
days of confrontations at the micro level with the people. It has been a structural 
failure, caused by the interruption of communications (often brought about by a 
lack of a battery in their walkie-talkies)”. 
 
According to Midu273, the mobilisation of the Popular Committees was a first 
reaction to the arbitrary methods of the police. “During my night shift, I often 
encountered former and violent policemen engaged in indiscriminate lootings”. 
However, Anas274 added that his participation in the Popular Committees was 
necessary to protect his home from the spreading presence of criminals. “I took care 
of my area from the baltagy’s (thugs) attacks all through the night”. Finally, 
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Mustafa275 added that the Popular Committees were “spontaneous networks built-
up on the perfect knowledge of each neighborhood of the Muslim Brotherhood 
supporters and their capacity to identify any minimum risk”.  
 
As Bremer and Hassan276 have argued, residents tried to forge new relationships of 
trust: “first with residents in their apartment buildings, then with neighbors on their 
street, and eventually with individuals across entire neighborhoods”. This is true for 
this case study as well: all the participants in our focus group, when they took part in 
the formation of the Popular Committees, were living in the same building or in very 
close alleys.  
 
It was often anxiety that motivated participants to secure major intersections of 
their streets and prevent looters and other outsiders from approaching their homes 
and cars. Individuals in a small alley, like Berqet Fil, were concerned with protecting 
homes, cars, building entrances, banks, stores and supermarkets. Popular 
Committees' participants, in larger streets such as Port Said Street, chose to stand 
on the main road’s intersections277.  
 
Berqet Fil is a relatively insulated quarter connecting Kadri Basha Street to Port Said 
Street. As many interviewees stated, the presence of a high number of small 
alleyways between each end of a side street “increased the number of potential 
entrance points for looters”278. Many of the alleyways at the intersections between 
the small alleys were controlled by participants of the Popular Committees. The 
same happened towards the intersections between the alleys and minor internal 
squares. All the interviewees confirmed that, at an initial stage, they were standing 
in front of their building or at the intersections with alleyways and internal squares.  
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“Our anxiety grew on January 28 2011 when the Sayeda Zeinab police station (200 
metres from our homes) and the National Democratic Party’s buildings were 
burned”279. According to Mustafa280, “the burning of the police station and NDP’s 
headquarters had been part of a more general plan to spread disorder, orchestrated 
by the regime, with the aim to create a controlled chaos and put in place their plans 
of political succession from Mubarak to another military officer”. 
 
As confirmed by all the participants in the focus group, during an initial attempt to 
secure all the intersections between the main road and an internal square, 
surrounded by small stores and constantly occupied by dozens of cars, and the side 
small alleys in the area, they blockaded their street with metal barriers, abandoned 
or old cars and microbuses, wooden sticks, plastic objects and big stones. “The 
target was to prevent the entrance within the neighborhood of any unidentified 
person”281.  
 
In other words, the Popular Committees were becoming check-points. “We were 
asking anyone who was passing through our alley for an official Identity card; we 
were wearing colored armbands to be differentiated from other Committees in the 
same area; we were asking for documents from any taxi driver, car owner or to his 
passengers who intended to come to our alley from the main road or other 
intersections”282.  
 
As Hassan explained, “residents used intersections not only to communicate with 
one another but also to prevent entry into a street […] and test the limits of their 
own authority”. At that stage and during the two days when all mobile phone 
networks and the Internet were shut down by the regime, all the outsiders were 
treated as criminals by the Popular Committees' components. “When I was going to 
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visit my relatives, the participants in other Popular Committees, not far from my 
neighborhood, were very rude to me, asking many questions”283. 
 
At this stage, they scheduled a rota with all the other participants within the 
Committees. “We established daily and night shifts according to the voluntary 
availability given by the individual participants in reference to their work activities or 
their will to take part in mass demonstrations”284.  
 
This more structured organisation of the Popular Committees was paralleled by the 
decision of the elders within the Muslim Brotherhood to take part in the Tahrir 
Square mobilisations. “Many of the participants in the Popular Committees in my 
neighborhood were supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and were already 
sharing reciprocal relationships of trust or were active in their Private Voluntary 
Organisations”285. Mustafa286 added that many Popular Committees of his 
neighborhood were directly forged from the organisational structures of the local 
branches of the Muslim Brotherhood. “The Popular Committees have been put in 
place thanks to the organisational structure of the Muslim Brotherhood and their 
specific knowledge of the district. Their representatives within the charities were 
very useful in order to unify and manage the people taking part within the 
Committees”.  
 
In this instance, el-Meehy confirmed287 that the Popular Committees have exhibited 
“important continuities with Islamist activism”, comprised mostly of “upwardly 
mobile, educated, middle-class professionals”. 
 
4.2.1 Popular Committees: Sympathisers and Thugs 
As for the composition of the urban Popular Committees, the interviewees agreed 
that they were spontaneous groups, with cross-class members, all volunteers288, 
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95% male with a few women participating during the day shifts and with a 
significant presence of Copts and elders289. And Khaled added290, “Some women, 
Christians, Syrian and Palestinian immigrants took part in the Popular Committees”.  
 
Often women were not physically present in the streets, especially during the night 
shifts. However, they worked extensively as lookouts from their balconies, 
communicating news or rumours spread by the media, or spending hours on their 
terraces signaling the approach of any stranger or unexpected danger291. Moreover, 
they provided food to the members of the Popular Committees and in their homes 
they often took care of people, living in their buildings and alleys, injured during the 
clashes in the main roads292. Neighbour pharmacists often provided free medicines 
to the women of the neighborhood and the local mosques.  
 
Firstly, according to Anas293, the sheikhs from the mosques often motivated the 
people of the neighborhood to take part in the Popular Committees294. In other 
words, the muezzin in the side streets mobilised through the mosque’s loudspeaker 
the ordinary people to take part in the local Committees. “Many mosques were set 
up as hospitals to help injured people. Some of the Martyrs of the Revolution were 
transferred to small mosques before joining the morgue in Sayeda Zeinab (Zeinum), 
once dead”295.  
 
All the interviewees confirmed that, in the main roads, on the one hand, there were 
more episodes of looting and theft compared to their side street, on the other hand, 
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the main mosques in Port Said Street were less active in mobilising the inhabitants 
or providing services compared to the small ones296.  
 
Secondly, the doormen (baoab) were active at different levels in the Popular 
Committees. In normal circumstances, they usually work as people of trust for the 
building's landlord. Thus, they control who enter or leave the building. Moreover, 
they often ask every stranger approaching a building who he or she intends to visit. 
In other words, they control the “morality” of the tenants, for instance, they often 
intervene if an unmarried woman is visited by a number of different men. They 
check if every inhabitant of the building paid their bills on time. They often deliver 
food or help locate other facilities or amenities within the neighborhood to the 
people living in the building. Finally, they work as middle-men in order to bargain for 
the amount of rent to be paid by the new tenants or with estate agents to allow 
newcomers to visit a flat they would like to rent.  
 
During the 2011 uprisings in Egypt, many doormen left their jobs to go back to their 
family homes in Upper Egypt. Those who did not leave their place of work were 
spending, as usual, their days at the main door of the building or in the entrance hall 
passing important news from the streets to the tenants of flats. According to 
Mustafa and Ahmed, on January 28 2011, the “baoab was encouraging the people 
living in our building to be ready to check the alley for any suspect coming from the 
main road”297.  
 
Hassan argues that the importance of the doormen goes “beyond the security that 
they provide”298. The baoab often had a good knowledge of the alleys where he was 
working, knew the people living in the neighborhood and their activities. Some of 
them had strong connections with local politicians, both the National Democratic 
Party (NDP) and the Muslim Brotherhood.  
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Thirdly, the thugs (baltagy) were at the same time the enemies of the Popular 
Committees and part of their operation. The term is very vague and it has been used 
to justify different and conflicting narratives. During the 2011 uprisings, the term 
appeared to be related to legendary middle-men who were suddenly released from 
prisons, paid by the National Democratic Party (NDP) or motivated by the 
withdrawal of the police to spread insecurity. But according to Ismail299, in the 1980s 
and 1990s, the term baltagy referred to all terrorists taking part in attacks against 
tourists. On the other hand, Amar considered the baltagiyya as “strongmen hired by 
the regime to physically and sexually harass political dissidents”300.  
 
In parallel with the evolution of the different stages of the uprisings, the term 
baltagy acquired different meanings. For instance, after the 2013 military coup, 
according to the Muslim Brotherhood's narrative, the baltagya was “attacking their 
peaceful sit-ins”301. Likewise, according to the army, at that stage, the real thugs 
were only the Muslim Brotherhood supporters who formed part of a terrorist 
organisation. During the events of 2011, the same unfixed fear of these “thugs” was 
ever present. Thus according to my participants, Khaled and Midu, in Berqet Fil, the 
most notorious thugs were “Sarsa, Hanata and Tareq Matua”. They felt that the 
baltagys302 were “affiliated in local networks of corruption ('mafias'), they were 
owners of small shops or trades, often hiring illiterate children or unemployed 
youngsters”303. Hassan’s  research304 and my own demonstrate how residents 
claimed to be able to identify these “thugs” from their “bad look”, emphasising the 
presence of scars or wounds on their skin, or their use of colloquial Arabic, often 
used as a sign to identify then as “outsiders” intruding into the  neighbourhood. It is 
also been argued that the “thugs” in the side roads “infiltrated” the Popular 
Committees. As Hassan states, they served as scouts for the baltagya present on the 
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main roads and they wanted to determine how insecure a given neighbourhood was 
in order to carry out opportunist crimes305.   
 
On the other hand the nebulous term “thug” could be an excuse for the 
unacceptable behavior of elements of the Popular Committees. Thus many ordinary 
citizens witnessed aggressive, violent or exaggerated reactions coming from the 
participants within the Popular Committees often attributed to the presence of 
armed individuals or baltagya306 within the Committees themselves.  
 
Thus, with negative or positive connotations, baoabs, sheikhs and baltagys took part 
in urban Popular Committees of Sayeda Zeinab. In this area, the Committees had a 
majority of members from various social classes in which these social strata worked 
harmoniously together, guaranteed by preexisting networks of trust present among 
the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood.  
 
It is not the aim of this chapter to analyse the differences in the composition of 
Popular Committees in rural and urban areas. However, it is relevant to consider 
that, according to el-Meehy, there were some important differences in the 
composition of Popular Committees in the peripheral neighborhoods. She argued 
that the mobilisation of self-defence groups in the countryside has been a more 
“top-down process designed to maintain social peace”307. According to her, 
committees’ participants in the villages were often not volunteers, but men selected 
by major families for their social status: “rural committees excluded the poor, 
reinforced tribal hierarchies and, in many instances, welcomed members of 
Mubarak’s National Democratic Party”. However, a majority of Muslim Brotherhood 
supporters were the prevaling presence in the rural Popular Committees as well. As 
confirmed by our interviewees, this happened especially in the rural regions (e.g. 
Sharqeya, Gharbeya, etc.) where in a later stage the Muslim Brotherhood obtained 
impressive electoral victories. 
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4.3 Popular Committees: Patterns of Demobilisation 
The demobilisation of the Popular Committees in the urban neighborhoods began in 
parallel with the appearance of military officers in the public.  
 
As explained in Chapter 3, the tanks of the army were already present in the main 
squares of Cairo on January 29 2011. By February 2, the army began to occupy the 
major intersections of the Sayeda Zeinab neighborhood. “The people and the army 
are one hand” was one of the most heard slogans in Tahrir Square. Thus, with the 
army in the streets the role of the Committees began to change”308.  
 
In other words, the anxiety of the ordinary people was alleviated by the presence of 
the military in the streets of Cairo. This determined a perceived decline in lootings 
and the slow disappearance of the alleged criminals. “The baltagiyya decided to go 
back to their daily life as outlaws after hearing the approaching military tanks”309. 
 
A second element contributed to change the structural organisation of the Popular 
Committees: the imposition of a curfew. “There were days when the curfew began 
in the early afternoon. The habits of many people began to change in these days”310. 
According to our interviewees, compared to the previous daily shifts, in the side 
streets “the shops and food sellers were closing by the early evening, taxi and 
microbuses were not working anymore after sunset, almost all the cafes were 
removing their outdoor chairs before 11 pm”.  
 
For a few months, after witnessing people arrested merely because they did not 
carry special permits or their Identity cards, the areas between Abdin, Sayeda 
Zeinab and Westel Balad (downtown Cairo) were completely empty after midnight. 
“This did not prevent the internal movement of people within the alleyways (haret) 
and different neighborhoods. However, only a few people tried to pass through the 
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major intersections between main and side roads and only the youngsters tried to 
have a more extended mobility between different neighborhoods”311. 
 
Thus, by February 2, the participation in the Popular Committees was more 
routinised. According to Hassan, “individuals were not forced to remain on patrol at 
their Popular Committees”. Doing so, participants defined a “common set of 
practices, such as monitoring checkpoints, establishing barricades, detaining 
suspects, and sharing information”312. 
 
In other words, the Popular Committees evolved into collectives with overlapping 
interests and non-contending ideologies despite the very diverse kind of 
participants, due to their political, age, gender, class and social backgrounds. “We 
were often celebrating and joining demonstrations. At that stage, we spent time 
watching football matches following less strict time shifts”313.  
 
With the Mubarak’s resignation on February 11 2011, the main duty of the Popular 
Committees’ participants to fill the security vacuum had been mostly achieved. “I 
remember that there was an unprecedented enthusiasm: everything was possible at 
that moment and the army was on our side. The soldiers patrolling our 
neighborhood told us to go back home”314.  
 
However, at that stage, the Popular Committees did not suddenly disappear but 
they did change their main features. Even with the lifting of the curfew, a less 
routinised presence of the people of the neighborhood was still evident in the main 
intersections within the Sayeda Zeinab district. At that stage, the Popular 
Committees’ participants were no longer checking with the same accuracy the 
movements of people in the streets.  
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However, those who did take part in Sayeda Zeinab’s Popular Committees were 
ready to be active again in their own neighborhood during the major episodes of 
mass mobilisation, which accompanied the spread of new waves of unrest: the 
Fridays of Anger, during the attacks on the State Security (Amn el-Dawla) on April 9, 
2011 and the Baloon Theater clashes on June 30, 2011.  
 
According to el-Meehy, in some districts the Committees continued to gather in 
spring and summer of 2011 to discuss the main problems of the neighborhood: 
“cleaning streets, fixing water fountains improve living conditions in the area and 
painting buildings”315.  
 
According to her study, in the neighborhood of Basatin where she focused her 
research, the members of Popular Committee “gradually turned its attention to 
politics”, evolving towards “active citizenship”316. The Committee’s participants 
were especially involved in the electoral campaign for the constitutional 
amendments in the March 2011 referendum.  
 
Thus, the participants in the Popular Committees, especially if young, students or 
unemployed, had been the first to be ready to take part during the continual waves 
of mobilisation and the electoral campaigns. In our specific focus group, the very 
first political struggle amongst the Committees’ members began with the 
Constitutional Referendum (March 2011). Our interviewees split over their political 
choices: five of them voted “Yes”, following the indication given by the Muslim 
Brotherhood and the army, the other two supported “No” (Laa campaign). The first 
group appeared to be motivated by more conscious revolutionary and secular 
intentions: “We wanted a new Constitution. For this reason, we distributed flyers 
asking to the people to vote No”317. The second group was motivated by a 
nationalist, populist and genuine sense of belonging: “We agreed with the decision 
                                                             
315 El-Meehy, A. 'Egypt’s popular committees'. 
316 El-Meehy, A. 'Egypt’s popular committees'. 
317 Case 1, Interviewees 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7. 
133 
 
of the Muslim Brotherhood to support the call of the army to not make major 
changes to the then existing Constitution”318. 
 
It is possible to argue that at this stage, and after the end of the Mubarak’s rule, the 
social proto-movements, included the Popular Committees, began to evolve into 
social non-movements losing their initial revolutionary potential, as we have already 
argued in previous chapters. 
 
4.3.1 Popular Committees and the Electoral Process 
Thus towards the end of 2011 the reconfigured relationship between state and 
society influenced and reshaped the functions of the Popular Committees. To a 
certain extent, as el-Meehy argues, they began to work as NGOs in different social 
fields319, and less as local alternative sources of power and legitimacy.  
 
Previously, we have seen how left-wing organisations were marginalised while the 
rallying call for “Social Justice” fell by the wayside. The same happened in the proto-
movements, and the mass mobilisation as a whole, as the Islamists who took 
advantage of the space opened for political dissent after the 2011 uprisings, 
attempting to monopolise the local and street based movements. Thus, many 
members of the Popular Committees went back to old or new forms of social 
assistance, already existing within the welfare structure of the Muslim Brotherhood.   
 
Although many Popular Committees “remained independent and active”320 and held 
local meetings in April 2011 and, on the other hand, the  Popular Committees 
tended not to develop “participatory decision making or to establish mechanisms 
for accountability to the communities”. Thus their staying power was limited as their 
organic linkage to communities faded and could not compete with the Muslim 
Brotherhood. In Sayeda Zeinab, the process of institutionalisation of the Popular 
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Committees into these more structured and less accountable organisations seemed 
to be less routinised than elsewhere.  
 
The members of the Berqet Fil’ Popular Committees extended their mobilisation out 
of the neighborhood and thus seemed to be growing. On the other hand, many 
participants were returning to their daily life and shared some of the mainstream 
opinion, which by now stigmatised the remaining activists, who were pictured as a 
source of instability and therefore against Egyptian national interests. For instance, 
Ahmed, Midu and Khaled took part in their first demonstration only on the occasion 
of the Mohammed Mahmud Street clashes of November 2011. “This was the first 
time we went to Tahrir Square. We witnessed the violence of plain clothes 
policemen, infiltrated within the protests”321. “At that stage, some of the people of 
my area went for the first time to Tahrir Square holding Egyptian flags, motivated by 
their nationalist sense of belonging”322. 
 
At this stage, many of the interviewees they were engaged in the more traditional 
pursuit of electoral campaigns and in party politics. The majority of the interviewees 
supported the Muslim Brotherhood at the ballot boxes during the November-
January 2011-2012 parliamentary elections. The Al-Khadeweia High School in Port 
Said Street, a few metres away from Berqet Fil, witnessed an unprecedented turn-
out and long queues outside. “I was interested in Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). 
Thus, I decided to vote for them at the parliamentary elections”323. Ahmed argued 
that the Muslim Brotherhood supporters encouraged in different ways their 
constituency to participate in the electoral process. “The supporters of the Muslim 
Brotherhood and Salafi groups, previously present within the Popular Committees, 
were distributing food, sugar, oil and clothes (galabyyas) at the schools’ entrances 
to encourage their supporters to vote for them”324.  
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However, in Sayeda Zeinab, a noticeable number of votes went to Hamdin Sabbahi, 
at that time perceived as a genuine “Neo-Nasserist” candidate. “I thought that Tyar 
Shaabi and Kutla (secular and left wing political groups) could have won many more 
seats in the new parliament”325. In any case electoral politics took charge, and 
Popular Committees were losing their potential roles as mass organisations.  
 
The final nail in the coffin was the cycles of violence as, the interviewee, Mustafa, 
recalled. “The political euphoria left behind the pre-existing patterns of mobilisation. 
Many Popular Committees completely disappeared after massacres and killings”326. 
 
On February 2 2012, the Port Said massacre occurred and this was recalled by 
interviewees as the opening shot, perpetrated by the “Deep State” against the 
presence of young people within the social proto-movements. As Khaled argued327, 
“this massacre was a political vendetta perpetrated by the police against the al-Ahly 
supporters but this was a warning to all of us, to all the revolutionaries and 
mobilised activists to not pursue our goals”. 
 
The members of the Berqet Fil Popular Committees were once again confronted 
with an electoral choice on the occasion of the 2012 presidential elections. Mustafa, 
Khaled, Midu, Moataz and Mustafa decided to vote for Mohammed Morsi only to 
prevent the election of Ahmed Shafiq. “We were not happy with the Muslim 
Brotherhood but we did not want a felul (man of the old regime) to be the new 
president”328. “Some of the members of our Committee during the days of the 
revolution encouraged people of my building to go to vote for the Brotherhood 
representative. Many of them did it for the relationships of trust built-up especially 
during the previous months of mobilisation”329. On the other hand, Ahmed and Anas 
began their boycotts of the electoral process. “Leftist parties were not ready to 
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prepare a campaign. I could never expect that a politician coming from the Muslim 
Brotherhood could have been chosen as the new Egyptian president”330. 
 
4.4 The Institutionalisation of the Popular Committees 
El-Meehy and Bremer331 have analysed the transformation of Popular Committees 
into more formalised organisations. Originally the participants in the Popular 
Committees felt “empowered” by their daily engagement in these self-defence 
groups and as Hassan adds Popular Committees “challenged previous definitions of 
collective behavior and social movements”332. 
 
But the “Deep State” and the newly born military junta, perceived the Committees 
as a potentially dangerous, modern, political and experimental space for building-up 
a grassroots and participatory structures of power. For those reasons, they decided 
on a ban on their activities. One can argue that the limitations placed upon the 
Popular Committees’ activities was the first step in the political repression before 
the suppression of all the Islamists’ grassroots associations, which was later 
extended to all activities of Muslim Brotherhood’s activities. Many of the Popular 
Committees members were arrested and intimidated several times and faced 
military trials. As Mustafa, Ahmed and Anas confirmed, “We have been arrested and 
released at least three times in the last three years”333. 
 
In order to limit the spread of these local sources of popular power, the Supreme 
Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) tried to issue licenses to both legalise and 
control their operations. Some of the participants in the Egyptian Popular 
Committees, especially those closely affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood, aligned 
to the procedural alliances between the Islamists and the army, that were forged 
during the initial bouts of elections, accepted the system of legalisation proposed by 
the army and the state. At the same time, SCAF also pursued an agreement of sort 
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with the Popular Committees to compensate for the crackdown on workers’ strikes 
by seemingly allowing for greater leeway in other sectors of civil society. 
 
Thus, “a coalition of Popular Committees signed a three-year protocol with the 
Ministry of Local Development by which local activists would be recruited to deliver 
butane cylinders to households. But the protocol also gave the committees a 
broader mandate to cooperate with the authorities in providing literacy classes, 
vocational and leadership skills training, encouraging religious tolerance, cleaning 
up squares and supporting the families of the imprisoned”334. According to el-
Meehy, the Popular Committees were successfully engaged in more ambitious 
projects as well. “Ard al-Lewa’s Committee successfully self-financed a railway 
crossing to minimise accidents among residents. It also mobilised around the 
establishment of a park, school and a hospital on fourteen feddans of vacant land 
owned by the Ministry of Religious Endowments (Awqaf) in the neighborhood. 
Next door, the committee in Imbaba organised effective nonpayment campaigns 
for public services the state failed to provide, such as garbage collection, while 
Nahia’s Committee constructed an on/off ramp to connect the neighborhood to 
the ring road”335. 
 
By doing so the Popular Committees were slowly becoming NGOs, tending to merge 
with the pre-existing networks of Muslim Brotherhood charities, schools and 
hospitals. As the interviewee Mustafa confirmed, “In Berqet Fil, many participants 
within the Popular Committees were involved in associations working with the 
elders or providing social services to the disabled”336. Other interviewees from the 
Popular Committees began working in centres and NGOs focused on the defence of 
human rights. “My participation in the grassroots movements has been vital for my 
present work position as a human rights defender”337. 
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However, compared to other areas, where the Popular Committees’ boards were 
located in buildings affiliated with the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs, as el-
Mehhy notes, the Popular Committees in Sayeda Zeinab were less structured and 
organised.  
 
At this stage, these groups began to be more integrated in the vertical and far more 
well structured organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood, which mobilised its 
constituency to take part in the electoral campaigns and the political process of 
formation of the party, once Freedom and Justice (FJP) had been officially legalised 
for the first time in the Muslim Brotherhood's history. It might be added that the 
activation of those newcomers to political activism has been achieved despite the 
long periods of political demobilisation witnessed by many Islamist activists before 
the 2011 uprisings.  
 
However, some of the interviewees were not so easily assimilated into the new 
arrangements during the transition and they expressed greater scepticism towards 
this state-driven attempt of institutionalisation. “Towards the end of 2012, I was not 
interested anymore in the activities of the Popular Committees. They entailed a 
political affiliation that I was not willing to share”338. At that stage, other groups 
began to be infiltrated by the military and secret services (Mukabarat) as we will see 
more clearly in the case study involving the Egyptian Independent Trade Unions 
(EFITU), introduced in the next chapter.  
 
For this reason, many members of the Popular Committees were not necessarily 
involved in a process of empowerment or enhanced political capabilities but in the 
building-up of renewed networks of charities. Consequently, as el-Meehy stated, 
“the reinvention of the Popular Committees as NGOs has limited their 
effectiveness”339.  
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339 El-Meehy, A. 'Egypt’s popular committees'. 
139 
 
It might be argued that in other urban neighborhoods of Cairo and Alexandria a 
different kind of political competition was occurred. As a matter of fact, the 
legalisation process of the Salafi groups has been used by the regime to delegitimise 
and stigmatise the Muslim Brotherhood in the long-term.  
 
Even if, at the micro level, there was not a clear distinction between Popular 
Committees run by the Muslim Brotherhood and Ansar al-Sunna, there have been 
urban areas where the majority of the Committees’ members were in the hands of 
Salafi supporters (e.g. Ayn Shamps), helped by millions of pounds coming from the 
Gulf States. “The members of the Salafi Popular Committees were less politically 
and scholarly trained. Moreover, their knowledge of their own areas was less rooted 
within the neighborhood’s daily customs. The same can be said about the relations 
of trust between the people who were less stable compared to the Muslim 
Brotherhood pre-existing networks”340. 
 
As el-Meehy notes, the Salafi groups were especially active with the poorer people 
in some of the urban neighborhoods of Cairo, providing for instance “LPG 
cylinders”341. However, in the neighbourhoods the Salafi groups were not perceived 
competitors to the longstanding presence of the Muslim Brotherhood but as 
populist allies of the army. “Many of those people were considered by us as 
newcomers, we did not witness such a widespread presence of Salafi before January 
29 2011”342. 
 
The evolution of Popular Committees in these urban neighborhoods in the 
aftermath of the events of early 2011 demonstrates how the army used the blurred 
distinction between state and civil society, to retrieve power and authority after the 
fall of Mubarak. Thus in the initial stage, nationalists and Islamists latched on to the 
wave of dissent as embodied in the Popular Committees to create forms of   
“political populist sociability” in the vacuum left by the fall of the old regime and 
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thus preventing the political empowerment of the members of the Popular 
Committees and other proto-movements. Later on, the state reinforced its control 
over civil society through the usual methods of legalisation as coterminous with co-
optation. Where this was not possible the process was carried out with more violent 
methods of repression, as we shall see in the next section.   
 
4.5 Popular Committees and the Military Coup 
Here I will discuss the evolution of the Popular Committees during the year in power 
(2012-2013) of Mohamed Morsi. In Sayeda Zeinab the local Committees in the initial 
incarnation as centre of potential participatory democracy were no longer visible in 
the neighbourhood. It is true that the Muslim Brotherhood did not have complete 
control over the state security apparatus. Thus, in various stages of the ensuing 
political confrontation, the Popular Committees of the Muslim Brotherhood were 
part mobilised to oversee the electoral procedures for the Constitutional 
referendum (December 2012), protect the Presidential Palace of Heliopolis during 
the clashes following the presidential decree (November 2012) and on the occasion 
of the attacks on the Muslim Brotherhood headquarters (Moqattam, Manyal and 
Mansour Street) between June 30 and July 9 2013. As Bassiouny and Alexander 
argue, “the Brotherhood turned increasingly to the activist base of the Islamist 
movement to act as 'police' – attacking demonstrators, and in some areas taking 
over functions of maintaining law and order. These moves [...] inspired fears of both 
the collapse of public security and the emergence of a state of Islamist militias”343. 
 
The Popular Committees, led by a majority of Muslim Brotherhood supporters, 
guaranteed a system of checkpoints and security within the sit-ins of Rabaa al-
Adewya and El-Nahda in Cairo. The same happened in the major Squares all over the 
country where the followers of the ousted President, Mohamed Morsi, were 
demonstrating to defend his legitimacy. “The alliance between the police and the 
army was instilling a sense of vendetta against the Islamists”344. 
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After the June 30 2013 demonstration in Tahrir Square, Popular Committees were 
formed again in urban localities. In Sayeda Zeinab, they were less structured and 
organised compared to previous years. “At that time, we partially mobilised again in 
parallel with a spreading sense of uncertainty and insecurity. However, we did not 
strictly follow daily and night shifts. We were less in number”345. “One was not sure 
what the reaction of the Muslim Brotherhood could have been to the 2013 military 
coup. However, we did not support the roadmap proposed by the military junta”346. 
At the same time, older fears resurfaced.  “There were many groups of baltagys and 
thieves active again at that stage in downtown Cairo”347. 
However, this renewed and precarious mobilisation did not last long. “The Popular 
Committees resisted shortly and everything went wrong”348. If the Popular 
Committees continued to protect the urban spaces chosen by the Muslim 
Brotherhood for their peaceful resistance, a few days after the approval of the 
roadmap and the beginning of the mandate of the acting President, Adly Mansur, a 
law banning the Popular Committees was approved. “This decision has been the first 
step to later ban all demonstrations with an anti-protest law”349.  
According to our interviewees350, the law banning the Popular Committees was the 
first attempt by the authorities to identify the supporters of the Muslim 
Brotherhood so as to later arrest or control them after the approval of the anti-
terrorist law. In other words, the ban on the Popular Committees has been vital to 
deactivate completely the mobilisation of the Islamists and, in more general terms, 
to put under strict control all the activities within Egyptian civil society, 
strengthened by the mobilisation in early 2011. “The martial law gave to the police 
the right to kill. It allowed to a certain extent the society as a whole to be engaged in 
arbitrary actions”351. “It was a way to go back to the emergency law of the Mubarak 
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and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces’ times”352. “The police can arbitrarily 
arrest, torture and violate human rights”353. 
 
After the Rabaa’s massacre (14 August 2013) and the non-violent resistance of many 
supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, the participants in the Popular Committees 
of Berqet Fil involved in this research went back to their ordinary lives. They did not 
take any further part in the electoral processes or in demonstrations. “We 
boycotted the Constitutional Referendum (January 2014), presidential and 
parliamentary elections (May 2014, December 2015)”354. “The Muslim Brotherhood 
made many mistakes but I will never support Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and this military 
regime”355. “I never went to vote since 2012, in my area the schools during the 
electoral procedures have always been empty”356. “After the recent crackdown, 
there is a new political alliance among left-wing and Islamist activists”357. 
 
The interviewees involved in this research, at the moment of writing, share a sense 
of depression and disillusionment for the current conditions of political crackdown 
and human rights violations, perpetrated at the micro-level by the Egyptian police, 
as discussed in the previous chapter. However, they are ready to be active again 
whenever the arbitrary practices of the police officers in the urban neighborhoods 
again become too unbearable358.   
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter I described the workings and evolution of Popular Committees (or 
lijan sha’biyya) in the Cairo downtown district of Sayeda Zeinab in reference to a 
focus group carried out during the different stages of the local mobilisation between 
2011 and 2015. It is very useful to disentangle the micro-dynamics of mobilsation 
and demobilisation in urban Cairo localities during the Egyptian 2011 uprisings and 
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the 2013 military coup in order to better understand how the “Deep State” has 
controlled and repressed the mass.  
 
This chapter sought to present a new understanding of the development of the 
Popular Committees in local urban neighbourhoods, examining them over time but 
also noting the diverse politics of their participants. In the end, like other proto-
movements, the Popular Committees evolved into social non-movements and were 
permanently demobilised. 
 
The Popular Committees in Egypt challenged the traditional patterns of state control 
over civil society. They were a modern, self-organised and experimental system of 
grassroots participation, in the long term integrated within the Muslim Brotherhood 
charities and NGOs, gradually losing their initial potential of political empowerment, 
revealed in their attempt to fostering cross-class and ideologically mixed coalitions.   
 
The Popular Committees were self-defence groups, a spontaneous response to the 
absence of police. They gradually evolved into checkpoints and service providers in 
an initial attempt to secure all the intersections between the main roads and 
internal alleyways, using informal methods of resistance and networks of trust.  
Women, doormen, sheikhs and thugs were involved within the Popular Committees 
at different levels and with distinct functions. The petty criminals were often ready, 
on the one hand, to provide jobs in the black market to the disadvantaged youth 
involved in the Committees, on the other hand, they were infiltrated these self-
defence groups, and thus generated a sense of insecurity, which undermined the 
reason why the Popular Committees were established in the first place. 
 
With the arrival of the army’s tanks, a demobilisation process of the Popular 
Committees began. In Sayeda Zeinab, the Popular Committees were less organised 
and routinised than elsewhere. However, in many cases, the Popular Committees 
began to work as a constituency to forge new political parties, as Committees to 




However, their evolution into more participatory and legalised structures was 
prevented by the military junta. The army and the Abdel Fattah al-Sisi presidency 
after the 2013 military coup banned the Popular Committees, perceived as a 
potentially dangerous space for building-up grassroots mobilisations. This was the 
initial step in a more general process of repression which later swept up the 
Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as the left-wing activists, leading to the 




The Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU) in a 
Peripheral Industrial Area 
As I have discussed previously, up to 2011 the politics of the Middle East can be 
characterised as a set of state-society relations in which, at most, ineffective dissent 
has been allowed so long as it did not threaten the status quo359. However, in this 
chapter, I draw upon other approaches (Hanieh)360, previously mentioned in Chapter 
3, arguing that the “notion of class” is a key to understanding the dynamics followed 
by Egyptian contemporary contentious politics. This brings about a new 
understanding of the nature of the state, the relationship between “markets and 
political democracy, and the assessments of social struggles”361. This is especially 
true if we look at the dynamics behind the Egyptian 2011 uprisings and their 
aftermath with regards to the relevance of strikes and workers' movements.  
 
In other words, in this chapter, I argue that, in 2011, Egypt was on the eve of a 
working-class based social movement, thanks to a long-lasting instances of class 
struggle and trade union mobilisation, but these fragmented workers' movements 
lacked political organisation, a coherent leadership and a cohesive ideology that had 
as their first aim the inclusion of the sub-proletariat and the countryside into the 
urban proto-movement. As I argued in the Introduction and Chapter 3, I will further 
disentangle how left-wing and workers’ proto-movements have been marginalised 
in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings in Egypt. In doing so I will answer to the 
questions: to what extent did the encounter in urban and peripheral 
neighbourhoods between non-organised groups and more defined political 
movements affected the workers' proto-movement? How did the Independent 
Trade Unions work and their operations evolve when the popular unrest ended? 
 
Thus, first, I will analyse the evolution of the workers' movements in Egypt and the 
attempts of trade unionism to overcome the control of the state in the fight for 
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better workers' rights. I will later discuss the participation of the independent trade 
unions throughout the 2011 uprisings in the Nile Delta town of Mahalla al-Kubra.  
 
If we previously tackled the attempts at the institutionalisation of the mass 
mobilisation in urban neighbourhoods in reference to the evolution of the Popular 
Committees, we will focus our attention now on the evolution of the workers' proto-
movement in a peripheral area. The Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade 
Unions (EFITU) [in Arabic Al-Ittihad al-Masri li-l-Naqabat al-Mustaqila] had been 
among the most organised and structured oppositional forces to mobilise during the 
18 days of occupation of Tahrir Square and afterwards. However, the trade unions 
within EFITU appeared very fragmented and lacked an independent leadership, thus 
they were easily used as a tool of cooptation of political figures belonging to the old 
regime by any newcomers or they were manipulated by the military junta and finally 
advanced as supporters of the 2013 military coup.  
 
As discussed in the Introduction, I will focus my research of the industrial town of 
Mahalla al-Kubra in the Nile Delta with one of the biggest textile factories in Egypt. 
For the historical presence of industries and factories, the high number of workers' 
protests, levels of labour mobilisation, and number of independent trade unions, 
Mahalla al-Kubra is one of the most interesting peripheral areas to be studied in 
Egypt, which serves as good case study in order to shed light on the evolution of the 
trade unions throughout the revolutionary process. 
 
The concentration of factories in Mahalla al-Kubra is related to the industrial policy 
of the late 1970s to shift new industries to satellite cities “isolated from old 
industrial centres and from each other”362. According to Abdelrahman, “the whole 
city is in one way or another connected to the industrial complex”363. 
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This is true even if we look at the grassroots level and we try to describe such micro-
dynamics of the uprisings within this countryside. Thus, in this chapter, I will 
describe the workings and attempts of institutionalisation of the Egyptian 
Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU), especially in reference to the 
peripheral area of Mahalla al-Kubra, drawing upon the results of one of the focus 
groups carried out in this neighbourhood during my stays in Egypt between 2011 
and 2015. 
 
My aim is to understand the levels of political participation of these workers, 
analysing their electoral choices at the ballot boxes, the reasons that triggered their 
mobilisation and demobilisation, and the attempts to institutionalise the often 
precarious structure of the local independent trade unions.  
 
Very few studies have focused research on the development of the independent 
trade unions at the micro level during and in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings in 
Egypt. In doing so, I shall try to add a new understanding of the development of the 
Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU) in peripheral 
neighbourhoods, and in reference to the literature on workers' movements in the 
Middle East.  
 
Nine workers were part of this focus group. They were all living in Mahalla al-Kubra 
and its outskirts. The trade unionists and activists, Hamdi Hussein and Gamal 
Hassanin, acted as the gatekeepers interviewed in order to select the workers 
involved in this focus group. Hamdi Hussein has spent his life taking part in mass 
mobilisations and strikes. He has been in prison several times in the previous 
decades. The last time was in 1988 when he marched in Shon Square (downtown 
Mahalla al-Kubra) with a few pictures depicting former President Hosni Mubarak in a 
coffin.  
 
In a preliminary stage, Hamdi and Gamal were part of the process for the 
composition and organisation of this specific focus group. The aim was to choose 
farmers and workers in order to analyse the workings of the local independent trade 
148 
 
unions before and after the 2011 uprisings in Mahalla al-Kubra, compared to more 
established trade unions representing labour rights (ETUF), the levels of mobilisation 
and demobilisation within the social proto-movement, the  cooperation with other 
oppositional groups, the political participation after the 2013 military coup, their 
accounts of the 2011 uprisings and its aftermath, the relations with soldiers and 
policemen, established political parties and the Muslim Brotherhood, and finally, the 
strategies of these organisations. At the end of each meeting we had a debriefing 
session with the gatekeepers involved in order to talk about the group dynamics and 
the results of the interviews.  
 
The participant workers and farmers were: Wedad, 32 years old, a worker at Gazal 
al-Mahalla; Garib Moussa, 30, a former worker at Gazl el-Mahalla textile factory; 
Mahmoud, 40, a farmer and tuk tuk driver in Qafr el-Aghazia, close to Mahalla; 
Mahrour, 45 years old, a farmer and honey producer; Emad, a farmer and voluntary 
trade unionist; Walid, 50 years old, a worker at Gazl al-Mahalla; Eman, 23 years old, 
a worker and rank and file activist.   
 
Table XII: Focus group 2: Mahalla al-Kubra, EFITU 
Focus group: nine participants Two stakeholders: Hamdi Hussein, 
leader of the local Socialist party and 
Gamal Hassanin, local trade unionist. 
Seven workers and farmers: Wedad, 
Walid, Eman, Gamal, Garib, Emad and 
Mahmud. 
 
From the very beginning, I found a promising level of interest among the participant 
workers and farmers. However, a number of problematic issues had to be tackled at 
a later stage. We met workers and farmers in their workplace in Mahalla al-Kubra 
and Qafr al-Aghazia in three different sessions from January 2013 to December 
2015. Initially access to workers and farmers was through the mediation of the 
activists and trade unionists who convinced them to participate in the research, 
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especially before the 2013 military takeover, but afterwards the interviewees were 
involved in the focus group without the presence of the aforementioned trade 
unionists.  
 
At the beginning of this research, the interviewees did not express any security 
concerns in reference to their participation in the focus group. However, after the 
2014 presidential elections, the workers involved appeared to be more concerned 
about freedom of speech and the general state of repression in their daily activities, 
thus some of the workers and the farmers asked to be mentioned in the research 
only with their first names in order to be less noticeable. However, the interviewees 
never expressed any personal or specific concern or fears or mistrust.  
 
5.1 Workers' Movements and the Egyptian Trade Union Federation 
(ETUF) 
This section will explore the institutionalisation of the workers' movements in Egypt 
and the state’s control over such a potentially strong oppositional force. The 
Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) was created during Gamal Abdel Nasser's 
presidency in order to put workers and former Communist activists under the 
control of the state364. This formal arrangement continued during the Nasser, Sadat 
and Mubarak presidencies: unofficially the workers’ movement presented a major 
challenge to the legitimacy of the regime from the 1970s to 2011. Historically, the 
major social movements in Egypt (1919, after the Second World War, 1977 and 
1985) were informed by the spread of strikes and workers' mobilisations. The 
protests in the late 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and 2000s paralleled economic 
liberalisation and “open door” policies. The public sector workers protested against 
the government cuts to the annual budget (1975) that culminated in a three-day 
occupation of the Ghazl al-Mahalla textile factory in March 1975365. 
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However, in order to be eligible for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans, 
the Egyptian government accepted to cut subsidies on consumers “up to 50 per 
cent” in the spring of 1976 and decided to privatise 314 public enterprises. In 
January 1977, mass riots took place in the major Egyptian urban districts with the 
participations of independent trade unionists, ex-Communists and unaffiliated 
workers. 
 
According to Beinin, between 1986 and 1993, there was an average annually of 33 
strikes in Egypt366. At the same time the balance between state and private 
enterprises changed. According to Tripp, by 2005 75% of the Egyptian economy was 
privately owned367. As Hanieh argues, Egypt had recorded the “largest number of 
firms privatised out of any country in the region”368. 
 
Again the biggest strikes took place in September 1988 at the Ghazal al-Mahalla 
factory. They were triggered by the end of the annual grant to public sector workers 
to buy clothes and supplies for their children369.  
 
At the end of the mobilisation of 1988, the labour protests began to be strictly 
monitored by the regime. As a matter of fact, as state capitalism and liberalisation 
did not take into account workers' rights, many leftwing intellectuals and activists 
grew alienated from the Communist and socialist pro-regime political parties (e.g. 
Tagammu) and preferred to be engaged in NGOs activities. Many of those NGOs 
advocated labour rights. For instance the Center for Trade Union and Workers 
Services (CTUWS), founded in 1990, was among the first promoters of workers' 
mobilisations in the 1990s and 2000s. 
 
Most notably, the professional syndicates began to be perceived by the Egyptian 
authorities as an area of dissent and for this reason, the pro-regime hierarchies of 
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these organisations were used to control dissent within them370. Thus with Law 100 
(1993), the government could better interfere in the trade unions' activities while 
simultaneously the Muslim Brotherhood extended its control over the boards of the 
Lawyers and Engineers Syndicates371. It is not the aim of this research to disentangle 
the role of the professional unions but it is important to consider to what extent 
they have been used by the authorities as a means to co-opt the Muslim 
Brotherhood supporters within the state institutions. 
 
With the appointment of a businessman as Prime Minister, Ahmed Nazif, in 2004, 
and a large number of new liberalisations, strikes and collective actions also 
increased significantly. According to Beinin, from 1998 to 2003, there was an 
average of 118 workers' protests per annum, and long-term strikes and factory 
occupations, more than doubled in 2004 (265)372. At that stage, despite the 
increasing number of labour mobilisations, the security apparatus rarely used 
violence to disperse the protests. Thus, as Tripp explained, in the 2000s it was 
evident that there was “a new spirit of industrial activism, new ways of organizing 
labour protests and an agenda that challenged the political leadership of the state 
and the regime's instruments of control”373.  
 
In 2006 and 2007, the largest industrial strikes took place in Ghazal al-Mahalla 
textile factory. According to Beinin, this was a turning point for the intensification of 
workers' mobilisations: “Viewing the 2006 strike at Ghazal al-Mahalla as a beginning 
tends to promote the view that the intelligentsia's discovery of the workers' 
movement established its significance”374.  
Thus, he continues: 
The symbolic importance of Ghazal al-Mahalla, the concentration of one 
fifth of all the public sector textile workers there, their long history of 
struggle, and oppositional political forces' acknowledgment of the 
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significance of the strikes marked a qualitative intensification of workers' 
collective action and its significance375. 
 
The state reacted quickly. The security forces directly intervened in the ETUF 
elections for local union committees replacing popular leaders with pro-regime 
figures. However, a number of workers' leaders were elected in a type of counter-
committee at Ghazal al-Mahalla376.  
 
After the December 2006 strike in Mahalla, the strike committee launched a 
campaign to impeach the ETUF committee. Three thousand workers resigned from 
the official textile trade unions within the ETUF, while regime representatives went 
to Mahalla to negotiate with the unofficial committee about the demands for 
bonuses coming from the workers377. Workers’ organisations outside the framework 
of the ETUF were also initiated378.  
 
As Tripp notes, “the old techniques of social control were breaking down”379, and, as 
Alexander added, the engine that drove strikes in Mahalla al-Kubra became “a 
model of democratic organizing in which delegates and negotiators were 
accountable to mass meetings of the strikers, and leadership was predicated on the 
self-activity of the rank and file”380. 
 
In 2008, the Ghazal al-Mahalla strike committee proposed a national labour strike 
on April 6 (giving the name to the April 6 Youth Movement) to demand an increase 
in the minimum wage. The concerns of the mobilised workers appeared to move 
beyond the workplace to include “ambitious demands concerning the political 
order”381 with some coordination with opposition parties. However, in more general 
terms, the demand was to establish an independent trade union of the local textile 
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workers. Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif went to Mahalla to discuss this with the 
workers' representatives. Their demands for better transportation, special bakeries, 
subsidised foods and medical equipment were achieved.  
 
However, only tax collectors had the official recognition of the Independent General 
Union of Real Estate Tax Authority Workers (RETAU) granted. By December 2008, 
with an unprecedented decision, around 30, 000 of 50, 000 tax assessors left the 
ETUF to join the RETAU382. 
 
5.2 From the ETUF to the EFITU 
This section will further analyse the attempts of the Egyptian independent trade 
unionism to overcome governmental control in the years preceding the 2011 
mobilisations and the flow of activities from 2011 to the al-Sisi regime. In the 2000s 
the Egyptian workers were increasingly mobilised. As Tripp noted, “they were 
unwilling to acquiesce in their deteriorating position. Instead they were determined 
to resist many aspects of the economic reform policies, the neoliberal justifications 
on which they rested and the intertwined interests of private capital and state 
authority that promoted them”383.  
 
In other words, as discussed in the Introduction and Chapter 3, to participate in 
protests and strikes in Egypt, in the 2000s, became acceptable. Between 2009 and 
2010, hundreds of workers and farmers gathered in front of the People's Assembly 
to fight for their social rights. According to Beinin, this established the right “to 
occupy public space” which led to the decision later to occupy Tahrir Square384.  
 
However, at the national level, the ETUF did not have the same approach of the 
UGTT in Tunisia. In other words, the traditional trade unions, controlled by the 
Mubarak regime, during the 2011 uprisings, did not call for labour protests even if 
the proto-movement was clearly ready for a mass mobilisation. The spontaneous 
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workers' committees had no “institutional mechanism to compel the ETUF to join 
the popular movement against Mubarak”385. In other words, the local committees 
were not duplicated at the national level.  
 
The CTUWS coordinator, Kamal Abbas, and the RETAU president, Kamal Abu Eita, 
along with smaller unions of teachers, health professionals and retiree associations 
formed on January 30 2011 the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions 
(EFITU), taking advantage of the permanent occupation of Tahrir Square. However, 
the pro-regime ETUF continued to support the state institutions while in April 2011 
its president, Hussein Megawer, was arrested for his affiliation to the then dissolved 
National Democratic Party (NDP). 
 
The Tahrir Square demonstrations encouraged the workers' groups to mobilise and 
communicate386. A demand for cleansing (tathir) of public institutions of the 
remnants of the old regime was raised during the nationwide teachers' strike 
involving half a million workers387.  
 
In February 2011, there were 489 strikes in Egypt. The EFITU issued a statement 
proclaiming “Demands of the Workers in the Revolution”: right to form non-
governmental unions, right to strike and the dissolution of the pro-regime and 
corrupt ETUF. The SCAF appointed Ahmed el-Borai, professor of labour law at Cairo 
University, as the interim Minister of Manpower.  
 
On the one hand, the labour mobilisations were constantly increasing in parallel 
with some trade unionists’ attempts to have better represented workers’ rights 
within the interim government. On the other hand, the military junta intervened in 
order to put under state control all kind of protests. Thus, while El-Borai obtained 
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the legalisation of the EFITU, a law criminalising strikes, demonstrations and sit-ins 
was also approved388.  
 
The law on independent unions has been one of the most important achievements 
for the Egyptian workers. According to the new Trade Union Freedom Law (August 
2011), 50 workers in a workplace can form a union without any governmental 
supervision389. Moreover the EFITU statements ahead of a massive strike in Mahalla 
al-Kubra indicated “a degree of organisation and defiance of the law that was likely 
to overwhelm the existing resources of the government”390. Finally, Kamal Abu Eita 
was elected as the EFITU first president. Likewise, in April 2013, a second federation 
of independent unions was established: the Egyptian Democratic Labour Council 
(EDLC) convened with 149 unions represented391.  
 
However, the post-revolutionary 2012 Parliament was not representative of the 
Egyptian workers. As Alexander argues, “the parliamentary arena proved to be 
almost impenetrable by workers themselves, or even by political organisations 
articulating workers' social and political demands”392. Moreover, the seats available 
for the Egyptian workers, according to the electoral law, have been largely 
controlled by the ETUF393. 
 
After the election of Mohammed Morsi to the presidency (June 2012), the Muslim 
Brotherhood's leader issued a decree allowing all the members of the Islamist 
movement to be part of the ETUF board. During the Morsi presidency, former NDP 
politicians were co-opted within the boards of the official trade unions showing an 
effort of the Muslim Brotherhood to “share control of the ETUF with former 
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Mubarak supporters”394. In more general terms, the Muslim Brotherhood tried to 
strengthen the ETUF in order to counterweight the independent unions395. 
 
As Beinin shows, in 2012, 1,969 strikes took place in Egypt, and as many as 1,972 in 
the first six months of 2013396. The Muslim Brotherhood warned that strikes and 
civil disobedience would lead to “the collapse of the state”397. The workers' 
mobilisations were part of the opposition to Morsi's liberalisation policies and to the 
lack of workers' rights in the 2012 Constitution. This pushed the CTUWS, the EFITU, 
the ECESR and other think tanks and independent trade unions to take part in the 
Tamarrod campaign asking for Morsi's resignation.  
 
After the 2013 military coup, the labour protests decreased and Kamal Abu Eita 
accepted an appointment as Minister of Manpower in the interim government, 
paving the way to what we defined in Chapter 3 as a pseudo Neo-Nasserism which 
had the aim to co-opt leftwing activists within formal politics without the 
recognition of the workers' demands.  
 
In 2014, the strikes continued in Mahalla al-Kubra forcing the interim Prime Minister 
Hazem Beblawi to resign. After the 2013 military coup, on the one hand, although 
the EFITU continued to express concerns for workers' rights398, on the other hand, it 
supported the security apparatus and the crackdown on Islamists.  
 
5.3 Workers and Farmers: Patterns of Mobilisation in Mahalla al-Kubra 
In this section I will zoom in on the patterns of workers mobilisation and 
demobilisation in Mahalla al-Kubra during and after the 2011 uprisings. Due to the 
historical presence of industries, the high and constant number of workers' 
mobilisations and labour unionism, Mahalla al-Kubra is an interesting case study to 
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elaborate on the evolution of the independent trade unions during the 2011 
uprisings and beyond.  
 
The January 25 2011 uprisings in Mahalla al-Kubra were centred in the street 
protests in Shon Square at the intersection between the main road, where 
microbuses coming from Cairo usually stop, and the small and unpaved crowded 
alleys nearby.  
 
The workers involved in our second focus group confirmed their early participation 
in the 2011 local protests even if the number of participants was not comparable to 
the Tahrir Square mass riots. Many of them had already been involved in previous 
anti-regime mobilisations and strikes. The participants who were unionised workers 
demanded better labour conditions and new investments in the textile industries. 
“We were among the hundreds of young people of the revolution gathering in Shon 
Square in Mahalla al-Kubra”399. “We were asking for a better life and human working 
conditions”400. “We participated during the first protests after an already long-
lasting struggle to overcome the rooted crisis of the Egyptian cotton industry”401. 
But this interviewee had some previous experience: “We have been used for years 
to go to downtown Cairo during mass demonstrations and strikes or close to the 
Mubarak' residency in Qasr al-Qobba to demonstrate against his neo-liberal labour' 
policies”402. 
 
As seen in Chapter 3, after Mubarak resigned, between February and March 2011 
the workers' proto-movement “entered the workplaces on a mass scale”403. As 
confirmed by the participants in our focus group, if during previous mobilisations 
the demand of the Mahalla' workers was about an improvement in labour rights and 
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a minimum wage, at this stage, the major demand of the workers was the removal 
of the factory management associated with the Mubarak regime404. 
 
After the approval of the law on the legalisation of the EFITU, from April to 
September 2011, there was a rapid expansion of labour organisations and a spread 
of independent unions in Mahalla al-Kubra. The focus group participants considered 
at this stage that the improvement of workers' rights should have been the major 
outcome of the upheaval. However, they recalled that even during the first waves of 
protests there were doubts whether or not the military junta would have allowed 
more secure workers’ rights or, in any case, these new openings were only a façade. 
“The most important achievement of the 2011 revolution seemed to be that we 
might have better defended workers' rights”405. “The military junta has been 
working to sabotage the law on Independent Trade Unions (EFITU) since its approval 
by the Minister of Manpower, Ahmed el-Borai”406.  
 
The strikes of September 2011 brought about a change in the workers' demands. 
Rather than occurring as isolated strikes in fragmented workplaces, the larger strikes 
were supported by 500,000 workers nationwide407. “We entered in a new strike in 
September 2011 asking for better works' conditions and a change in the factory' 
management”408, recalls one focus group participant. 
 
In this period, the Egyptian authorities appeared to be willing to open new 
negotiations with Mahalla's unionised workers pressurised by their high levels of 
mobilisation. According to the trade unionist, Hamdi Hussein, the September 2011 
strikes in Mahalla al-Kubra forced the government to talk to the workers. “Misr 
Spinning threatened to strike in September and forced the government to open up a 
                                                             
404 Case 2, Interviewees 1, 2 and 8. 
405 Case 2, Interviewees 1, 4 and 5. 
406 Case 2, Interviewees 2 and 9. 
407 Alexander, A. and Bassiouny, M. Bread, Freedom, p. 213 
408 Case 2, Interviewee 3. 
159 
 
new round of negotiations”409. This ended with an agreement approved by the 
government to improve pay and labour conditions across the textile sector410. 
 
5.4 EFITU in Mahalla al-Kubra and the Elections  
Despite initial attempts to take some advantage from the newly approved legislation 
on independent unionism, during the six elections between 2011 and 2015, the 
wishes of Mahalla al-Kubra workers to institutionalise their proto-movement faded, 
as I will discuss further on.  
 
After the 2011 mobilisations, the strike committee of the Gazhal al-Mahalla textile 
factory tried to take some advantage of the el-Borai's law on the independent 
unions and the parallel short-termed political openings, with an attempt to legalise 
at least seven411 unofficial unions with the support of the already unionised workers 
in the local manufacturing industries. 
 
However, the rushed electoral procedures did not give the local workers enough 
time to organise a consistent structure within the factories. The Nile Delta electoral 
district, including Mahalla al-Kubra, participated in the national vote during the third 
round of the parliamentary elections in January 2012. The presence of soldiers and 
the military police was overwhelmingly evident in the town.  
 
As for the political transition, for the local workers, initially it seemed wise to take 
part in the 2011-2012 parliamentary elections although many other mobilised 
workers in Cairo, Suez and Alexandria were already feeling marginalised within the 
political arena and decided to boycott the elections from that stage onwards. 
However, the Muslim Brotherhood supporters in Mahalla al-Kubra failed to mobilise 
their local constituency, thus they were poorly represented in the new Parliament, 
winning four of the 10 available seats. “I decided to go to vote and support 
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independent workers or some candidates of the local party al-Adl (Justice)”412. 
Another interviewee added: “The left-wing Revolution Continues Coalition was 
almost absent in Mahalla. For this reason, I voted for independent candidates 
supporting workers' rights, like Hosman Zeina”413.  
 
Once they realised that the new Parliament was lacking a genuine representation of 
the workers among its MPs, the local trade unions had the idea to forge a “People's 
Parliament” in order to list the workers' demands to the renewed People's 
Assembly414. The same happened at the end of 2010 when the political opposition 
formed an alternative Parliament to the Assembly controlled by Mubarak's National 
Democratic Party (NDP). 
 
In this same year, the workers' grievances did not decrease with the political 
empowerment of the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, the atmosphere in Mahalla al-
Kubra noticeably changed in parallel with the June 2012 presidential elections. The 
local workers involved in this research, with some exceptions, considered Hamdin 
Sabbahi as a valid candidate representing workers' rights due to his political career 
as a trade unionist. For the same reasons, Sabbahi obtained the support both of 
Kamal Abu Eita, the leader of the EFITU, and Tarek Mostafa Kaeb, treasurer of the 
Tax Collectors' Union (RETAU)415. Along with the former member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, Moneim Abul Fotuh, Sabbahi appeared to be the only alternative to 
the old regime candidate, Ahmed Shafiq, and the Muslim Brotherhood leader, 
Mohammed Morsi. “I voted for Sabbahi. However, he did not genuinely represent 
workers' rights in his political programme”416. 
 
At this stage, it was already evident that the grassroots movements and the 
mobilised workers had not acquired any benefits from the 2011 uprisings. However, 
these grievances were soon transferred to the opposition to the neo-liberal policies 
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of the Muslim Brotherhood, widely associated with the previous regime of Mubarak. 
Thus, many workers and farmers preferred to vote for Ahmed Shafiq at the 2012 
presidential elections. “We did not witness any benefit from the revolutionary 
movement. Thus I voted for Ahmed Shafiq”417. “The Muslim Brotherhood politicians 
belong to the old regime too”418. 
 
Ahmed Shafiq won in three of the electoral districts of Mahalla al-Kubra being the 
leading vote winner at the presidential elections in the town’s hinterland. On the 
other hand, Hamdin Sabbahi won in the two urban districts of Mahalla al-Kubra, as a 
potential representative of the local workers. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood 
completely failed to mobilise their supporters among the voters in this industrial 
area, despite one of the moderate Islamists, Saad al-Husseini, being chosen as 
Mahalla's representative in the People's Assembly in the 2005 parliamentary 
elections419. 
 
5.5 Workers, Farmers and the 2012 Constitution 
On the occasion of the 2012 Constitutional Referendum, the Mahalla al-Kubra 
workers and farmers were already very critical of the political approach of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. The “no” to the new Constitution here won with 52%. In more 
general terms, all the policies implemented at the national level by the Islamists 
appeared to be ineffective in supporting workers' rights. “The political ideology of 
the Muslim Brotherhood is a major reason of concern for us”420. “Some Islamists 
came to our homes promising a 100 EP (£10) raise and sugar to push us to go to vote 
yes”421. “To some of my neighbors the local supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood 
rented a tuk tuk in order to push them to express their vote in support of the 
Islamists”422. 
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According to the farmers interviewed in this study, at that very moment, the major 
matter of concern for them was the law on the cancellation of the debts for the 
farmers, exceeding 10,000 EP (£1,000). They complained that the cut was not 
implemented by the local banks. Thus, they considered the political decisions of the 
Muslim Brotherhood as ineffective at the local level. “When I went to the bank, they 
said that I should have carried a special permit which I was not aware about in order 
to cut my debt”423. “The Muslim Brotherhood was cheating us”424. In this instance, 
the local supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, such as Khaled Derwish, argued 
that the decision of the central government was not implemented by remnants of 
the old regime at the local level with the aim to sabotage Morsi's presidency. 
 
Weeks before the December 2012 Constitutional Referendum there were protests 
and strikes in Mahalla al-Kubra again. On the occasion of major clashes, 318 people 
were injured while they were heading to Shon Square to ask for the cancellation of 
the farmers' debts. “The clashes erupted with the Muslim Brotherhood supporters 
and the police did not intervene”425. 
 
However, the criticisms of the Muslim Brotherhood were related especially to their 
policies on the prices of food and vegetables. “The Muslim Brotherhood government 
decided that the value of a ton of sugar was 2,000 EP (£200) but its real value is 
1,500 EP. Often the local farmers did not find local buyers for their goods thus they 
were forced to sell it to other traders”426. “There was no freedom or 'Social Justice'. 
The prices were increasing too fast”427.  
 
In the 2012 Constitution, at the end of a controversial political debate, and 
approved by the Constituent Assembly controlled by a majority of Muslim 
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Brotherhood politicians, the quota for workers' seats was removed, “along with the 
state's commitment to a wide range of social and economic rights”428.  
 
This was perceived by the workers and farmers involved as detrimental to their 
specific social interests. On the specific articles of the 2012 Constitution concerning 
workers' rights, the criticisms coming from the interviewees, who were unionised 
workers, ranged from the levels of their salaries to the right to strike. “The 2012 
Constitution was against workers' rights”429. “There were no rights for farmers and 
workers. A woman cannot accept that the salary is related to the level of 
productivity”430. “This new Constitution gives to the factory owners the right to fire 
their employees”431. “We do not know when a strike is legal and when it is not”432. 
“They did not hear the workers' demands”433. 
 
The same complaints were referred by interviewees in our second focus group 
centring on trade unions, minimum salary, economic rights and industrial 
productivity. “The Constitution was detrimental for the Egyptian trade unions. The 
government has the control over the workers”434. “It is wrong to link salaries to the 
levels of productivity: our infrastructures are obsolete and this decreases the levels 
of productivity”435. “The salary of the public sector' workers do not rise in reference 
to inflation and this impoverishes them”436. “They want to bring about a new class 
struggle within the factories: the extra levels of production are not paid”437.  
 
In the week preceding the 2012 Constitutional Referendum, in Shon Square, a 
symbolic election had been organised by the local trade unionists and Left-wing 
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activists. As Gamal and Hamdi confirmed438, long meetings and discussions took 
place in downtown Mahalla al-Kubra on the eve of the Referendum. “There was a 
great participation in our counter-Referendum”439. “No won with 96%. There was a 
big participation especially of women who often encouraged other women to take 
part in the symbolic vote”440.  
 
According to the participants who were trade unionists, at the moment of 
conducting this focus group, the 2012 Constitution encouraged inequalities among 
the citizens and had the potential to trigger new protests. “The Constitution created 
inequalities among the citizens and the first to be affected were Nubians, women, 
workers, Christians and children”441. “The 2012 Constitution could have brought 
back demonstrations in the streets”442. “The Muslim Brotherhood is a conservative 
movement and their politicians are truly capitalists”443. 
 
5.6 Workers' Movements and the Military Coup: Patterns of 
Demobilisation 
With the Morsi presidency, a growing opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood's 
economic policies arose in the Nile Delta. As already discussed, hundreds of strikes 
and new workers' mobilisations were taking place daily in the first months of 2013. 
This new wave of strikes and workers' protests was hijacked by the military leading 
up to the 2013 military coup through the Tamarrod campaign. According to our 
interviewees, at this time the meetings of the EFITU, the CTUWS and other 
opposition groups began to be infiltrated by the military and civilian secret services.  
 
Even after the coup, however, quiet was not restored: the workers went back on 
strike in January 2014 bringing about the resignation of the interim Prime Minister, 
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Hazem Beblawy. The demands of the workers included the revision and the approval 
of the law on a minimum wage.  
 
This national strike involved the Suez Steel factories, the Munoufeya and Mahalla al-
Kubra textile factories, the woolen mill sector, the workers in Gharbeya, together 
with Bticino's workers in the Cairo satellite district 10th Ramadan and Pirelli in 
Alexandria. Thus, in parallel with the economic crisis, 1,050 industries were closed in 
the previous three years, including the paper factory Simo and the sugar industry 
Nesha. Many other workers were gradually joining the protests including the 
Cleopatra cement factories, public transport' and post office workers, together with 
hundreds of tourism employees at public resorts.  
 
On the eve of the 2014 presidential elections, the ETUF supported Abdel Fattah al-
Sisi. However, despite the call of the EFITU and the EDLC to boycott the elections, 
the former Manpower Ministry, Kamal Abu Eita, gave his support to the only other 
candidate, Hamdin Sabbahi. This has been considered as a new sign of the 
controversial support given by some of the former leaders of the independent trade 
unions to al-Sisi’s agenda. In other words, before and after the military takeover, the 
Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU) appeared to be 
fragmented, easily demobilised, with some of their leaders both at the national and 
local levels supportive of the military coup. 
 
As a matter of fact, the interim government and al-Sisi's presidency maintained their 
form of state capitalism, including negotiations with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), and the elimination of the tax on the higher income (more than 22.5%). 
On April 28 2015, with a provocative decision against the mobilised workers, the 
Cairo Administrative Court labeled the strikes as illegal and sacked many workers, 
charging them with being involved in illegal protests. The governmental Egyptian 
Federation of Trade Unions (ETUF) approved this decision. In a statement, the ETUF 
stigmatised the “politicisation of the trade unions” in reference to the spread of the 
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new independent trade unions444. Moreover, the security personnel became to act 
increasingly aggressively against workers' mobilisations. For example, they fired on a 
workers' sit-in close to the cement factories in al-Arish on February 2 2015. A worker 
died and three were injured.  
 
Thus, the participant workers in our second focus group appeared very critical of al-
Sisi's economic policies. Moreover, they had wanted accountability by the police and 
the military personnel of those who attacked workers' strikes and appeared to be 
ready for new mobilisations in relation to economic demands. “The al-Sisi political 
economy is the most neo-liberal ever witnessed in Egypt”445. “The target of the new 
president is to include in the military regime, the former NDP politicians and 
businessmen”446. “The military personnel who attacked the workers must be 
charged for their crimes”447. “The aims of the army are to show that the revolution 
is over and the workers' demands are against the national interests”448. “New 
conflicts have been opened up in the countryside between farmers and 
businessmen for the land and water rights”449. 
 
The Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU), especially at the 
national level, has been clearly weakened by the 2013 military coup for several 
reasons. “They did not have enough time to evolve into a more structured 
organisation”450. “The laws for the formation of independent trade unions are too 
blurred. Thus, we did not know if our demands of legalisation would have been 
approved by the government”451. “We lacked financial resources to create new 
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independent unions”452. “Many workers are worried about possible economic 
consequences if they decide to leave the ETUF in order to join the EFITU”453. 
 
At the local level, the EFITU continued to organise new strikes, which have been 
limited in time and space, and without any reference to a comprehensive or national 
strategy. According to the Mahrousa Center, the number of workers' protests 
nationwide in 2015 were 393, this showing a constant high level of labour 
mobilisation. Moreover, according to the Egyptian NGO Democracy Meter, there 
were 1,117 reported labour protests in 2015, and an additional 493 protests from 
January to April 2016, showing a constant high level of labour mobilisation454. 
However, as discussed in Chapter 3, repression has been extended from the 
Islamists to the Left-wing activists and the trade unions. Especially the professional 
unions, traditionally controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood, have been purged of 
their Islamists board members, as all their other grassroots activities. “After the 
military coup, they not only attacked the Islamists but the local independent trade 
unions as well”455.   
 
With full victory at the 2015 parliamentary elections, and a very low turn-out, al-Sisi 
implemented his agenda and consolidated his power. But despite the spread of 
repression against NGOs and opposition groups, on December 11 2015, the biggest 
meeting of the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU) took place 
in Cairo in the office of the Centre for Workers Services and Trade Unions (CTUWS).  
 
The meeting was organised after the ETUF issued a document where it stated its aim 
to oppose and marginalise the EFITU456. At least 50 trade unions participated at the 
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meeting, including the Mahalla al-Kubra's textile workers, al-Arish cement factories' 
workers and several representatives of the Nile Delta's farmers. This meeting was 
especially important because the EDLC and the EFITU had not organised a general 
assembly since 2013. Thus, every local independent union began to act 
independently from the national federation.  
 
Some of our interviewees took part in the Cairo meeting and considered it as crucial 
for further mobilisations. “The December 11 2015 meeting was especially important 
because it has been the first attempt to coordinate again the works of the local 
fragmented and isolated unions”457. “We decided to forge a committee representing 
workers' rights and launch a national campaign for supporting trade union 
freedoms”458. “At the CTUWS, we discussed organising a number of regional 
conferences, taking part in the January 25 2016 anniversary celebrations of the 
revolution and ending our mobilisation with a unified protest”459.  
 
One of the controversial issues for the workers involved in our focus group is Law 18 
2015, which targets public sector workers. Between December 2015 and August 
2016 a number of new strikes in textile, cement and building factories began. 
According to the workers who were interviewed those strikes were not structured 
or well organised. “The workers mobilised again for better salaries”460. “In many of 
those strikes, the EFITU was not involved”461. “The fear among workers, farmers and 
all other opposition groups is unprecedented. It is very hard to organise and take 
part in any kind of demonstration within the framework of al-Sisi's military 
regime”462. 
 
In more general terms, al-Sisi's regime strengthened the repression against all the 
organisations of the Egyptian civil society. Many NGOs have been searched and 
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closed on the grounds of receiving foreign funding. A number of foreign NGOs, 
active for years in Egypt, have been closed since 2011, including Freedom House and 
the Centre for International Journalists (CIJ). As for the EFITU, a lawsuit filed by the 
ETUF on the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings asking for the prohibition of the 
independent unions (including other small groups defending labour rights), labelled 
as “illegal” and “illegitimate,” has been referred to the Supreme Constitutional Court 
in June 2016 and is expected to be discussed in the coming months.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I used a class-based approach as a key to understanding the 2011 
uprisings and their aftermath in Egypt. Although this approach has been often 
neglected by many mainstream analysts, one cannot avoid the noticeable number of 
strikes and workers' mobilisations, which occurred in the country between 2011 and 
2016.  
 
However, there is also another current of scholars who have considered the 
grassroots' mobilisations of the workers both at the urban and peripheral levels as 
being intertwined with other political grievances and the most significant form of 
protests during the Egyptian 2011 proto-movement, and thus well rooted in a long-
lasting tradition of struggles against the Mubarak regime, and as of significant 
concern for the military junta and the al-Sisi presidency.  
 
As seen in the previous chapter, which focused on Popular Committees in an urban 
Cairo district, grassroots' protests were easily demobilised or channeled in more 
general, less political and organised civil society activities in many neighborhoods in 
parallel or after the 2011 mass riots. The same happened with the legalisation of the 
Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU). This appeared to tackle 
the demands for workers' rights that were more independent from the government 
economic policies and control, at least compared to the past. On the other hand, the 
EFITU has been used both to control the mobilised workers by the state security 
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agencies and to manipulate and divide the workers' grievances and their leadership, 
partially co-opting them into the interim government. 
 
In doing so, the military regime included some of the left-wing oppositionists, 
excluding and demobilising the working class. This technique did not succeed 
completely. If the Muslim Brotherhood and their civil apparatus have been easily de-
motivated with the introduction of death penalties, the imposition of life 
imprisonment and the freezing of assets, nevertheless strikes and workers' protests 
were and are still taking place in post-coup Egypt. Moreover, if the Islamists 
movements, along with the Popular Committees as seen in the previous chapter, 
have been outlawed, the same did not happen with the EFITU. However, the 
independent trade unions are still working under the strict supervision and control 
of the government. This of course hindered the independence of these trade unions, 
reducing the scope of their activities to the same forms of irrelevant opposition 
pursued by other NGOs working for social and human rights. Thus, like many other 
non-governmental organisations working in Egypt, the EFITU have been gradually 
put under strict state supervision. 
 
In this chapter, I argued that Egypt in 2011 was ready for more radical change, 
especially thanks to decades of strikes and workers' mobilisations in peripheral 
areas that culminated in the 2011 occupations in the urban centres. However, these 
proto-movements were too fragmented, leaderless and lacked a coherent ideology 
to follow through on their initial successes.  
 
I further disentangled the attempts at the institutionalisation of the workers' 
movements in Egypt, which echoes the state’s policy of controlling potentially 
strong oppositional forces during its waves of liberalisation of the Egyptian economy 
from the 1970s to the 2000s.  
 
I especially focused my attention on the evolution of the workers' proto-movement 
in the peripheral area of Mahalla al-Kubra, due to the historical presence of 
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industries and factories, the high number of workers' protests, the levels of labour 
mobilisation, and the number of independent trade unions. 
 
The aim has been to understand the levels of political participation of the local 
workers analysing their electoral choices at the ballot boxes, and especially on the 
occasion of the referendum for the new Constitution, where they rejected the 
Muslim Brotherhood's neo-liberal policies.  
 
After the December 2006 strike in Mahalla al-Kubra, the local strike committee 
launched a campaign to impeach the ETUF committee paving the way for the 
formation of the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU), later 
legalised after the 2011 uprisings. In 2008, the Ghazal al-Mahalla strike committee 
proposed a national labour strike moving beyond the workplace and becoming 
increasingly political. Thus, some of the leaders of such non-governmental unions, 
such as Kamal Abbas, and the RETAU president, Kamal Abu Eita, along with the 
smaller unions of teachers, health professionals and retiree associations were 
among the protagonists of the 2011 uprisings.  
 
The Mahalla al-Kubra workers and farmers, involved in our second focus group, 
confirmed their early participation in the 2011 local protests, especially the strikes 
of September 2011, which brought about a change in the workers' demands asking 
in more general terms for better workers' rights.  
 
However, with the electoral victory of the Muslim Brotherhood and the 2013 
military takeover, it was evident that the grassroots proto-movements and the 
mobilised workers did not retain any benefits from the uprisings. Initially grievances 
were transferred to a focused opposition to the neo-liberal policies of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Later on, the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions 
(EFITU), especially at the national level, was clearly weakened by the 2013 military 
coup and it is currently under strict state control, despite an attempt of renewed 
mobilisation in December 2015 and the high number of strikes registered in the first 
six months of 2016. 
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Chapter 6  
Grassroots’ Mobilisation in the MENA Region: A Comparative 
Perspective 
It is very controversial to assess to what extent the Egyptian 2011 uprisings and the 
2013 military coup have influenced the social movements taking place in other 
countries of the Middle East or, in more general terms, if they have been inspired by 
other social movements grown elsewhere in Europe before and after the 2008 
economic crisis. Were there links between the demonstrators in Tahrir Square and 
the anti-austerity and Occupy movements in Europe? Was there a transnational 
collaboration between the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Syria, Libya and other 
countries? Is it possible that the 2013 military takeover in Egypt strengthened the al-
Assad regime in Syria? Are there sufficient connections between left-wing trade 
unionists in North Africa and Europe, anarchist and post-communist activists all over 
the world? 
 
As a matter of fact, the 2011 uprisings in the Middle East will be remembered not 
only as an “Islamic Awakening” but as well as a renaissance of left-wing activism, 
from the formation of the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU) 
in 2011 to the Nobel Peace Prize obtained by the UGTT in Tunisia in 2015, from the 
entrance in the Turkish Parliament of the pro-Kurdish and leftist party HDP in 2015 to 
the strenuous fight against the jihadists of the Islamic State (ISIS) undertaken by the 
Kurds of the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria463.  
 
However, as Laura Galián has argued, these social movements did not “have a stable 
structure of international connections”464. In other words, even if between 2011 and 
2016, a growing number of personal contacts between different individual activists or 
groups has been put in place all over the world, “those transnational connections are 
                                                             
463 Acconcia, G. 'Sinistra, movimenti e guerre in Medio Oriente', Euronomade, 2015. 
Available at http://www.euronomade.info/?p=5896. Last time accessed on 1 October2016. 
464 Galián, L. 'New Modes of Collective Actions: The Reemergence of Anarchism in Egypt'. In 
Gerges, F. A., Contentious Politics in the Middle East Popular Resistance and Marginalized 
Activism beyond the Arab Uprisings, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 365. 
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mainly to show solidarity with comrades abroad who suffer from repression or to 
make statements regarding the situation of other struggles”465.  
 
Thus, even if the purported presence of Gene Sharp’s books in Tahrir Square and his 
ideas of non-violent resistance have been widely publicised, as much as the latest 
generation techniques of cyber-activism, started by Wael Ghonim, as well as the 
alleged tactics of non-violence assimilated by some of the Egyptian political activists 
studying in workshops about the techniques used during the mobilisation against the 
Milosevic regime in the former Yugoslavia, in 2011 many Middle Eastern activists 
appeared to have very poor connections with anti-regime/anti-systemic movements 
in other countries, despite the regime’s allegations of an “insurgency” led by 
foreigners.  
 
This is especially true if we look at the Egyptian social movements. As we have seen 
in Chapter 3, the Egyptian leftist groups had been marginalised by the authoritarian 
and military regime of Hosni Mubarak and Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. As a consequence of 
their fragmentation, lack of organisation and leadership, they have been less focused 
on building-up transnational alliances, strongly prevented in doing so by the ruling 
elite, even in comparison to other social movements in the region.   
 
However, if we look at the micro-dynamics of the 2011 uprisings in the MENA 
countries, we will find many commonalities between the patterns of mobilisation and 
demobilisation in the region. In this chapter I will compare the Egyptian case with 
other social movements that took place within urban settings in the MENA region 
between 2011 and 2016. I will especially focus on the workings and attempts of 
institutionalisation of the Popular Committees and Women Committees (Mala Gel 
and Mala Jin)466 in the Kobane Canton in reference to the third of the focus groups 
carried out in this urban district during my period of stay in Syria in the spring of 
2015. 
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I will compare the levels of initial political participation of the components of the 
Popular Committees in Syria and Egypt, the way in which they perceived insecurity 
and the need for stability, the reasons that triggered their mobilisation and 
demobilisation, the attempts to institutionalise the precarious structures of the 
Committees, and the parallel evolution into armed paramilitary groups in the context 
of war.  
 
I decided to focus on the Syrian Popular Committees because, as showed by Gelvin 
and anticipated in Chapter 3, formation of such grassroots mass movements 
emerged467 in this country already between 1918 and 1920. Local Committees were 
already a modern pattern of political mobilisation and an example of the attempts of 
a process of institutionalisation of non-state elites468.  
 
King Faisal governed Syria for two years, after World War I, between the end of the 
Ottoman Empire and the beginning of the French mandate469. In a more politicised 
public space, an autonomous civil society pushing for the accountability of the state 
institutions was emerging. In this context of economic, administrative and urban 
transformation, new relations of power were about to surface. In other words, the 
domain of formal politics expanded when the state and the market were providing 
new functions. At that stage, the Popular Committees began to be involved in a 
diverse number of modern and alternative activities, partially alien to the state 
apparatus. Local representatives were chosen through district elections470. Moreover, 
the Popular Committees recruited their own militias. In every urban neighbourhood, 
they began to hold meetings to coordinate the various militia’s branches which filled 
the vacuum due the lack of governmental control.  
 
A century ago, the Popular Committees in Syria were proposing new power 
relationships: firstly, they affirmed the prerogatives of their elected members 
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through open elections; secondly, they asked for the accountability of the urban 
notables controlling their resources and functions; finally, they wanted to 
institutionalise the electoral procedures on a national base, forming a “supervisory 
committee” to oversee the citizens of every neighbourhood. In this period, and as it 
happened in some parts of the country between 2011 and 2013, an increased 
number of ordinary citizens began to contest a growing number of public issues471. In 
this regard, Gelvin472 argued that the Popular Committees “institutionalised and 
broadened horizontal and associational ties”473: they defined a new framework for 
social and political legitimacy, filling “the void that neither the government” or the 
“national organisations were structurally or ideologically capable of filling”474.  
 
As already mentioned in Chapter 3, Popular Committees are “self-defence groups 
heterogeneous in their tactics, organisation, and efficacy, but a critical response to 
the security vacuum”475. In this chapter I argue that the Northern Syrian Popular 
Committees, as happened in Egypt, challenged the traditional patterns of state 
control over civil society building up, as partially happened in Libya as well, a new 
political and paramilitary structure of power.  
 
I decided to focus on the Northern Syria Popular Committees, instead of Tunisia or 
Palestine, where the relevance of trade unions is historically central, as I will later 
discuss, because in this area the grassroots' mobilisations, organised in local 
committees, appeared to be as relevant as in Egypt from an early stage.  
 
As Salwa Ismail explains476, subaltern actors in Egypt and Syria shaped differently 
their evolution in relation to their attitude towards the state. Compared to Egypt, in 
Syria, the regime' strategies of control, or divide and rule, over the grassroots 
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mobilisations, manipulated subaltern forces. In other words, this process 
contributed to fragment the oppositionists, turning groups against each other. 
 
However, it is not the aim of this chapter to discuss about the dynamics of the 
Syrian civil war but to disentangle the evolution of Popular Committees in a 
comparative perspective. In 2011, as el-Meehy states, the Popular Committees in 
Syria can be defined as “horizontal forms of committee-centered grassroots 
activism”477, also known as tanseeayat, or “ad hoc local coordination 
committees”478. Among the activities of the Syrian local committees in an initial 
stage of mobilisation: “they extended support for families of prisoners, provided 
emergency relief to internally displaced persons, and committed local armed 
groups to sign up to an ethical code of conduct for observing human rights”479.  
 
According to el-Meehy, the first local committees were founded in Aleppo and al-
Zabadani. However, they quickly spread all over the country and, “by 2016, the 
number of active councils had fallen sharply to around 395”480 with the majority 
located in Northern Syria. 
 
The initial demonstrations and riots in Northern Syria between 2011 and 2012 
sparked the formation of new means of popular mobilisation, and triggered the mass 
participation in alternative networks that aimed at recruiting ordinary citizens to 
provide social services, security and self-defence. Later on, in the context of war in 
Northern Syria between 2013 and 2016, with the further emergence of a very diverse 
range of jihadist groups, including ISIS, the participants within those Popular 
Committees felt the need to be involved in direct action, including the armed 
struggle, in order to protect their neighborhoods and substitute the constant absence 
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of security personnel and therefore defend their properties from the attacks from a 
wide range of both oppositional groups and regime supporters.  
 
Thus, in Syria those social movements evolved into paramilitary organisations, that 
were very different compared to the Egyptian case study where, in a context of 
diminishing mobilisation, they became closer to Private Voluntary Organisations than 
to revolutionary groups, as previously argued. At that stage, in Northern Syria the 
Committees were pivotal in forming armed entities, such as the People’s Protection 
Units and Women’s Protection Units (YPG-YPJ) [Yekîneyên Parastina Gel-Yekîneyên 
Parastina Jin] , that began to provide systems of patrols to guarantee local and 
external security, building up an embryonic autonomous government.  
 
It might be argued that this same kind of evolution could have been experienced by 
the Egyptian participants in the local committees if those participants in the 2011 
uprisings would have been more closely involved in an armed insurgency or a civil 
war. This briefly happened during the 2013 military coup when the supporters of the 
Muslim Brotherhood defended the headquarters of their political party and their 
NGOs from the attacks of the police and ordinary citizens. However, in Egypt the 
armed forces quickly gained control of state institutions, laying out their own 
roadmap to power, by claiming the need to bring back security and “stability”. 
 
6.1 The Kobane Canton 
I decided to focus on the urban district of Kobane and its surroundings due to the 
sufficient level of security present after ISIS withdrew in January 2015, the proximity 
to the Turkish border of this relatively accessible region, compared to other parts of 
Syria, and the high levels of politicisation and mobilisation among the Syrian Kurds.  
 
Figure V shows Northern Syria and the Efrin, Kobane and Jazira Cantons (Rojava). 
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Figure V: Northern Syria and the Kobane Canton 
 
 
With the end of French colonisation, the Syrian Kurds in the three provinces of Jazira, 
Efrin and Kobane, were excluded both from Northern Turkish Kurdistan and isolated 
by the neighbours’ growing Arab nationalism481. Later, as a consequence of the 
Hasaka Census (1962), thousands of Syrian Kurds were left without citizenship and 
excluded from the labour market. At that stage, the major local pro-Kurdish left-
communalist parties were founded along with 32 other smaller leftist political 
groups.  
 
Those activists mobilised very little support until the aid given by the United States to 
the Iraqi Kurdish fighters (peshmerga), between 2003 and 2005. With the 2012-2013 
uprisings, the Syrian Kurds joined the opposition to the al-Assad regime within the 
framework of the Damascus Declaration, issued in October 2005. However, with the 
2011-2012 uprisings in Syria, the PYD did not join the Kurdish coalition (KNC) nor the 
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Arab opposition groups, but began to put in practice Abdullah Öcalan’s theories482 of 
democratic autonomy, forging self-defence groups and organising an armed wing: 
the YPG/YPJ.  
 
Compared to mid-20th century approaches to guerrilla war (e.g. Mao, Guevara), the 
Kurdish communalist provided a non-violent critique to hierarchical and capitalist 
societies. As Bookchin explains483 in order to define his notion of “libertarian 
municipalism”, 
Communalism seeks to recapture the meaning of politics in its broadest, 
most emancipatory sense, indeed, to fulfill the historic potential of the 
municipality as the developmental arena of mind and discourse. It 
conceptualizes the municipality, potentially at least, as a transformative 
development beyond organic evolution into the domain of social evolution. 
The city is the domain where the archaic blood-tie that was once limited to 
the unification of families and tribes, to the exclusion of outsiders, was—
juridically, at least—dissolved. It became the domain where hierarchies 
based on parochial and sociobiological attributes of 26 kinship, gender, and 
age could be eliminated and replaced by a free society based on a shared 
common humanity.  
 
In Northern Syria popular assemblies have been organised; local councils have been 
formed in respect to ethnic and gender differences, in cooperation with the Kurdistan 
Workers’ Party (PKK)484. The PYD has always fought in Syria and not in other adjacent 
countries and its autonomous struggle has been characterised by being neither 
supporting al-Assad nor the rebel opposition, but taking a pragmatic and situational 
position, depending on what would best benefit their cause485. On the one hand, the 
Arab moderate oppositional groups have appeared to be hostile to the Syrian Kurds’ 
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demands. They often accused the PYD of being in agreement with al-Assad against 
the Free Syrian Army (FSA). On the other hand, the PYD accused all the anti-Assad 
militias of working in coordination with the Turkish army. It is not the aim of this 
dissertation to discuss the geopolitical alliances in the region. However, it is relevant 
to add here that, despite the 2014 worsening crisis with ISIS conquering the Northern 
Syrian region and Iraq, on the one hand, the Turkish government has been accused 
by the YPG/YPJ of delivering weapons and fighters to ISIS through the Syrian border, 
while never supporting the PYD due its link with the PKK, on the other hand, the 
Syrian Kurdish fighters have been criticised by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 
in Iraq and some human rights organisations (e.g. Amnesty International) as utopian 
and exclusionary486. However, the YPG/YPJ gained some support from the US 
coalition against ISIS, due to its effective combat performance487.  
 
Still, few academic studies have focused on the development of the Popular 
Committees in the on-going civil war in Northern Syria. In so doing, I shall try to add a 
better understanding of the development of grassroots’ mobilisations in an urban 
district, considering them, as I have done in Chapter 4 with the Egyptian case study, 
as long-term phenomena of political mobilisation. 
 
In this specific focus group 12 young Syrian Kurds who joined the YPG/YPJ and two 
Unit commanders have been involved. Diane and Rangin were the gatekeepers 
interviewed in order to select the YPG/YPJ fighters involved in this focus group. Firstly, 
we met the YPG Commander Diane at the Tall Abyad front line in June 2015, a few 
days before the liberation of the town from ISIS supporters. Diane spent his youth in 
Lebanon in contact with Abdullah Öcalan when he fled to Syria (1980-1998). He had 
been a YPG Commander during the battle in 2014 for the liberation of Kobane. Later, 
we met the YPJ Commander Rangin at the YPJ’s headquarters in Kobane a few days 
after the liberation of Tall Abyad in June 2015. Rangin joined the YPJ in 2013, she was 
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previously a journalist and part of the management of a local institution supporting 
women rights. 
 
In a preliminary stage, Diane and Rangin were part of the process for the composition 
and organisation of this specific focus group. The aim was to choose male and female 
members of YPG/YPJ with or without a previous involvement in the Popular 
Committees in order to analyse the evolution of these local social movements before 
and after the ISIS occupation of Kobane (2014), the reasons and degrees of 
mobilisation and demobilisation within the social movements in the context of peace 
and cooperation with other oppositional groups, the levels of political participation, 
the personal accounts by the focus groups participants of ISIS invasion of Northern 
Syria in 2014, the relations between male and female members of the groups, and 
the evolution of civilian movements into a paramilitary and then a full-fledged armed 
force. At the end of the two meetings we held a debriefing session with the 
gatekeepers in order to talk about the group dynamics and the results from these 
sessions.  
 
Maslum, 22 years old, injured five times in the battles with the ISIS, was unemployed 
in Lebanon and joined YPG as a heremi (local self-defence citizen) in 2013, while his 
parents fled to Turkey. Agid, 18 years old, the eldest son of a farmers’ family, worked 
as a carpenter in Istanbul before joining the YPG. Chakdar, was from Kobane and 23 
years old. His parents were farmers, while he ran an electronics shop before joining 
the YPG. Chaidar, 21 years old from Tall Abyad, joined the YPG two years previously. 
His parents were unemployed living in Kobane. He worked in a mobile phone shop 
and one of his brothers had been killed by ISIS. Biriar, 19 years old, joined the PYD's 
youth group before entering the YPG. His mother was working in a centre supporting 
the relatives of people killed by the ISIS. Zenar, 19 years old, was a tailor, and joined 
the YPG six months before. Massum, 29 years old, a former construction worker, 
joined the YPG two years before. Rashuan, 31 years old, a house painter, joined the 
YPG one year previously. Filos, 29 years old, from Kobane had a brother who owned a 
minimarket, and he was one of seven brothers and sisters, three of whom were 
working abroad. He was a welder before joining the YPG. Nurshin, 18 years old, from 
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Kobane, was a student before joining the YPJ three months previously. Cicak, 25 
years old, was a student, her parents were farmers. Polda, 19 years old from Kobane, 
was fighting with the YPG for one year. 
 
The focus group was conducted in two long distinct sessions at the Tall Abyad front 
line and the YPJ’s headquarters in Kobane in June 2015. Table XIII shows the 
composition of the third focus group with 14 participants of a YPG/YPJ Unit in 
Northern Syria.  
 
Table XIII: Focus Group 3: Kobane Canton, YPG/YPJ  
Focus group participants: 14 
 
Two YPG/YPJ Unit commanders. Nine 
young men (18-31 years old), joined the 
YPG, some previously involved in the 
grassroots’ activities with the PYD. Three 
young women (18-25 years old), joined 
the YPJ, some previously involved in the 
grassroots’ activities of the PYD. 
 
From the very beginning, I found a promising level of interest among these activist 
male and female YPG/YPJ fighters. However, a number of problematic issues had to 
be tackled at a later stage (for example in terms of access to the field during the 
periods of armed combat, timing related to the daily shifts of the soldiers, presence of 
mines, aggressive methods of the Turkish authorities refusing to give official 
permissions to go to Syria, etc.). We met YPG/YPJ fighters in their camp at the Tall 
Abyad front line and the Kobane headquarters in June 2015 before and after the long 
struggle for the liberation of Tall Abyad from ISIS. If in a first stage, the access to 
fighters both male and female had been constantly mediated by the unit commanders 
who convinced them to be fully involved in the research, despite the ongoing daily 
fight against ISIS, the interviewees were later independently involved in the focus 
group.  
 
At the beginning of this research, the interviewees did not express any security 
concerns in reference to their participation in the focus group. Even in a later stage 
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and after the liberation of Tall Abyad, the interviewees did not express any personal 
concern or fears or mistrust.  
 
6.2 Hierarchy and Organisation 
In this section I will describe the evolution of the Popular Committees in Northern 
Syria and the workings of a YPG/YPJ unit in Kobane in reference to the interviews 
from our third focus group. I will further highlight to what extent, in the context of 
war, voluntary networks of self-defence groups, forged in an increasing environment 
of political participation, evolved into a more structured military force, to confront to 
the growing emergence of jihadist fighters.  
 
This process entails a stronger level of hierarchical organisation and the 
institutionalisation of daily practices both at the military and civilian levels that will 
probably never be needed in a less chaotic context. Those soldiers were working both 
to manage and defend Kobane and its surroundings sometimes with similar tasks or 
overlapping duties with the security and political apparatus. Commander Diane 
confirmed this when he defined his unit as “soldiers for the government of Kobane 
and the protection of the border”488.  
 
This determined the need for a very structured division of duties and a continuous 
mobilisation of the local Popular Committees that are still working simultaneously as 
service providers and self-defence groups. For instance, we met groups of armed and 
unarmed men and women, at the crossroads of small alleys, helping ordinary citizens 
to reach their homes during the night due to the almost complete lack of electricity. 
These are Heremi: non-professional volunteers in plain clothes, involved in Popular 
Committees, protecting their villages, towns or neighborhoods. The YPG/YPJ are male 
and female professional fighters, in military uniforms engaged in armed attacks to 
protect the borders. Asayş is the internal security or police, comprised of both men 
and women, in military uniforms, different from the YPG/YPJ. “First of all there are 
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the local self-defence units (heremi), then professional fighters and finally the 
resistance units. Often men leave the self-defence units to join the YPG/YPJ”489. 
 
As it happens for many female fighters, Commander Rangin was not involved in the 
Popular Committees or within the internal police units (Asayş) before joining the YPJ. 
“I joined the YPJ initially at a professional level. Many others began as heremi”490. “I 
did not work within the Popular Committees before joining the YPG/YPJ”491. “I was 
not a heremi before joining the YPJ”492.  
 
The actual experiences within this group of the other fighters are different, as 
confirmed by our interviewees. On the one hand, other participants in this focus 
group never reached a professional status and they are still form part of this unit as 
local self-defence volunteers493. On the other hand, some of them were heremi 
before joining the YPG/YPJ494. “Not all of us will be YPJ for all their lives. I began as a 
person of my neighborhood defending and controlling our area (heremi)”495.  
 
On the other hand, Commander Diane was involved in the Popular Committees 
before joining the YPG. “I have been working for Rojava (South Kurdistan) before 
joining the YPG one year ago. I was a heremi”496. Diane defined himself as a 
revolutionary. “I am ready to fight everywhere, I am a man of the revolution”497. Due 
to his long training with the PKK’s commanders in Lebanon he defended the Kurdish’s 
People Party and its principles. “The PKK fought for land and freedom. They fight for 
the concept of freedom and the human being”498. 
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As for the composition and age of this YPG/YPJ unit’s members, it is mixed as their 
ethnic backgrounds499. Those soldiers are very young, both men and women, and 
unmarried. After joining the YPG/YPJ they cannot marry each other. This is not the 
case at the heremi level. “There are both Kurds and Arabs. We fight together (men 
and women). Everything happens in friendship but the soldiers cannot marry”500. “As 
for women fighters, to be part of the YPJ is more important than a marriage. However, 
the local components (heremi), as non-professional self-defence groups, are often 
married people”501. 
 
Especially within the female units, the evolution of those self-defence groups did not 
lead necessarily to the formation of a conventional army. “We are like every other 
army; we depend on the ideology of Abdullah Öcalan. But we are not only an army. 
We are a defensive army”502.  
 
6.2.1 Women as Fighters 
The female fighters (YPJ) appeared to be very well trained by their supervisors, as 
confirmed by Commander Rangin. “The more educated women often enter directly 
as professional combatants. In meetings we spend time discussing and self-criticising. 
In order to fight, women must know why and for what to fight. For this reason we 
begin with ideological and academic preparation, because every YPJ fighter must 
know her own self”503. However, according to this YPJ’s Unit Commander, there are 
more men than women working as local volunteers (heremi). “There are more men 
than women in the first level of engagement. Women usually join at a professional 
level”504.   
 
                                                             
499 In October 2015 the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have been founded. This is a multi-
ethnic and multi-religious alliance including Kurds, Arabs, Assyrian, Armenian, Turkmen, 
Circassian fighters.  
500 Case 3, Interviewee 1. 
501 Case 3, Interviewee 2. 
502 Case 3, Interviewee 2. 
503 Case 3, Interviewee 2. 
504 Case 3, Interviewee 2. 
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Thus, there is a very noticeable women’s participation, compared to Popular 
Committees in other MENA countries, both within self-defence groups and resistance 
units. They are all imbued by feminism and highly politicised505.  
As Commander Rangin explained: 
We stand for feminism. We depend on ourselves and benefit from the 
experience of everyone. Women at home protect the essentialness of 
women. Our fight is as women (no matter if Kurdish, Syrian or European) and 
for a nationality that identifies with democratic autonomy and is opposed to 
the concept of State. During the fighting for Shingal, for example, women 
went to save other women. At Til Temir, YPJ fighters went to save Arab 
women. We went to save dozens of women captives in villages occupied by 
ISIS506. 
 
Equality between men and women fighters is an essential part of the political 
formation of those fighters, as much as their sexual awareness. “Love is essential, it is 
part of everyone’s instinct. The philosophy of death is a way of living. In past times, 
everyone knew death could come quickly; now it is different and this disconnects us 
from nature and does not allow us to accept the idea of death. Religion exploits 
death: if you are a martyr you go to heaven. For us love and death are in 
contradiction”507. This discourse is closely related to a military and communitarian 
lifestyle. “When we discuss this, it is to search for a new military, communitarian and 
quotidian life. Women are not made to only have children. We want to reform and 
renew the community. Thus, we also talk a lot about sexuality”508. 
 
According to Rangin, this approach does not result in conflicts with the hierarchy, 
with male commanders. “Some men do not accept that their commanders may be a 
                                                             
505 Knapp, M., Flach, A., Ayboga, K. Revolution in Rojava. Democratic Autonomy and 
Women’s Liberation in Syrian Kurdistan, London, Pluto Press, 2016. 
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508 Acconcia, G. 'La coalizione internazionale è contro l’Isis solo a parole', Il Manifesto, 2015. 
Available at http://ilmanifesto.info/la-coalizione-internazionale-e-contro-lisis-solo-a-parole/ 
Last time accessed on 3 October 2016. 
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woman. If in this context the women are soldiers, it is not in vain. We have to fight 
against the concept that many male comrades have of women. When we talked 
about this with a YPG soldier, it often happened that he changed his mind and 
understood that the men’s units exist because the YPJ exists and not vice versa”509.  
 
As confirmed by our interviewees, the main difference between men and women 
fighters, as YPG/YPJ soldiers, is that the former appeared to be more educated with 
some of them having completed secondary schools or wanting to study at the 
university once finishing with the YPJ510. The YPJ’s headquarters in Kobane were very 
well organised and clean, compared to the male units. Some of these women fighters 
were previously married and later decided to join YPJ. “Sometimes we are forced to 
refuse the request to join the female fighters’ unit because some women wanted to 
leave their children alone to be part of our group”511. “Within the local Women 
Houses (Mala Jin), there are crèches and other facilities for the children of the 
fighters”512. “Many couples, both men and women, are fighting in their respective 
units while there are families in which men are ordinary workers and women are 
fighters”513. Moreover, women wearing a scarf are accepted too. “If she (a potential 
YPJ fighter) is convinced to wear it we do not complain. Many YPJ fighters wear the 
scarf. In the Commanders’ Council there are women wearing the hijab”514.  
 
Thus, women are a key for understanding the peculiar system of both political 
management and security defence in Kobane. As Commander Rangin highlighted: 
The YPJ is not a military auxiliary. Many of our female fighters have been 
blown skywards by mines; they are commanders (the majority of them) of 
male units. There is plenty of autonomy regarding this. We have mixed 
battalions; in almost all battalions there are co-commanders. In every army, 
men attack without considering the values of this community, with women 
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as fighters they give up doing so. For instance, if Kurdish fighters do not 
commit ethnic cleansing after the capture of a city, it is mainly because our 
influence stops errors from being committed515. 
 
6.3 From Popular Committees to Fighting Units 
In this section I will describe the developments within the organisation of the initial 
mobilised self-defence groups in Northern Syria between 2011 and 2016. In other 
words, I will further disentangle the process of mobilisation of the local Popular 
Committees’ participants who often began as volunteer self-defence civilians, later on 
transforming themselves into YPG/YPJ’s Unit professional fighters in Kobane, which 
forms part of the discussion in the interviews in our third focus group. 
 
Kobane has lived in a context of constantly high mobilisation of ordinary people 
between 2011 and 2016. However, a standardised system of recruitment and career 
paths both within Popular Committees and YPG/YPJ units has not been established. A 
standard period of compulsory training is usually needed. “The system is not 
stabilised yet. There are many exceptions, especially in periods of general 
mobilisations. However, when local men or women become heremi they usually need 
at least three months to decide if they want to continue both as self-defence 
volunteers or professional fighters”516. “We do not sign any contract to be part of the 
YPG/YPJ”517. 
 
It is still problematic to state exactly at what stage of the Syrian civil war these groups 
changed their nature and transformed themselves from non-violent defenders to 
armed defensive units. “At the beginning of the uprisings we did not carry weapons. 
We depended only on the support of the ordinary people, not on weapons”518.  
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This commonly happened when the Syrian regime withdrew from the Northern 
regions between 2012 and 2013. In this period, YPG/YPJ commanders officially 
announced their armed struggle. As Commander Rangin recalled:  
After the liberation of Northern Syria by the Syrian regime we took many 
weapons. Everything changed. At the end of 2012, we announced the 
beginning of our armed struggle. Later on, in the Jazira and Kobane 
provinces, we seized weapons. Only recently (2014), we received a number 
of Kalashnikovs from abroad, while some foreigners joined our units519. 
 
In the initial engagement for local volunteers in self-defence groups, the concept of 
legitimate defence was very important. “If someone attacks you, you have to attack 
him or her for legitimate defence, positive or active defence. If the attacks intensify, 
we intensify the attacks too. The target is to protect ourselves before the enemy 
attacks us”520.  
 
This seems to be not only a military aim but a political one too for those YPG/YPJ 
members. For example, as I witnessed, when those soldiers liberated Tall Abyad from 
ISIS (2015) they lifted the flag of their army as a symbol of both political and military 
power in the Kobane Canton. “Sometimes we attack militarily but we resist politically. 
The political and military defence are overlapping”521.  
 
6.3.1 Mobilisation and Strategy 
The majority of the interviewees were politically or emotionally involved in the Syrian 
civil war before joining YPG/YPJ. It seems that if, at an initial stage, they joined local 
Committees only with the aim to protect their homes from a lack of security, but with 
the emergence of ISIS’s fighters and their permanent occupation of Kobane, they 
became highly motivated to be part of the armed struggle. 
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Some of them had a relative killed by ISIS and this motivated him or her to join the 
armed struggle522. “I was a member of the Democratic youth of PYD before joining 
YPG. My mother is working for a local institute supporting martyrs’ families”523. “One 
of my brothers is a martyr”524. “My cousin has been killed by ISIS”525. “I came from 
Lebanon to Syria when I knew about the ISIS’s attacks”526. “I was working for the PYD 
before joining the YPG”527.  
 
The main reason to be part of the fight against the jihadists appeared to be with the 
aim to protect their land from ISIS. “ISIS is our biggest problem”528. “We fight to 
protect our land”529. “We fight against ISIS, to free our land and for our rights”530. 
“This does not mean to fight only for the Kurds but for the freedom of everybody”531. 
“I fight because I want my family back. They escaped to Turkey after the ISIS’s 
attacks”532. However, this has nothing to do with religious motivations. “They [ISIS] do 
things in the name of Islam, but this is not right. No religion says to shoot another 
man”533. “They are not humans, they are monsters. They do not represent Islam”534. 
The al-Assad regime did not have a better reputation among those YPG/YPJ’s soldiers, 
however they were more careful in their judgments. “He was controlling us”535. 
 
As for the female fighters, they seemed to have as their first objective the defence of 
their own people and of women in more general terms. “We fight to protect our 
people”536. “I fight for the Kurdish people and the martyrs”537. Many of those YPJ 
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fighters considered ISIS and Turkey as allies. “The jihadists are monsters and Turkey 
had much responsibility for helping them”538. “ISIS is the first enemy of women”539. 
“In Shingal, the jihadists were so aggressive against women, it is our duty to fight 
them”540. As Polda, a YPJ soldier, added, “after three months of training, I can fight 
everywhere in the region (Rojava). I am fighting for the freedom of my land”541. 
 
Many of those fighters felt abandoned by the so-called foreign allies. For instance, the 
commander of this YPG’s unit did not consider as effective the support given at that 
stage by the airstrikes of the US-led coalition. As Commander Diane stated: “If the 
coalition would like to bomb a cigarette they do. But if we ask to bomb an ISIS target 
often they do not listen to our requests”542. However, at the lower level, the 
interviewees considered the US strikes as helpful while highlighting that the real 
enemies were the Turks. “They [US-led coalition] are helping us”543. “Our [Kurds’] 
biggest enemies are the Turks”544. “Turkey supports ISIS, they opened the borders to 
let ISIS fighters escape when we attacked them”545. “The US coalition is helping but 
they could do much more”546. 
 
As for the use of weapons, according to Commander Diane, at the moment of 
conducting the focus group, there was a daily need to use weapons against ISIS’s 
fighters by his unit’s components. “They [ISIS] attack everyday even if they do not 
have great experience and are gradually losing their military capacity”547. However, 
the YPG soldiers’ engagement did not end with the liberation of Kobane from ISIS 
(2015). “During and after the liberation of Kobane, we had to free and control the 
town house by house, road by road. The jihadists were always 10 metres from us. 
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Now we are involved in the liberation of other parts of the Canton in order to connect 
it with Jazira province”548.  
 
Finally, some of those fighters appeared to be willing to continue as civilians, and 
others as combatants, once the situation has been stabilised. “I will be a combatant 
after the war too. I will work for my town and my country”549. “I joined YPJ but this 
will not continue until the end of my life, as I am not a professional soldier”550. All of 
them will pursue the defence of their political behavior as imbued by Öcalan’s books 
and experiences. “Only Öcalan’s philosophy brought us to this level. He gave us the 
opportunity to know who we are. He made us understand our culture”551. “Öcalan’s 
theory is for all nationalities”552.  
 
Thus, it is still unclear whether, in a more stabilised environment, those fighters will 
go back to their civilian activities, will contribute to institutionalise a permanent 
armed wing of the PYD or will be integrated as the army and security personnel of a 
potentially autonomous state. 
 
6.4 A Comparative Perspective with the Egyptian Popular Committees 
In this section I will compare the workings and evolution of Popular Committees in 
the Cairo urban district of Sayeda Zeinab with the grassroots’ mobilisation in the 
Northern Syrian’s town of Kobane between 2011 and 2016. On the one hand, the 
study of the micro-dynamics of mobilisation and demobilisation in the Cairo urban 
space during the Egyptian 2011 uprisings and the 2013 military coup has been key in 
order to better understand the process of control over the mass movement 
perpetrated by the state. On the other hand, such micro-dynamics in Northern Syria 
allowed a better understanding of the evolution of the grassroots’ mobilisation in a 
context of armed struggle and with a notable emergence of groups of jihadist 
fighters.   
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In comparison to other scholars, who examined one or the other, I have examined 
the Popular Committees in local urban neighbourhoods, both in Egypt and Northern 
Syria. If in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood monopolised the space of dissent at the 
micro level, the pro-Kurdish left-communalists (PYD) and the PKK followers did the 
same in Northern Syria. However, if the Popular Committees in Egypt evolved into 
social non-movements and were permanently demobilised, due to a diminishing level 
of popular participation and a strong state crackdown on dissent, the same did not 
happen in Syria. In this country, both the retraction of the state’s institutions and the 
emergence of armed Islamists, motivated the local Committees to evolve into a more 
structured and professional level of mobilisation and thus forging the YPG/YPJ 
defensive army. 
 
Popular Committees in Egypt and Northern Syria challenged the traditional patterns 
of state control over civil society. They have been a modern, self-organised and 
experimental system of grassroots participation. In the long term, in Egypt they have 
been easily integrated within the Muslim Brotherhood charities and NGOs, gradually 
losing their initial potential of political empowerment, or building-up initial forms of 
cross-class and ideologically mixed coalitions. However, in Northern Syria, they have 
been integrated into the power structure of PYD, forging, since 2012, a new military 
wing engaged in an armed struggle both against the regime and the jihadist fighters, 
finally serving as political and military providers in order to defend their territory and 
to guarantee internal security.  
 
In both cases, Popular Committees have been a spontaneous response to the 
absence of police. In Cairo, they gradually evolved into checkpoints and service 
providers in a first attempt to secure all the intersections between the main roads 
and internal alleyways, using informal methods of resistance and networks of trust. In 
Kobane, they quickly evolved into the military wing of the PYD, with a training period 
for the first level of participation, a hierarchy and a noticeable engagement of 
women. The female fighters appeared to be a key element of this defensive army in 
front line battles, internal security, and they were essential for a better integration 
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between men and women fighters, to control ethnic divisions and provide sexual 
equality. Moreover, if in Egypt, petty criminals often exploited the workings of local 
committees, infiltrating those groups and generating a sense of insecurity, in 
Northern Syria, the YPG/YPJ became a professional highly motivated army, in the 
context of war, monopolising the vacuum left by the collapse of the al-Assad regime.  
  
During the demobilisation process and the electoral campaigns, on the one hand, the 
Popular Committees in Egypt began to work as a constituency to forge new political 
parties or as NGOs active in different fields. On the other hand, the YPG/YPJ are still 
fighting for the complete liberation of Northern Syria from ISIS (2016). Thus, the local 
Popular Committees are still working in parallel with the military units. Some of the 
fighters appeared to be willing to go back to their civilian volunteer activities, after 
years of armed struggle. The availability of weapons, seized from the regime or 
provided from abroad, utterly changed the nature of these groups, motivating many 
young people to join this army directly at a professional level.  
 
In Egypt the evolution of the Popular Committees into more participatory and 
legalised structures has been prevented by the military junta. The army and the 
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi presidency after the 2013 military coup banned the Popular 
Committees, perceived as a potentially dangerous space for building-up a renewed 
grassroots’ mobilisation. However, in Northern Syria, with a complete lack of state 
institutions, these groups located their major threat as the Turkish state, whilst 
adopting a more nuanced approach towards the support strategically provided in 
some circumstances by the US-led international coalition. The movement became to 
play the part of a sovereign actor. 
 
Table XIV shows in a comparative perspective the evolution of Popular Committees in 




Table XIV: The Evolution of Popular Committees in Egypt and Northern Syria 
Case Studies Popular Committees 
Egypt  
(Sayeda Zeinab) 
In Egypt, Popular Committees are a long-term 
phenomenon which was a spontaneous response 
to the absence of the police. They challenged the 
traditional patterns of state control over civil 
society. They gradually evolved into checkpoints 
and service providers. They began to work as a 
constituency to forge new political parties or as 
NGOs active in different fields. The Muslim 
Brotherhood monopolised the space of dissent at 
the micro level, while Popular Committees evolved 
into social non-movements and were permanently 
demobilised. In Egypt the evolution of the Popular 
Committees into more participatory and legalised 
structures has been prevented by the military 
junta. 
Northern Syria  
(Kobane) 
In Northern Syria, Popular Committees are a 
spontaneous response to the absence of the state. 
The PYD and PKK’s followers, monopolised these 
groups. Both the retraction of the state’s 
institutions and the emergence of armed Islamists, 
motivated the local Committees to evolve into a 
more structured and professional level of 
mobilisation, forging the YPG/YPJ defensive army, 
with a training period for initial recruits, a 
hierarchy and a noticeable  engagement of 
women. The availability of weapons seized from 
the regime or provided from abroad greatly 
changed the nature of these groups. With the 
complete lack of state institutions, these groups 
perceived the Turkish engagement in the region as 
detrimental for their survival but displayed a more 
nuanced approach towards the support 




Left-wing activism has been boosted by the 2011 uprisings in the MENA region. If we 
look from a bottom-up perspective at the uprisings, although the ongoing social 
movements did not have strong international connections both within the region and 
worldwide, there are many commonalities between the patterns of mobilisation and 
demobilisation within mobilised groups between these countries. This is especially 
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true if we look in a comparative perspective to the grassroots’ mobilisation in Egypt 
and Northern Syria. 
 
In this chapter I tried to compare the workings of the Egyptian Popular Committees in 
the Cairo urban neighbourhood of Sayeda Zeinab with the local mobilisations in the 
Kobane Canton (Rojava) leading to the formation of the People and Women’s 
Protection Units (YPG/YPJ) in reference to the interviews carried out for my third 
focus group in this urban district in 2015.  
 
I decided to focus on the Syrian Popular Committees because both in Egypt and 
Northern Syria the initial grassroots mobilisation challenged the traditional patterns 
of state control over civil society. Later on, in the context of war in Northern Syria, 
the participants within those Popular Committees felt the need to be engaged in an 
armed struggle in order to protect their neighborhoods and fight against the growing 
emergence of jihadist fighters.  
 
Thus, in Syria the social proto-movements evolved into paramilitary organisations. In 
other words, they were paramount in forming armed entities, such as the YPG-YPJ. 
This clearly surfaced when the Syrian regime withdrew from the Northern regions of 
the country in 2012 and those units’ commanders officially announced their armed 
struggle. 
 
This process determined a stronger level of hierarchical organisation and the still 
ongoing institutionalisation of daily practices both at the military and civilian levels 
with very nioticeable women’s participation, both within self-defence groups and the 
resistance units. If in a preliminary stage, the interviewees joined local Committees 
with the primary aim to protect their homes due to a lack of security, later on they 
became highly motivated to be part of the armed struggle, especially with the 
emergence of ISIS fighters and their permanent occupation of Kobane. 
 
Examining the Popular Committees as a long-term and politicised phenomenon, at 
the urban level in Egypt and Northern Syria, allowed us to better understand the 
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process of control over the mass uprisings sparked in response to state repression of 
peaceful protest by these emergent grassroots’ organisations, as well as 
understanding the second phase of the growth of hierarchical structures in response 




Grassroots' Mobilisations in the MENA region: Tunisia and Turkey 
In this chapter I will analyse the other practices in the aftermath of the 2011 
uprisings in the MENA region with reference to social movements and political 
parties that grew after the upheaval. I will further assess whether it is reasonable to 
argue that workers' movements succeeded in Tunisia while they failed in Egypt. I will 
also assess whether the People's Democratic Party (HDP) in Turkey was the most 
successful example of an effective left-wing party possessing a structured 
organisation strengthened by the popular mobilisations.  
 
I will argue that despite greater autonomy towards the state institutions compared 
to the Egyptian Trade Unions Federation (ETUF) the aforementioned non-state 
actors had a varied but at times important impact, certainly in Tunisia and less so in 
Turkey. 
 
7.1 The UGTT in Tunisia 
In this section I will describe the evolution of the Tunisian labour unions and their 
response to workers’ mobilisations. It will be argued that, compared to Egypt the 
UGTT has always had an autonomous space for mobilisation both during the regime 
of Ben Ali and in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings. The eventual success of the 
Tunisian National Dialogue Quartet553 and the agreement between trade unionists 
and Islamists have been the most important achievements of the Tunisian uprisings 
leaving both groups a certain space for manoeuvre after the end of Ben Ali's regime. 
 
7.1.1 From the CGTT to the UGTT 
In 1925, the CGTT, Confederation Générale Tunisienne du Travail (al-Jami'a al-
'amma al-tunisiyya lil-shughl), was dissolved by the French authorities after strikes 
and workers' mobilisations554.  
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However, the nationalist New Liberal Constitutional Party (Neo-Destour) sought to 
rebuild a national labour federation. In 1944, the UGTT, Union Général Tunisienne 
du Travail (al-Ittihad al-'amm al-tunisi lil-shughl) was formed as the “largest civic 
organisation” with a national base in Tunisia mobilising thousands of workers555. 
This renewed trade unionism was built on the southern axis of Gafsa-Sfax and 
Kerkennah. In other words, the first workers' mobilisations arose from the historic 
inequalities between interior-southern and coastal regions in Tunisia.  
 
A well-known socialist, Ahmed Ben Saleh, supported by President Habib Bourghiba, 
was the UGTT's leader until independence. Ben Saleh became the new Minister of 
Planning and Finance in 1961, adopting a “peripheral Keynesianism”556 in parallel 
with the reforms carried out in Egypt by Gamal Abdel Nasser. As Beinin argues, at 
this stage, the UGTT resisted wage austerity, retaining “a certain degree of 
autonomy from the state and the ruling party and credibility among its base”557. The 
UGTT was always a “weak link”558 for the Tunisian regime. 
 
When Tunisia abandoned the socialist experiment, Bourghiba continued to support 
a strong presence of the state in the public sector, giving to the UGTT the right to 
negotiate with the national association of employers and the government. The UGTT 
represented “the interests of the working class rather than as a component of a 
nationalist united front”559. This autonomy by state institutions had underpinned 
the UGTT's activities during major strikes throughout the 1970s560. 
 
After having declared Bourghiba as medically incapacitated, Zine El Abine Ben Ali 
succeeded as president in 1987. His economic policy had as its first target the 
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implementation of policies of liberalisation, in a similar manner to what was 
happening in Egypt, such as the Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment 
Program (ERSAP), and cuts to public expenditures, in order to be eligible for IMF 
loans and in line with the Washington Consensus.  
 
At that stage, Islamists had begun to work in the Tunisian trade unions. For this 
reason, the UGTT started to be considered as a reliable partner for the regime with 
the aim, on the one hand, to control the local Islamists (Ennahda) and, on the other 
hand, to control the spread of strikes561. Nevertheless, the traditional autonomy of 
the UGTT from the state was kept intact. As Beinin argues, “despite the UGTT 
leadership's demonstrations of 'national responsibility', it never succeeded in 
completely eliminating the politics and culture of class struggle”562.  
 
Thus, the UGTT slowed down Ben Ali's privatisation process of the public sector. 
However, Tunisia witnessed very high levels of poverty and unemployment on the 
eve of the 2011 mobilisations. In the previous decades the Ben Ali government often 
manipulated the unemployment rates among the young cohorts563, artificially 
reducing the officially reported levels of poverty so the full extent of this problem 
was hidden from the public.  
 
In the 2000s, multifaceted social movements in opposition to Ben Ali's presidency 
grew. The Left was well represented within the unions of primary and secondary 
school teachers, health, postal, and telecommunication workers, air and railway 
transport workers, and phosphate miners.  
 
In 2004, the regional unions of Sfax, Kairoun, Mahdia and Jendouba rejected the 
candidature of Ben Ali for a fourth term. However, on the one hand, the national 
leaders of the UGTT did not look for a confrontation with Ben Ali's regime. On the 
other hand, between 1996 and 2007, the number of strikes and labour mobilisations 
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increased, especially in the manufacturing sector. Table XV shows the number of 
strikes in Tunisia between 1996 and 2007: 
 
Table XV: Number of Strikes in Tunisia between 1996 and 2007 













Source: Beinin, Workers and Thieves, 2015564. 
 
7.1.2 The UGTT and the 2011 Uprisings in Tunisia 
Yousfi argues that during the 2011 uprisings in Tunisia the UGTT represented the 
“heart of the coordination between the diverse actors of the protests: lawyers, 
oppositionists, and the youth”565. 
 
The ruling elite tolerated a space of “debate, disagreement and militancy”566 within 
the UGTT. This is the major difference if we compare the Tunisian labour unions 
with the ETUF in Egypt. The Egyptian state unions were under complete government 
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control during the Mubarak presidency while independent unions grew in peripheral 
areas (See Chapter 4). Moreover, compared to Egypt, the UGTT did organise in the 
private sector567. In other words, the UGTT can be defined as a “complex 
organisation”, an umbrella of “sector-based mobilisations”568. 
 
The impoverishment of the internal and southern regions brought about new waves 
of labour mobilisation. One of the most important was the 2008 “rebellion” in the 
Gafsa phosphate mining basin: a series of riots carried out by teenagers and young 
men “against poverty and unemployment intensified by the local implementation of 
neoliberal structural adjustment in the phosphate industry, […] and a rebellion 
against the local face of autocracy and corruption”569. The local political parties and 
independent leftwing activists gave some support as well to the Gafsa workers.  
 
In other words, the failure of the strategic plans and privatisations, and increasing 
unemployment were among the most important factors that caused the 2011 
uprising in Tunisia. This had happened because, in the 2000s, even the UGTT 
generally accepted the government policies concerning labour flexibility and 
privatisations570.  
 
In its history, the UGTT has always suffered due a contradiction between the 
expectations for more participation of the working class and the acceptance of 
governmental labour policies. In other words, while the Tunisian production system 
increasingly overlapped with the interests of the state institutions571, many UGTT’s 
members were asking for a more democratic debate within the trade union 
federation, but with little success. 
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Daily demonstrations took place in December 2010 in the town of Sidi Bouzid after 
the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi, a street vendor who died in hospital on 
January 5 2011. “No to misery, no to unemployment!” and “Work, Freedom and 
Social Justice” were among the slogans of the opposition572. Moreover, the police 
violently dispersed several lawyers' sit-ins in Tunis. Just as in Egypt (see Chapter 2), 
in Tunisia the end to police brutality was a key demand of the demonstrators. 
 
The mobilisations increasingly involved the towns of the center-west and lawyers all 
over the country. They obtained the support of the UGTT local branches as well, 
despite their shrinking autonomy from the state during the last years of Ben Ali's 
presidency573. As Hamzaoui argues, never were the state and the trade unions more 
interlinked in Tunisia as in the 1990s and 2000s574. 
 
Assessing the role of the national trade union confederation in the mobilisation of 
these crucial demonstrations is rather difficult. According to Hamzaoui, the UGTT's 
support for the demonstrations was the “most important factor for the success of 
the movement”575, while Gobe argues for a more nuanced appraisal:  the UGTT 
leaders at the national level swung between a “crony compromise” with the regime 
and support for the social movements576.  
 
As a matter of fact, the UGTT allowed for the politicisation of street slogans and the 
geographical extension of the social movements in Tunisia. Three UGTT members 
took part in the interim government of Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi. On 
February 11 2011, left-wing parties, NGOs, and Ennahda, with the support from the 
UGTT and the Bar Association formed the National Council to Protect the 
Revolution577. 
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In the aftermath of the uprisings, the UGTT initiated internal reform578. Leftists, not 
revolutionaries, became a significant presence in the UGTT albeit with the clear 
marginalisation of women. Meanwhile Moncef Marzouki, leader of the moderate 
leftist group Congress for the Republic, became the interim president.  
 
As Beinin argues, “the polarisation of the Tunisian politics between Islamists and 
secularists compelled much of the radical left to unite”579. However, neither the 
UGTT nor Ennahda fully accepted their reciprocal legitimacy. For example, the 
Islamists stigmatised the UGTT collaboration with the Ben Ali government in the 
previous years.  
 
Meanwhile, the number of strikes in Tunisia between 2010 and 2012 increased from 
420 to 524 per year580. The UGTT announced general strikes in Kasserine, Gafsa, Sidi 
Bouzid, and Sfax to challenge the Islamists who were increasingly taking control of 
the Parliament and the Constituent Assembly.  
 
With the example of growing repression in Egypt, in Tunisia Ennahda sought to avoid 
the fate of the Muslim Brotherhood and asked to join the National Salvation Front to 
help conclude the process of writing the Constitution. As a consequence of this 
decision to compromise, falling back on its long term tradition of accommodation 
with state power, the UGTT abandoned street protests for a more moderate 
position of negotiation with the authorities.  
 
The catalyst role of police violence in the activities of the Left during the Tunisian 
2011 uprisings is epitomised by the murder of the political activist, Chokri Belaid. 
Seddik argues for the involvement of the police, or rogue elements of the police in 
his murder. “Several autonomous groups within the security apparatus were 
growing in the aftermath of the uprisings”581. The murder of Chokri Belaid was 
considered as an attack on the Tunisian Left as a whole and, to a certain extent, a 
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method to stymie more radical demands posed to the government. “All the Tunisian 
leftists have been symbolically targeted with his murder. This was an evident threat 
to all the more radical oppositionists in order to ask them to withdraw their 
revolutionary demands”582. The Tunisian Left modulated its demands in light of this 
threat. 
 
Despite a context of political violence, on January 26, 2014 the Tunisian constitution 
guaranteeing equality between men and women was approved. Moreover, workers 
and the Left established a significant presence in the Tunisian Parliament. According 
to Yousfi, the UGTT had been vital for the success of the process of national 
dialogue583 in the aftermath of the uprisings. The UGTT mediation between the 
different social actors participating in the revolts and within the Quartet, gave the 
Tunisian trade unions a strong national legitimacy. This national dialogue allowed a 
quicker resolution to the internal conflicts between the different forces of the 
opposition, to conclude the process of the drafting of the Constitution, and to 
establish procedures for future national elections.  
 
Thus, the UGTT became “a symbolic refuge of the political and organisational 
spontaneous movements”584. However, in the transitional period towards a more 
democratic political civil society, the UGTT did not bring about a more equal 
redistribution of wealth or help lower unemployment rates585. Thus in the aftermath 
of the events the UGTT is still very divided between those who want a negotiation 
with the government and the European Union for better labour conditions and 
those who stand for a more radical change to prevailing neo-liberal political policies 
within the Tunisian labour market.  







7.2 The HDP in Turkey 
Despite the ongoing repression carried out by the Turkish authorities, in this section 
I will argue that the People's Democratic Party (HDP), in the aftermath of the Gezi 
Park movement (2013), has been one of the more successful example of a left-wing 
oriented group, which had participated in recent grassroots' protests in the MENA 
region. Thus with important electoral victories after its entrance, for the first time in 
Turkish history, it entered the Parliament (2015), albeit the authoritarian turn of the 
Turkish government has severely threatened this breakthrough. It is not the aim of 
this dissertation to discuss the Gezi Park movement, but I will disentangle the 
circumstances which led to the transformation of this social proto-movement into a 
political party. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, this did not happen in Egypt where 
the proto-movements never evolved into stable political parties. 
 
The repression of the PKK intensified with the military coup in Turkey in 1980. 
Among those who left the country after the coup, was the leader of the party, 
Abdullah Öcalan. He left Turkey in 1980 and then found refuge in Lebanon and Iraq. 
The Syrian Kurds gave him protection until 1998. However, the PKK fighters who 
decided to stay in the southern regions of Turkey were harshly repressed. Thus, the 
attempts to forge a united front of Kurdish resistance forces provoked a severe 
response from the Turkish military.  
 
The first attempts to begin a national dialogue between the Turkish authorities and 
the PKK took place in 1993. However, it did not last long. The attacks against the 
Turkish army led by one of the leaders of the party, Shamedin Sakik, in Bingol, 
brought about 33 deaths, and undermined the peace process. At this stage, the 
armed struggle restarted and the Turkish state responded with repressive measures.  
 
In 1998, Öcalan was obliged to leave Syria by the then President Hafez al-Assad and 
he was captured in Kenya and imprisoned by the Turks in 1999. Since then, Öcalan 
has sent messages encouraging the peace process with the Turkish authorities. In 
the same year, 500 PKK fighters were killed by Turkish soldiers while they were 
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leaving the country, despite being allowed to do so by the decision taken during 
political dialogue with the Turkish authorities aimed at implementing the peace 
process.  
 
Despite a context of political violence, since 2003, the pro-Kurdish Left 
communalists (HDP) grew in Turkey as a democratic alternative to support both the 
demands of the minorities and the working class. However, the entire credibility of 
the peace process was undermined between 2007 and 2008, with Turkish military 
attacks on the PKK headquarters in the Turkish, Iranian and Iraqi mountains. 
However, in 2013, in a letter on the occasion of Newrooz (the Kurdish New Year), 
Öcalan encouraged the end of the armed struggle again. Ten conditions for the 
peace process were announced in 2015 at the Dolmabahçe Palace in Istanbul by the 
HDP's MP, Sirri Surreya Önder.  
 
After taking part in urban mobilisations in 2013, at the June 2015 elections, the HDP 
garnered 13% of the votes, obtaining the possibility to enter the Turkish Parliament: 
the HDP won 80 MPs for the first time in its political history, receiving more than 
90% of the votes in some provinces controlled by its local political affiliate, the 
Peace and Democracy Party (Bdp). However, before the elections, the Turkish 
President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the Turkish government decided to put an end 
to the peace process due the increasing presence of the HDP in the Parliament. The 
HDP leadership tried to steer clear of the PKK in order to not give Erdogan an excuse 
to crack down on them. 
 
As the HDP's MP, Ziya Pir explaines, in an interview carried out for this dissertation:  
The HDP had no organic links with the PKK. However, their electoral 
constituencies are overlapping. AKP politicians know this well. Thus they 
orchestrated dozen of provocations against the HDP headquarters during 
the months preceding the elections. But we never reacted for a specific 
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reason: if the PKK fights, the HDP loses its votes. Thus, our decision has 
always been to resist any provocation586.   
 
Although the entrance of the HDP in the Turkish Parliament was reaffirmed in the 
elections that took place on November 1 2015, in this case, the AKP obtained 40% of 
the votes, allowing the Islamists to form a stronger government and promote 
constitutional reforms pressing for more presidential powers. In parallel, several 
large terrorist attacks hit the country at Suruç (at the border with Syrian Kurdistan), 
Ankara and Istanbul, while more recently the Turkish army has launched daily 
attacks on the PKK headquarters and southern towns controlled by the pro-Kurdish 
Left communalists, with the aim of preventing territorial and personal contacts with 
the Syrian Kurdish guerrillas (See Chapter 6). 
 
As Zubaida noted in an interview for this dissertation, “the Turkish authorities 
attacked the PKK to motivate the Turkish nationalists to support them”587. After the 
July 15 2016 failed military coup, the immunity of the HDP's MPs was revoked, while 
the national leaders of the party, Salahettin Demirtaș and Figen Yuksekdag, were 
arrested, together with the mayors of many southern municipalities controlled by 
the BDP.  
 
According to the HDP political leaders, the Turkish authorities are engaged in 
fighting against Kurdish rights, female equality and democratic freedoms. As 
Yuksekdag argues in another interview held for this dissertation,  
The ban on the immunity for our MPs had the aim to undermine female 
political participation. However, all the attempts to put under state control 
the HDP will fail in the long term. We will continue fighting with the same 
tenacity of the Rojava's women fighters who combat against ISIS. We want 
to overturn gender inequalities in Turkey. In doing so, we want to fight 
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against any kind of political barbarism. For this reason, Erdogan and the 
AKP will never forgive us588. 
 
To conclude, due to the electoral victories, the HDP in Turkey is a good example of 
left-wing political party that enhanced its popular support after the recent 
mobilisations. However, as a consequence of the strong and ongoing political 
repression carried out by the Turkish authorities, it still has a very limited political 
impact on Turkish law making or the formation of public policy. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I analysed the mobilisations of diverse non-state actors in the MENA 
region in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings. If in Chapter 6, the evolution of 
Popular Committees from self-defence groups to armed entities has been discussed 
in reference to the case of Northern Syrian, in this chapter, the examples of the 
Tunisian trade unions (UGTT) and the People's Democratic Party (HDP) in Turkey 
have been discussed in order to show how in other contexts the initial mobilisations 
determined or enhanced the formation of more structured left-wing opposition 
both as trade unions and political parties.  
 
Compared to the ETUF in Egypt, the UGTT in Tunisia gained a certain autonomy from 
the state. Moreover, the Tunisian trade unions were organised in the private sector: 
this never happened in Egypt. Thus, on the occasion of the 2011 uprisings, the UGTT 
has been crucial for the mobilisation and expansion of a successful movement and 
was vital for the formation of a broad coalition that had as its first aim a 
comprehensive democratic transition. This probably happened in Tunisia, because 
both socialists and Islamists feared that an Egyptian road to repression after the al-
Sisi's takeover in 2013 could completely undermine their aspirations for political 
participation if it was taken in Tunisia. Though the UGTT remained an active and 
legal player in national politics, it did little to advance the distribution of wealth or 
the realisation of more acceptable terms and conditions for the working class.  
                                                             




The political path of the HDP in Turkey is a good example of a recent regional left-
wing social movement that succeeded in converting itself into a party contesting 
parliamentary elections. In this instance grassroots’ mobilisations had time to 
organise and structure their opposition to the traditional party political system and 
evolve into an effective political party with a significant constituency, albeit with 
limited national political impact. This happened despite the ongoing intense 




In this dissertation, I applied theories relating to SMs and NSMs to the MENA region 
in order to study the so-called “Arab Spring”. I focused on the Egyptian case trying to 
go beyond Tahrir Square and describe the political and organisational micro-
dynamics of the upheaval both in urban and peripheral areas.  
 
As I will further assess, there have been main results of this research: to acknowledge 
the reasons that determined the impossibility to forge cross-ideological coalitions 
between Socialists and Islamists in the aftermath of the upheaval; to compare Egypt 
and Syria in terms of grassroots' mobilisations; to analyse the 2011 uprisings as a 
“Leftwing Awakening” instead of an “Islamic Awakening”, as they have been often 
portrayed.  
 
The Egyptian case 
The protests that took place in the public space in this country were not an exception 
but part of a longstanding and already normalised struggle against state repression 
perpetrated for decades in this authoritarian regime. In particular, alternative forms 
of contentious actions, emerged as a number of fragile and diverse social 
movements, were able to mobilise a growing number of activists and ordinary 
citizens.   
 
According to Bayat, who especially focused his studies on the Iranian Revolution 
(1979), the notion of non-movements refers to “collective actions of non-collective 
actors”589. Those networks materialise in public space where the subaltern urban 
classes share their discontent collectively and try to defend their small gains.  
 
As Abdelrahman argued, “the pro-democracy movement in Egypt had evolved into a 
network of networks”590. However, in the Introduction, I tried to challenge partially 
this approach arguing that all those new networks among subalterns had little to do 
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with democracy. The main target of those activists and ordinary citizens was to 
defeat the violent practices of the local police. In Egypt the aggressive attitudes of 
the security apparatus emanates from the police station and become an “instrument 
of punishment and deterrence”591.  
 
During the 2011 uprisings, many other political oppositionists were protesting for 
better life conditions and more justice within their workplace. Only a very limited 
number of young people had as their slogan the need for a democratic transition. 
However, even among them, there was a great confusion as to what this meant and 
which parameters it had to entail to an extent that, at the end of the day, the Muslim 
Brotherhood leaders paradoxically appeared to be the most democratic among the 
non-democrats.  
 
Before the end of the occupation of Tahrir Square, the protests in the “Egyptian 
Street” elaborated new forms of organisation, outside the formal political parties. 
The opposition to the Mubarak regime already determined certain levels of cross-
political and cross-class cooperation. Thus, January 25 2011, one of the biggest 
demonstration in the history of the country, was evidence of a great opportunity for 
these activists to build-up a more concrete platform of contentious politics.  
 
Thus, in this dissertation I have argued that, in the Egyptian case, the encounter in 
the public space, during the initial mass mobilisation and afterword, both in urban 
and peripheral areas, between a more organised political group (the Muslim 
Brotherhood) with less structured activists (marginalised citizens, workers and anti-
police protesters) disrupted the agency and demands of the social actors in the 
streets. 
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Methodology and Chapter Outline 
In this research, I studied the patterns of mobilisation and demobilisation at the 
micro level during the 2011 uprisings by applying the literature concerning Social 
Movements and New Social Movements (Abdelrahman, Alexander, Bayat, della 
Porta, Gelvin, Owen, Tripp, Hanieh) to the Egyptian case. In other words, I tried to 
disentangle how the recent demonstrations in Egypt led to a transition that 
transformed the country from an authoritarian to a military regime. 
 
This dissertation has been comprised of 58 interviews: 28 semi-structured interviews 
with intellectuals and activists engaged in the study of the MENA region or active in 
the protests; and participatory research divided in three focus groups, conducted in 
Sayeda Zeinab (Cairo), Mahalla al-Kubra (Nile Delta) and Kobane (Northern Syria), 
involving 30 interviewees.  
 
The empirical research involved Egyptian activists (e.g. the Revolutionary Socialists, 
the Socialist Alliance, and the Young Islamists), intellectuals and economists (e.g. 
professors, writers, and bloggers), stakeholders and trade unionists, workers and 
ordinary citizens, army and police officers, YPG/YPJ commanders and fighters in 
Syrian Kurdistan. Table XVI shows the number of interviewees per relevant entity.  
 
Table XVI: Number of Interviewees  
Semi-structured interviews 28 
Participatory research 30 
Total 58 
 
The access to the fieldwork has been very problematic especially as a consequence 
of the increasing repressive measures taken after the 2013 military coup in Egypt 
and the spread of jihadist groups in Syria in recent years. At the beginning of this 
research, the interviewees did not express any security concerns in reference to 
their participation in the focus groups. However, after the 2014 presidential 
elections in Egypt, the local trade unionists, involved in the second focus group 
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conducted in Mahalla al-Kubra, appeared to be more concerned about voicing their 
opinions and then some of the workers asked to be mentioned only with their first 
names in order to be less noticeable.  
 
The first aim of this dissertation has been to limit the definition of the mobilisation 
from a common understanding of an ongoing revolutionary process and a 
subsequent initialised democratic transition to uprisings with little hope to 
succeed, and subsequently completely demobilised by a military takeover, as 
discussed in the Introduction. 
 
In Chapter 2, I presented a literature review of Social Movement Theories (SMT), 
New Social Movements (NSM) and alternative networks and I applied it to the 2011 
uprisings and the 2013 military coup in Egypt. In Chapter 3, I disentangled the 
patterns of political participation within the social movements, the repression of 
the military apparatus, applying the notion of class to the Egyptian case study. 
 
On the one hand, the Popular Committees, as discussed in Chapter 4, were the 
most important movement mobilised within the public space able to attract both 
left-wing and Islamists sympathisers. They had been tolerated by the Mubarak 
regime giving them the opportunity to be one of the most interesting entities to 
fight against the ordinary repression of the state both in a chaotic and more 
stabilised political environment. 
 
On the other hand, workers’ movements, as discussed in Chapter 5, for a decade, 
have constantly been the protagonists of anti-regime collective actions in the 
workplace. In 2011, the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), led by pro-regime 
figures with the aim to “regiment the working class”592 appeared too compromised 
in order to represent genuinely workers’ rights, leaving space for new forms of 
labour organisation. The protests spread even to companies owned by the military 
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apparatus, involving both blue and white collar workers593, and led to the 
formation of strike committees which later evolved into independent trade unions: 
perhaps the most important achievement of the 2011 uprisings in Egypt. 
 
In Chapters 6 and 7, I provided a comparative perspective for the study of Popular 
Committees and grassroots mobilisations in the Middle East with reference to the 
Kurdish mobilisation in Northern Syria and Turkey, the UGTT in Tunisia.  
 
The Utopia to Forge a Cross-Ideological Coalition 
As anticipated in Chapter 2, in this section I will try to summarise the reasons why 
the different strands of the Egyptian opposition were not able to form a political 
coalition after the end of the occupation of Tahrir Square.  
 
In this dissertation, I applied to the Egyptian case the patterns of inter-
organisational cooperation among social movements’ organisations, advanced by 
della Porta and Diani594. The categories of factionalism, neutrality, competitive 
cooperation and noncompetitive cooperation helped us to define the nature of the 
relations among the different strands of the Egyptian opposition throughout the 
different stages of the 2011 uprisings.  
 
The agreement to form inclusive, sustainable and effective coalitions, partially 
existing during the rule of Mubarak, appeared to be irrelevant in a context of 
enhanced political freedoms. As Abdelrahman explained, “the nature of coalitions 
forged under Mubarak […] was of little value for the formation of a sustainable 
revolutionary coalition after the uprisings”595. 
 
The cross-ideological cooperation of the 1990s between Socialists and Islamists, 
especially successful within student movements and often forged in prison, was no 
longer fashionable. It seemed that this cooperation was tactical, short-term, only 
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forced by the weakness of each distinct group of activists: “they could not 
independently to each other counter the repression of the regime”596. From the 
1970s the Left started to be manipulated by Sadat, as happened with the Muslim 
Brotherhood on the Right, and was marginalised. Before the uprisings, as many 
components of the Kifaya group argued, the Left was losing its constituency. In 
other words, it was absent from the “Egyptian Street”. 
 
On the other hand, the “middle generation” of the Muslim Brotherhood appeared 
to have a more pragmatic approach. Despite the rooted prejudice of many leftists 
towards the Islamists, many new leaders of the movement liked to be portrayed as 
authentic democrats, with democracy not sharia as their priority597, and willing to 
forge new alliances especially with the leftists598. 
 
However, to find the ground for structured cooperation has been very problematic. 
As Abdelrahman argued, “managing cooperation in joint action was a very time and 
energy-consuming task for activists”599. If, on the one hand, workers, anti-police 
activists, leftists and marginalised citizens appeared to be willing to be engaged in a 
more confrontational politics towards the regime, on the other hand, the Muslim 
Brotherhood appeared to be constantly negotiating their presence in the “Egyptian 
Street”, their participation in the elections, and their level of contentious actions 
with the military junta. Thus, many leftists have never seen the advantage of 
working with moderate Islamists in the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings600.  
 
In more general terms, it might be argued that a cross-ideological movement did 
not develop in Egypt given almost a century of conflicts between Islamists, 
nationalists and Secular groups. However, despite a mass workers' movement 
challenging the core structures of the Egyptian state, even a potentially more 
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structured and unified cross-class movement, could have ended up with similar 
limited outcomes, as it happenend during the recent upheaveal. 
 
The Army as a Non-Revolutionary Agency 
Between February 2011 and June 2013, the military junta decided to foster the 
Muslim Brotherhood as their “civilian partner”601 to avoid internal and external 
criticism that a direct political takeover would have entailed.  
 
On the other hand, the Muslim Brotherhood made “grave miscalculations”602 
accepting an alliance with the Salafi groups, a “strategic error”603, overestimating 
the popularity of their political neo-liberal vision. In other words, they deepened 
the already existing divisions among the different strands of Egyptian opposition 
groups. Some of the components of the secular opposition tried to be united in the 
National Salvation Front (NSF). However, they appeared to have “nothing in 
common”604 and, in the ballot boxes, they demonstrated to have inconsistent “links 
with the Egyptian masses”605. 
 
As a consequence, the three streams of the Egyptian oppositionists never merged 
into a revolutionary force. In other words, between marginalised citizens, anti-
police protesters and workers, there was not sufficient cooperation or even 
contacts to forge a more comprehensive anti-regime front. “The inability to merge 
the forces engendered by the different struggles under a more broadly-based 
cross-sectorial front remains one of the main stumbling blocks to the emergence of 
a strong revolutionary force”606. 
 
Especially the labour protests, together with the economic demands of the 
disenfranchised, very well summarised by the demands for more “Social Justice”, 
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appeared to be perceived by many activists, with the exception of a few critical 
voices, for example some supporters of the Revolutionary Socialists (RS) and 6 April 
Youth Movement, as completely separate from the larger political struggle. “The 
failure to see labour strikes and citizens’ protests that are in favour of economic 
interests as truly political is a major analytical misjudgment”607. 
 
As a matter of fact, economic and political demands were inseparable. This point 
appeared to be clear to those generals who supported Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s 2013 
military coup and his purported Neo-Nasserist political discourse, imbued with neo-
liberal economy policies, and crony and state capitalism.   
 
Thus, first of all, economic and political demands were considered as distinct 
issues. As Abdelrahman explained, “new social movements are often middle-class 
in character, not necessarily progressive or reactionary”608. Secondly, the rural-
urban divide was very difficult to overcome, as I showed in the case study of 
Mahalla al-Kubra. “Egypt’s rural protests could have been taking place on another 
planet”609. Thirdly, the oppositionists were not structured and organised enough. 
Thus, they were unable to react to a growing state repression of activities in civil 
society. 
 
Moreover, during the 2011 uprisings, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF) did not act as a revolutionary force, as their “forerunners resorted to in 
1952 to reconfigure the regime”610. They briefly sided with the demonstrators 
during the 18 days of occupation of Tahrir Square. As Kandil explained, this 
happened especially because the Ministry of Interior and Mubarak’s cliques were 
increasingly detrimental to the army’s interests. “The menace represented by 
today’s Interior Ministry was further enhanced by the fact that police officers had 
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become too closely wedded to public officials, businessmen and petty criminals to 
go down without stirring intolerable havoc”611.  
 
However, in the aftermath of the uprisings, the military junta did not find any 
reasonable alliance within the secular front for a coherent democratic transition. 
“The absence of a reliable revolutionary vanguard that credibly represents the 
demands of the uprising and is capable of controlling the street has added to 
SCAF’s fear that if the dam of autocracy is broken a sea of angry people will flood 
the country”612.  
 
Thus the military went back to its traditional cooperation with the Ministry of 
Interior and the so-called “Deep State”, trying to delegate the control of the 
security apparatus to a civilian authority, becoming the “avowed leader of the 
counterrevolution”613. Despite limited purges, the police aimed to regain their 
privileges “creating a rift between the people and the army”614. In other words, as 
explained by Kandil, the security apparatus instigated the army to liquidate the 
revolutionary camp, by controlling a political elite reliant on the security apparatus, 
with even harsher methods compared to those of Mubarak’s time.  
 
Popular Committees: a Comparison between Egypt and Syria 
The demise of the regime of Hosni Mubarak and the civil war in Syria enabled many 
Egyptians and Syrians to be involved in “nascent grassroots structures in spaces 
where state institutions no longer functioned”615. For this reason, I focused my 
attention on non-state actors in order to analyse the micro-dynamics of 
mobilisation and demobilisation in the Cairo urban and peripheral spaces between 
the Egyptian 2011 uprisings and the 2013 military coup. In order to add fresh 
insight concerning the development of Popular Committees in local urban 
neighbourhoods, I took a long view of their development and considered a wider 
                                                             
611Kandil, H. Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen, p. 233. 
612Ibid. 
613Kandil, H. Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen, p. 234. 
614Kandil, H. Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen, p. 237. 
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220 
 
gamut of political attitudes and beliefs that participants manifested. I later 
compared the processes of mobilisation and demobilisation of the Egyptian Popular 
Committees in the Cairo urban district of Sayeda Zeinab with the grassroots’ 
mobilisation in the Northern Syrian’s town of Kobane between 2011 and 2016.  
 
As el-Meehy argues, Popular Committees both in Egypt and Syria “represented 
unique developments against the Arab region’s backdrop of long-centralised states 
with hegemonic control over civil society. Their emergence carried implications for 
the de facto exercise of power on the ground, as well as future dynamics between 
localities and the central government”616. And a response to widespread 
liberalisation policies: “as states withdrew from their developmental 
responsibilities, informality grew and the process of socioeconomic expulsion 
increasingly affected the middle classes”617. 
 
Thus, with the emergence of the 2011 uprisings, the Popular Committees in Egypt 
aimed to self-manage their neighborhoods, settle disputes and provide security. In 
Syria as well, local committees were established as “bottom-up institutions aimed 
at stabilising society”: “activists turned their focus to responding to the needs of 
the population in opposition-held areas”618.  
 
In other words, Popular Committees in Egypt and Syria challenged the traditional 
patterns of state control over civil society. The 2011-2013 mass riots were 
paramount in the formation of new means of popular mobilisation, triggered by 
the participation in alternative networks enhancing a diverse range of unmet 
services and motivating ordinary citizens to participate in the electoral process.  
 
Especially, in Syria, the formation of Popular Committees in parallel with a growing 
participation of the masses was not a new phenomenon in the modern history of 






the country but rooted in a trajectory of enhanced engagement of the urban 
notables on providing alternative and horizontal networks of local governance.  
 
Thus, Popular Committees in Egypt and Syria can be considered mainly as a 
“rupture” with the past forms of grassroots' participation, although in many cases 
they acted in continuity with certain forms of local voluntary involvement within 
existing political groups (e.g. Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi controlled 
committees). 
 
Although the Popular Committees were very diverse in nature619, they generally 
worked against the arbitrary methods of the police and as service providers620. 
Later on, the participants within the Popular Committees aspired to have some 
influence on local public officials. Thus, they appeared to be willing to form more 
structured organisations621.  
 
Especially in Syria, while the armed conflict escalated, local councils have assumed 
“coordination of civil defence, education, health, and development projects, in 
addition to the extension of resource-intensive services like water, electricity and 
waste collection. To a lesser extent, they have also been directly involved in 
restoring infrastructure, as well as extending relief to the local communities, which 
are areas where nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and charity organizations 
became dominant players”622.  
 
The Egyptian Popular Committees were a spontaneous response to the absence of 
police. They gradually evolved into organising checkpoints and acting as service 
providers, initially to secure all the intersections between the main roads and 
internal alleyways, by using informal methods of resistance and networks of trust. 
In a later stage, when the state apparatuses went back to their usual functions of 
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service providers, the Egyptian Popular Committees were generally perceived as a 
challenge to the state institutions and were eventually dismantled.  
 
The members of the Syrian local councils often belonged to the local social elites. 
According to el-Meehy, their “selection or election is made by informal so-called 
'lijan al-sharaf' (honor committees) consisting of local notables and dominant 
families”623. Thus, el-Meehy argues that “as a result of their recruitment dynamics, 
bottom-up local governance remained, to a large extent, exclusionary”.  
 
This is not the case of Northern Syria where a more inclusive dynamic has been 
shown by the participants in our focus group. For instance, in the initial stage of 
participation, the involved activists described forms of collective deliberation 
within the local Committees. In the Kobane urban district, liberated from ISIS in 
2015, the oppositional forces evolved into structured and professional fighting 
units (YPG/YPJ), with a training period for new recruits, a hierarchy and a 
noticeable engagement of women. In particular, the female fighters (YPJ) appeared 
to be a key element of this defence force for the provision of internal security, and 
essential for a better integration between men and women fighters, and to limit 
ethnic tensions, as well as to advance sexual equality.  
 
However, here as well it was evident that the Democratic Union Party (PYD) was 
engaged in completely controlling the dynamics of participation and social inclusion 
within the nascent stracture of power. In Northern Syria, the Popular Committees 
have been integrated in the power structure of the PYD, contributing to the 
creation of a new military wing engaged in an armed struggle against the regime 
and the jihadist fighters, and finally serving as political and military providers in 
order to defend the territory and the internal security from attacks by the Islamic 
State (ISIS).  
 




At the moment of writing, some of the fighters appeared to be willing to go back to 
their civilian volunteer activities, after years of armed struggle. The availability of 
weapons, seized from the regime or provided from abroad since 2014, noticeably 
changed the nature of those groups, motivating many young people to join the 
defence force as professional soldiers. Thus, in Northern Syria those social proto-
movements evolved into paramilitary organisations. This process determined a 
stronger level of hierarchical organisation and the still ongoing institutionalisation 
of daily practices both at the military and civilian levels.  
 
Finally, it can be argued that the grassroots' mobilisations in Egypt and Syria shared 
many commonalities. Hitherto, those bottom-ups proto-movements have not been 
studied enough by scholars engaged in researchs focused on the 2011 uprisings. If 
some of them worked on the Popular Committees grown in both countries, still 
very few scholars focused their studies on a comparative perspective. Thus, one of 
the most important results of this dissertation has been to show that those 
horizontal grassroots' mobilisations in Syria and Egypt are very similar. They might 
have represented a long-term challenge to collapsing state institutions if they 
would have been not banned (Egypt) or evolved in an armed struggle (Syria). As I 
have done in this research, if those original experiments are studied in their initial 
stages and in reference to their ability to work for a better local governance, the 
Popular Committees both in Egypt and Syria might be considered as promising 
political laboratories, led by non-state and civil society actors, the most accredited 
forms of political participation that might create structured and modern cross-class 
and cross-ideological coalitions able to better represent genuine but structured 
bottom-up demands in case of future mobilisations in the region.  
 
The “Leftwing Awakening” 
Leftist activists in the MENA region forged or reinvigorated four unprecedented 
workers' proto-movements, established trade unions or political parties as an effect 
of the 2011 uprisings: the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU) 
in Egypt; the Union Général Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) in Tunisia; the People's 
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Democratic Party (HDP) in Turkey; and the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria. 
Thus, in my case studies, I argued that those have been the most relevant outcomes 
of the recent grassroots' mobilisations, despite the prominent mainstream 
relevance given to moderate or radical Islamists groups, proto-movements or 
political parties. 
 
This happened because the 2011 uprisings took place in a context where the 
disenfranchised and the working classes were especially significant and long 
neglected by formal politics. In other words, in 2011, those classes begun to be 
more structured and organised in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and Turkey. However, despite 
their popularity, they often have not been well integrated in the urban proto-
movements (Egypt and Syria) or in traditional parliamentary politics (Turkey and 
Tunisia).  
 
This approach is especially relevant if we compare the mobilisations taking place in 
2011 in the MENA countries to the major recent unrest witnessed worldwide. For 
example, as della Porta argues in her comparison of the 1989 democratic transitions 
in Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the Egyptian and 
Tunisian 2011 uprisings, workers' social movements appeared more developed in 
the MENA countries than in Eastern Europe. Even if in North Africa and the Middle 
East, the political opposition was generally more repressed by the state, there was a 
stronger organisation of the workers compared to Eastern Europe. As della Porta 
states in this instance,  
Social movement organisations as well as protest appear as better 
developed in the MENA region than in Eastern Europe. Even if repression 
was more brutal in the former than in the latter, a longer process of (even if 
interrupted) liberalisation had allowed for the growth of semi-autonomous 
spaces [...] A main difference also emerged in terms of social actors who 
mobilised. In Eastern Europe there was frustration at the declining 
economic performance and unfulfilled promises of economic growth. In the 
MENA region, market liberalisation had been met with intense – and often 
violent – protests. In particular, while in Eastern Europe the coalition was 
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built around human rights organisations that evolved in connection with 
various types of new social movements, in the MENA region (especially in 
Egypt) the unions and professional organisations played a more pivotal role. 
Even though in all cases workers participated in the eventful 
democratisation, their presence took on more organised forms in the 
MENA region624.  
 
As for the Egyptian workers’ proto-movements, I argued that they appeared to be 
too fragmented, leaderless and lacking coherent ideology. However, in comparison 
with the period before the uprisings, the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade 
Unions (EFITU) seemed to tackle the demands for workers' rights with a more 
independent approach from the government’s economic policies. However, the 
trade unions within the EFITU, as way as other independent trade unions 
umbrellas, have never been clearly legalised by the Egyptian authorities. They have 
been often used by the state security agencies to control the mobilised workers. 
 
In Tunisia, the workers' proto-movements succeeded. This happened especially due 
to a more compliant political attitude showed by the UGTT, Union Général 
Tunisienne du Travail. The role of the UGTT might have been one of the most 
important factors that gave the chance in Tunisia for the emergence of a more 
inclusive coalition compared to other countries. Thus, the UGTT represented the 
“heart of the coordination between the diverse actors of the protests”625.  
Compared to the governmental trade unions in Egypt, the UGTT in Tunisia gained 
autonomy from the state. It was vital in mobilising the proto-movements, especially 
in peripheral areas, and essential for the formation of a comprehensive coalition 
that had as its first objective a comprehensive democratic transition. However, at 
the time of writing, even if the UGTT has been more effectively involved in the 
Tunisia transition process towards a more democratic political system, this process 
still failed to advance an effective representation of labour' rights.  
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The political involvement in Turkish party politics and parliament of the HDP is 
another good example of a recent left-wing social movement in the region, which 
grew in the aftermath of popular uprisings (the 2013 Gezi Park movement). Thus, 
the grassroots' mobilisations in Turkey had as one of the most significant outcomes 
the strengthening of the pro-Kurdish Left communalist party (HDP). In other words, 
here, despite state repression, the grassroots' mobilisations had enough time to 
organise and structure their opposition to the traditional party political system and 
channel the grassroots' grievances into an effective political party with a notable 
constituency but a limited political impact.  
 
The same did happen in Northern Syria where the left-wing Democratic Union 
Party (PYD) emerged as the most important political group to lead the transition 
process in this region thanks to the support given by the YPG/YPJ militias. These 
fighting units are evolving into more comprehensive forms of paramilitary groups, 
respectful of gender and ethnic minorities (SDF, the Syrian Democratic Forces). 
“We are fighting and we are dying for the freedom of this land. We will continue to 
resist”. Those are the last words of Viyan Qamishlo, a young YPJ fighter, killed in 
Manbji in September 2016, during the clashes between the Syrian Kurds and ISIS. 
However, at the moment of writing, the revolutionary dream of an autonomous 
Rojava in Northern Syria has again been significantly challenged by the advance of 
the Turkish army, which has militarily occupied Jarablus and temporarally entered 
into Kobane, undermining the territorial continuity of Rojava. 
 
To conclude, in more general terms, in this dissertation, I argued that the 2011 
uprisings in the MENA region showed a certain incompatibility between Political 
Islam and the Left. This happenend at least in three of our case studies: in Egypt 
between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Left, in Turkey and Northern Syria with 
the repression of the HDP, the PKK and the PYD, carried out especially after the 




Six years after the 2011 uprisings in the Middle East, the space for social and 
political changes has narrowed because of strengthened military regimes and 
ongoing civil wars. The electoral victory of President Donald Trump in the United 
States reinvigorated a populist and xenophobic discourse, reproducing the same 
kind of fear and mistrust, justified by anti-terrorism rhetorical policies, witnessed in 
Russia and in other MENA countries. In this context, in Egypt and Syria, Abdel 
Fattah al-Sisi and Bashar al-Assad consolidated their power; while in Turkey, Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan, reduced the space for political dissent.   
 
This dissertation has been especially focused on the Egyptian case. Here “the 
neoliberal order institutionalised under Mubarak has remained untouched in the 
years that have followed his ousting”626. The Egyptian authorities are currently 
engaged in negotiating a new loan with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that 
will determine new privatisations and cuts. After months of talks, on September 9, 
2016, the Egyptian authorities received a first tranche of $1 billion from the total 
$12 billion loan, promised to Cairo by the IMF. The second tranche was provided in 
February 2017. The IMF’s demands concern the privatisation of banks and state-
owned enterprises (including the oil and electricity sectors) for a total of 49% of the 
domestic market (against the 20% promised by Cairo), together with a greater 
degree of flexibility in the market for changes that could result in the devaluation of 
the Egyptian pound (from EGP 8.78 per dollar to EGP 12.90 per dollar)627.  
 
The reforms needed to obtain the IMF loan materialised firstly with the law on 
public sector employment, approved by the Egyptian Parliament on July 26, 2016, 
which also provided for the introduction of a value-added tax (VAT) that should 
result in increased revenues arising from the possible growth in public 
consumption. On August 12, 2016, hundreds of textile company workers, 
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entrepreneurs and operators demonstrated against the government’s fiscal 
policies. According to the participants in the protests, the new measures could 
cause an increase in prices of raw materials, which would lead to the closure of 
many factories in the industry.  
 
In order to suppress these new, limited movements, the Egyptian police returned 
to their customary practices, with reported cases of hundreds of enforced 
disappearances and instances of arbitrary violence. One of the most ignominious 
cases has been the murder and torture of the Italian PhD student, Giulio Regeni, 
who disappeared on the fifth anniversary of the 2011 uprisings, and sparked a 
diplomatic crisis between Egypt and Italy.  
 
Moreover, Mubarak’s supporters and the military cliques regained or consolidated 
their control over Parliament, the Interior Ministry, the security apparatus, pro-
regime trade unions, the state bureaucracy, the media, the judiciary and other 
public institutions. In other words, “finding themselves confronted with an 
unrelenting revolutionary process, those in power, whether they are the military or 
the well-entrenched state bureaucracy, have all worked often in unison, to 
undermine and derail this process”628.  
 
NGOs and Egyptian civil society currently are strictly regulated with the result that 
even the most independent groups are constantly under the surveillance of the 
security apparatuses. Especially, with the opening of Case 173, where three judges 
Hisham Abdul Majid, Ahmad Tawab e Khaled Ghamry have been placed under the  
direct supervision of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, according to local independent 
journalists. In the framework of Case 173, 41 NGOs, among the most prominent 
organisations in Egyptian civil society, have been charged, with lacking an official 
license or receiving foreign funds, including the al-Nadeem Centre, which defends 
the victims of violence and torture, the Arab Network for Human Rights, the 
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Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, and the Nazra Centre for Women and 
Gender Studies. 
 
Previous conflicts between pro-Mubarak and pro-Sisi elites, which is often 
emphasised by mainstream researchers, has been reconciled by Abdel Fattah al-
Sisi. Despite the low popular participation in the elections, the new president now 
has stronger control over military and state institutions even compared to the 
Mubarak, and al-Sisi appears to be less vulnerable to internal conspiracies or 
grassroots’ protests than his predecessors. However, his abilities to rid the country 
of “terrorism”, “eliminate” the Muslim Brotherhood, provide “stability” and 
economic recovery are yet to be proven.  
 
On the one hand, the Muslim Brotherhood appeared to be willing, despite fraught 
discussions between older and younger members within the present-day 
clandestine movement, to forge again an unofficial settlement with the regime for 
its own survival, and thus the continued existence of its charities and the defence 
of its financial interests. On the other hand, younger and older activists from the 
mobilisations of Tahrir Square are now discussing new forms of political action, to a 
certain extent already practiced, but still weak and dispersed, within university 
campuses and factories, against the arbitrary practices of the police or gathering 
around single issues (such as the repression of the independent press or the 
promised transfer of the two islands of Tiran and Sanafir to Saudi Arabia), with the 
aim of finding common ground for future, possibly united and nationwide, waves of 
protests in the name of “Social Justice”.  
 
Questions might be raised in further studies as to whether the collective actions 
that took place in Egypt between 2011 and 2013 changed the nature of the diverse 
opposition groups which demanded greater democratic participation during the 
occupations of Tahrir Square, and thus in the future will allow for more 
coordination among the different strands of the Egyptian proto-movements and 
the formation of more structured cross-ideological and cross-class coalitions. 
Although a possible answer might be that the nature of those groups remained 
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generally unchanged after the uprisings, new mobilisations from below based on 
the spirit of the 2011 revolts might revitalise the working class and youth's 
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Questionnaire for the semi-structured interviews: 
1) To what extent have you been involved during the Tahrir Square protests? 
2) Can you please provide us with a narrative of the events related to the 2011 
uprisings in Egypt? 
3) Which is your opinion on the levels of cooperation and polarisation between 
the different Egyptian oppositionists? 
4) Which were the main targets of the Egyptian oppositions? Have they been 
achieved? 
5) How would you define the reaction of the army to the 2011 protests? 
6) Did you take part in the electoral process and which political party or 
presidential candidate did you support? 
7) What do you believe that were the main aims of the Tamarrod campaign? 
8) Which is your opinion of the Muslim Brotherhood and their policies while in 
power? 
9) Can you assess the effects of the 2013 military takeover and the roadmap 
put in place by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi? 
10) Can you describe the current level of repression and the reaction of the 




Questionnaire for the first focus group (Popular Committees in Sayeda Zeinab): 
1) To what extent have you been involved during the Tahrir Square protests? 
2) Can you please provide us with a narrative of the events related to the 2011 
uprisings in Egypt? 
3) Can you provide us with a definition of Popular Committees? Why did you 
join them and which was your role within those groups? 
4) Which is your opinion on the levels of cooperation and polarisation between 
the different participants within the Committees? 
5) Which were the main targets of the participants within the Committees? 
Have they been achieved? 
6) How would you define the reaction of the army to the 2011 protests in your 
neighborhood? 
7) Did you take part in the electoral process and which political party or 
presidential candidate did you support? 
8) What do you believe that were the main aims of the Tamarrod campaign? 
9) Which is your opinion about the role of the Muslim Brotherhood within the 
Populal Committees? 
10) Can you assess the effects of the 2013 military takeover and the roadmap 
put in place by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the political mobilisation process? 
11) Can you describe the current level of repression and the present engagement 




Questionnaire for the second focus group (Independent Trade Unions in Mahalla 
al-Kubra): 
1) To what extent have you been involved during the Tahrir Square protests? 
2) Can you please provide us with a narrative of the events related to the 2011 
uprisings in Egypt? 
3) Can you explain the level mobilization of the independent trade unions in 
Mahalla al-Kubra before 2011? Why did you join them and which was your 
role within those groups? 
4) Which is your opinion on the levels of cooperation and polarisation between 
the different participants within EFITU? 
5) Which were the main targets of the participants within EFITU? Have they 
been achieved? 
6) How would you define the reaction of the army to the 2011 protests in your 
neighborhood? 
7) Did you take part in the electoral process and which political party or 
presidential candidate did you support? 
8) Which is your opinion about the 2012 Constitutional Referendum? 
9) What do you believe that were the main aims of the Tamarrod campaign?  
10) Which is your opinion about the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 
factories and within EFITU in Mahalla al-Kubra? 
11) Can you assess the effects of the 2013 military takeover and the roadmap 
put in place by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the political mobilisation process? 
12) Can you describe the current level of repression and the present 















Previous Profession, if any: 
 






Political affiliation, if any: 
 
Explain how initially you have been in touch with the organization: 
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Appendix 5 
 
